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Three sets of experiments were designed to test Marcel's
(1983ab) claim that backward pattern masked word primes are
processed automatically and without awareness to a level of
representation where the meaning of the word is identified. In
the first set of experiments, Marcel's critical SOA procedure
for determining an awareness threshold was found to be
unsatisfactory. There was no evidence for semantic priming
effects when more trials were used to determine the critical
SOA. In the second and third sets of exper iments, awareness of
backward pattern masked primes was determined by subject's
report of the prime. Nonconscious priming effects from prior
presentation of the target word in a lexical decision task, and
the solution in an anagram solving task, were substantial and
robust. Nonconscious semantic priming effects were small but
were significant in both tasks when presentation was dichoptic.
Nonconscious semantic priming effects in the anagram solving
task were obtained under some conditions of binocular
presentation. Priming effects are discussed with reference to
word perception, reading, and theories of consciousness. One
conclusion is that nonconscious automatic priming effects are
"selective" and are far from being ubiquitous. This view of
heterogeneous nonconscious selective priming does not support
Marcel's (1983b) claim that nonconscious processing produces
homogeneous activation to the highest level in all
representations connected with the stimulus event•
.
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CHAPTER ONE
1.!.1E!!:§Q!£1!Y!
In a recent critique of cognitive psychology, Dennett (1979) suggests
that consci ousness as a phenomenal e>:perience has been Iargel y ignored
within cognitive theory:
Cognitive psychologists have skirted the domain of
consciousness by so wide a margin that they offer
almost no suggestions about what the 'interface'
between models of cognitive psychology and a theory
of consciousness should be (p.201).
The frequent use of subject report as data in cognitive psychology
indicates an assumption that inner representations equivalent to conscious
experience exist. The role of consciousness in its relation to other aspects
of behaviour should therefore be fundamental to theory. Dennett does not
provide a theory of consciousness to rectify the "inadequacy", but suggests
a broad distinction between those influences of which the individual is not
conscious but which influence his or her behaviour, and those influences of
which the person is conscious. If a computational metaphor is adopted, this
may be characterised as two types of process. First, processes having only
computational access (interacting subroutines operating over different
nonconscious levels). Second, processes amenable to public access
corresponding to the personal access to consciousn ••s (subject to the
capacity limitations imposed on this access). Dennett·s suggestion for a
dissociation between conscious and nonconscious processes has already been
made explicit. The view of Helmholtz (1867), for example, was that
consciousness was the result of "unconscious inferences".
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The psychic activities that lead us to infer that in
front of us at a certain place there is a certain
object of a certain character, are generally not
conscious activities, but unconscious ones. In their
result they are equivalent to a conclusion. (section 26)
Within information processing models many authors also endorse a
functional distinction between conscious and nonconscious processes (Dixon,
1971, 1981; Shallice, 1972; Marcel, 1980, 1983b, Mandler, 1975; Posner and
Snyder, 1975; Marcel and Patterson, 1978; Laberge, 1975; and Schiffrin and
Schneider, 1977). This distinction is exemplified by the empirical evidence
and theoretical position adopted by Marcel (1983a,b) to which particular
attention will be given. Dixon (1971, 1981) and Marcel (1980, 1983b) use
different terms to denote processes which are not conscious. Dixon uses the
term "preconscious", which is misleading for it implies that processing is
prior to awareness, or that such processes give rise to phenomenal
representation. Many of the examples which he cites as evidence for this
processing ng~g!: produce awareness. Marcel's use of the term "unconscious"
may be confused with the previous use of the term by Freud (1927) where it
denotes a different meaning. In this thesis the term "nonconscious" is
preferred as it implies greater inclusion than Dixon's "precon.cious" and
avoids the connotations associated with Marcel's use of "unconsciou ....
"Nonconscious" includes (a) those process.s subserving conscious .xperience
and (b) processes providing high level representations which may affect
behaviour but do not provide phenomenal representation.
The following sections discuss accounts of the functions of
conSCiousness, and review some of the evidence for a di.sociation betw ..n
conscious and nonconscious proces.ing. The argu ••nt is advanced that one way
to identify the function. of con.ciou.n.s. i. to determine the li.it. of
processes involved only in noncon.ciou. "computationAl" ace•••• COIaparison
between whAt happens consciou.ly, but not nonconsciously, .ay reflect some
functions of conscious processes.
- 2 -
!~£~~Q~§~!Q~§~~§§~~Q!1!!~~~1!Q~§
The terms "awareness" and "consciousness" will be used synonymously.
Carr (1979) proposes that consciousness be described as "a changing body of
introspectable mental activity" (p.123). Evidence for consciousness or
awareness is often related to reportability. As Marcel (1983b) saysl
The primary criterion for consciousness is
phenomenal awareness •••Awareness is taken to be
the prerequisite of an ability to acknowledge
or 'comment upon' our percepts, thoughts,
memories, and actions (p.240).
The distinction between conscious and nonconscious processes therefore
is that the former are reportable whereas the latter are not.
The underlying assumption in this thesis is that consciousness has a
function or functions and is not merely epiphenomenal. The view is similar
to Rozin's (1976) who suggests that consciousness, as an emergent quality of
brain, was positively selected. It provided the means for applying existing
mental operations to new stimulus configurations, outside of the ecological
niche that originally provided the basi. for those mental operations.
Individuals possessing this quality could operate more flexibly and survive
under conditions where a more rigid, locally bound system was inadequate.
The opposite view i. that consciousness is entirely epiphenomenal, is
merely a consequence of brain activity, and an unavoidable trait within
evolution. It need not have a function of its own, ind.ed it may only be
something akin to transmi.sion hum, merely a biproduct of the primary
endeavour (fitness). A negative natural .election theory MOuld hold that
consciousness continues to exist bacau •• it bears no negative consequences
for selection and would not be selected against. Con.ciousne •• in this
latter schema bears no evolutionary significance and performs no functional
role. Nothing is explained by con.ciousne.s that cannot be explained by
referring to neural proc ..... (Becht.l and Richardson, 1983). It follows
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that any effort expended on a psychological study of consciousness per se in
an attempt to understand human behaviour could be put to better use.
The reappearance of consciousness in the psychological literature
suggests a return to an investigation of its role in human behaviour. This
is particularly noticeable within information processing models.
!~~~gQn~~1Q~~n!~~in!n!Q[m~~1QnE[Q~!~~1ng~QQ!i~~
A review of information processing approaches to consciousness presents
a fragmented picture, where consciousness is attributed many different
roles. Norman (1981), for example, asserts that it embraces a wide diversity
of topics:
Consciousness (includes) the issues of conscious
and subconscious thought, the problem of awareness,
attention, the control structures of cognition,
the formation of intention (p.279).
One problem with such a broad definition is that it may lead to the
confusing question which Norman later asks: "What - who - experiences the
result of conscious attentional processes?" (p.280). This implies that the
perceiver may be divorced from the processes involved in perception.
According to Allport (1980) and ClaMton (1980), both tautological reasoning
and the unwitting invocation of homunculi are common in atteMpts to
incorporate the concept of consciousness into information processing medels.
Examples of this are given in sa.e of the theories discuss.d below.
Developed theories of consciousne •• are not available although Carr (1979)
suggests three approaches to consciousne.s within information proces.ing
models. One approach has been to adopt a computer program metaphor
(Shallic., 1972). Others 58. consciou.n ..s •• correlatad with Working or
Short-Term memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971; Mandler, 1973). A third view
links consciousness with attention (J~e., 1890, Duncan, 1980). These
approaches which address different a.pects of the role of consciousne.s are
not necessarily antithetical.
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Shallice (1972) adopts a programming metaphor, for the planning or
executive decision making role of consciousness. It is an approach
specifically oriented towards action. Consciousness is thought of as an
internal programming and control process, analogous to the decision programs
in a complex time-sharing system. The function of consciousness is to set
goals for action by prioritizing and executing the complex interaction of
internal and external needs of the individual. Once goals are set by
conscious operations they are effected by "automatic" processes. In the
computer metaphor these are the machine-code subprograms where the output of
operations (i.e., results of computations) are displayed in consciousness.
These machine code subroutines are analogous to Allport's (1979, 1980)
"production systems". Shallice (1972) extends the notion of machine code
subroutines into a behavioural action system. The action system is activated
on a unitary baSis, using input from both sensory and motor sources, but the
decision on which unit to select is the province of consciousness. Once a
subroutine or action system is selected and put into operation it retains
control of behaviour until consciousness transfers control to another
system, or until the goal set by consciousness is accomplished. The notion
of action systems as subroutines fits well with the acquisition of motor
skills (Keele, 1968). A progr.essive acquisition of motor coordination
enables higher levels of units to be compiled into machine code and
relegated to automatic mode, enabling consciousne.s to operata on the next
successively highar level of skill. Eventually the whole activity becomes
one integrated, automatized, action system. Future calls for this system
will require only the command to effect the operation, allowing
consciousne •• to be available for further behavioural integration. In
Shallice's (1972) viewl
The selector input selects which action syst ••
is to be dominant, .et. the goal of the Action
system, and is itself pr.served in ...ory. It
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is suggested that this input corresponds to the
concept of consciousness in the mental state
sense of the word (p.390).
Shallice's model provides a useful perspective, but as he points out, it
gives little help in understanding complex processes in visual perception:
"nor have any aspects of consciousness such as the complexity of conscious
perception been considered" (p.391l.
!~~~6~ggn!£ig~!n~!!~g~~~~g~itb~g(kingg( §bg(t=I~tm~~mgt~~
A second view of consciousness identifies it with Primary Memory (James,
1890) or Short Term Store (STS, Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968, 1971; Erdelyi,
1974; Mandler, 1975). A limited amount of highly activated, easily
accessible information, is held in this store in such a way that it can be
juxtaposed with other items of information in that store. Atkinson and
Shiffrin (1971) exemplify the approach:
In our thinking we tend to equate (the) short
term store with 'consciousness', that is, the
thoughts and information of which we are currently
aware can be considered part of the content of
short term store (p.83).
Consciousness thus provides a sort of mental blackboard (Carr, 1979)
where events in the psychological present can be extended before transfer to
long term memory (lTM). However, Atkinson and Shiffrin imply later that
"consciousness" should also include control processes. "Inforlllationand
retrieval are best described in terms of the flow of information through the
short term store and in the !y~jl~~:!,gn!rg! gf ~bl~f!g~" (p.84, emphasis
added). This view, which produce. a divorce similar to that espoused by
Norman, continues to be reiterated in the literature. Salsa (1979),
describing Atkinson and Shiffrin's MOdel states that •
..Information processing from one store to another
is.largely 'QD~(Q!!!g~~~b! !ytu~~. Information
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briefly held in the sensory register is §S!~Q!g~y
th!~~~j~~tand selected inform.tion is introduced
into the short term store" (p.163, emphasis added).
It is difficult to understand wh.t exactly his concept of "the subject"
relates to within an information processing model. The appearance of "the
subject" outside of the system which is supposed to represent his or her
totality provides no real explanation of processes.
Mandler, (1975) views consciousness as "a state of a structure
.••equivalent to focal attention" (p.238). However the clarity of definition
is lost when he l.ter suggests that:
Practically all novel relations and orderings
require that the events to be ordered must be
simultaneously present in the conscious field •••
consciousness permits the comparison and inspection
of various outcomes so that the choice systems can
operate on these alternatives (p.241).
He emphasizes the important distinction between the contents of
consciousness and the processes within consciousness (the choice systems)
but the final position remains uncle.r. Does consciousness refer only to
phenomenal representation (the blackboard) or does it refer to control
processes, or both? Sperling (1967) was more specific. He identifies
consciousness with the "sc.anner" which controls the sequencing and location
for further information processing. Posner (1978) also links consciousn.ss
with control processes. He suggests that the concapts of attention,
conSCiousness, and the gener.al purpose li.ited capacity central processor
<GPLCCP) all refer to the sallieenti ty. "conscious aw.areness is a direct
event that plays a specific role within the stream of information
processing". This "specific role" relates to control and organisation,
particularly of unfamiliar tasks. Whether the concept of the GPLCCP itself
represents a useful concept is questioned by Allport (1980) and defended by
Hitch (1980).
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The views outlined above which relate consciousness to primary memory~
working memory, or short term store do not provide a coherent description of
the role of consciousness. Most of them encounter difficulty in
distinguishing between phenomenal representations, the processes involved in
computing those representations, and the processes controlling those
representations.
1~~~~~~Qn!~iQ~!ng!~gg~~~gQ~i~Q8!~gQ~iQn
A third approach which relates consciousness to attention~ also lacks
coherence. James (1890) provided the basis for misunderstanding when he
alluded to the close correspondence between consciousness and attention:
We see that the mind is at every stage a theatre
of possibilities. Selective consciousness consists
in the comparison of these •••the selection of some
and the suppression of the rest.
Although there is a tendency to identify consciousness with some aspects
of attention (Dixon, 1971; Posner and Snyder, 1975; Posner, 1978), many
authors avoid a direct statement relating the two. As Allport (1980) points
out, "the word (attention) is still used, by otherwise hard n06ed
information proce6sing psychologists, as a code name for consciousne6s"
(p.113). Consciousness, equated with attention, is a regulatory system which
selects from amongst input provided both by sensory systems and internal
memory retrieval operation. in order to provide a contextually relevant
response. Many theories posit two processesl (a) parallel analytical
processes of relatively unlimited capacity which operate automatically prior
to selection for (b) a limited capacity conscious attentional system. The
locus (or loci; Erdelyi, 1974) for these limited capacity proc..... in
selective attention i. still unresolved (Allport, 1980, Duncan, 1980). An
earl y locus for selection is implied where auto_atic "pre attentive
processes II (Neisser, 1967) select fra. among cOMpeting stimuli solely on the
basis of physical stillUlus para_terse In "Early selection" theories
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conscious attention is a necessary prerequisite for access to the semantic
system. Treisman and Gelade (1980), for example, suggest that analytical
processes operate in parallel up to feature level. Conscious attention is
necessary to conjoin or integrate the separate features into a discrete and
meaningful object.
"Late selection" theorists also suggest a two process system <Deutsch
and Deutsch, 1963; Norman, 1968; Duncan, 1980), but parallel processing
includes establishing form and meaning as well as physical characteristics
prior to the limited capacity attentional system. The role of consciousness
(as attention) is to select between stimuli which have already been
processed to semantic level. The controversy is still active although
current evidence is substantially in favour of "Late selection" (Allport,
1977; Posner, 1978; Duncan, 1980; Marcel, 1983b). Evidence for late
selection is provided by demonstrations of high level semantic analysis of
unattended stimuli in dichotic listening studies (Corteen and Wood, 1972;
Corteen and Dunn, 1974; Lewis, 1970, 1972). Similar evidence comes from some
visual search studies which indicate preconscious categorisation (Carr and
Bacharach, 1976; Duncan, 1980). More recently, there is evidence fro.
pattern masking studies that automatic processing may continue to a level of
meaning without the involvement of conscious attention. Several
investigators claim that words which are pattern masked to prevent awarene ••
may nonetheless provide semantic facilitation for targets in Bubsequent
lexical decision and naming tasks (Marcel and Patterson, 1978; Marcel, 1980,
1983a; Fowler, Wolford, Slade, and TasBinary, 1981; de Groot, 1983; Carr,
McCauley, Sperber, and Parmelee, 1982; Evett and Humphreys, 1981). One
example of a Late selection theory is provided by Duncan (1980).
The theory distinguishes two levels of perceptual
representation. The work of stimulus identification and
classification is performed at the first level, but
outputs must pass through the limited capacity system to
a second level before forming a reportable perception,
- 9 -
or in other words before reaching awareness (p.284).
In his theory meaning is derived at the first level but none of the
information is available for response~ or is in any part of awareness.
However problems arise over the critical importance of the "selection
schedule" for the limited capacity system. How are specific task demands
interpreted at the level of selection to determine which stimuli are passed
through the limited capacity system? Consciousness is equivalent to gaining
second level representation, which implies that all operations below this
level are nonconscious, and these include the mechanisms responsible for
selection. Ultimately Duncan fails to account for this mechanism of
selection. Duncan's view of consciousness, which minimizes conscious control
processes compared with the major role played by nonconscious and automatic
processes, is similar in this respect to Marcel's (1983b) view.
!~~~~~~![£~!:!l!2~~~1!QQ[Q!£b!g £gn§£ig~!n~!!
Marcel stresses the extent of nonconscious processing and the important
functional distinction between conscious and nonconscious processes:
All sensory data impinging however briefly upon
receptors sensitive to them is analyzed, transformed,
and redescribed, automatically and quite independently
of consciousness, from its source form into every
other representational form that the organism i.
capable of representing, whether by nature or
acquisition (p.244).
Consciousness, according to Marcel is "an attempt to make sen.e of a.
much data as possible at the most functionally u.eful level" (p.238).
Marcel's shares Posner and Boies (1971) view that consciousness represent. a
late stage in processing, and Mandler's (1975) view that consciousness is
equated with focal attention. In Marcel's theory, consciousness plays an
active role in perception "obtained by a constructive act of fitting a
perceptual hypothesiS to its sensory source" (p.24S). Conscious
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representations are not automatically derived from nonconscious
representations. The two levels of representation are qualitatively
different and are neither "commensurate nor coextensive" (p.256). Each
analytical stage of nonconscious processing produces two outputs: (a) a
Result and (b) a Record. The Results support both information transfer
within the system and nonconscious behaviour such as postural adjustments.
Results also produce structural descriptions or "perceptual hypotheses" at
each stage of analysis. An extended trace of the output, or Record, is
produced at each stage, necessary in Marcel's theory for the process of
recovery. Conscious experience occurs when a perceptual hypothesis, i.e. a
Result of processing, is matched against a Record of processing. This
functional and active view of consciousness is distinct from views where
transfer from nonconscious processes to conscious awareness is automatically
produced by the most highly activated nonconscious representation (Deutsch
and Deutsch, 1963; Dixon, 1971). Consciousness is also responsible for
structuring and synthesizing the information recovered from separate domains
of processing. This is an important aspect of the theory, but how this is
accomplished is left insufficiently specified.
There are further problems with Marcel'. model. First, he states that
"We choose at what level to be conscious" (p.247). Thi. is an apparent
tautology similar to those offered by Norman (1981) and Atkinson and
Shiffrin (1968) above. Second, consciousness is described within two
separate locations within the information fiowl (a) fitting a hypothesi. to
its sensory source (record) and (b), synthesizing the output of all such
hypotheses into a coherent unity. Third, if all stimuli are proce.sed to
their highest level of representation then there will be many equally
competing verifiable hypotheses. Given that there is limited capacity at
some point in the information flow, how does consciousness .elect task
relevant from irrelevant information? Further difficulties with the model
will be treated later in discussion of Marc.l'. empirical work.
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A review of the literature does not provide a coherent account of
consciousness, nor any real evidence for a precise function. Although the
various approaches to consciousness in cognitive psychology differ in a
number of details, they share some important common features. One theme
running through all of them is the nonselective nature of nonconscious
processes as contrasted with the highly selective nature of conscious
processes. Nonconscious processes appear to apply in parallel and without
capacity limitations to compute all possible representations up to whatever
level nonconscious processes reach. They therefore stand in marked contra.t
to conceptions of lithe unconscious" such as those developed within the
psychoanalytic tradition. The conception of consciousness as being highly
selective also stands in contrast to the richness of phenomenal experience.
In most approaches selection is regarded as a conscious process, although
debate continues on the locus of selection and the extent of automatic
parallel processing. Duncan (1980, 1981) however, proposes that selection
for consciousness is the result of a nonconscious selection procedure.
1~~~ IQ! Qi~tinstiQn q!t~!~n B!:!tQffi!t1seng ~QQ!SlQM! Btt~ntlQQ!l e!:QS~!!!!~
Many of the approaches outlined above have defined con.ciou.ne ••
relative to nonconscious and automatic processes. Lexical decision, naMing,
and search tasks, using word. and sometime. letters, have provided the main
source of evidence for this distinction. The following review of the
relative contributions of automatic and conscious att.ntional proce •••• will
be restricted to work in some of these areas. Posner and Snyder (1975)
emphasize the distinction between the two typ•• of proce.sing.
Automatic activation proces.e. are tho.e which may occur
without intention, without any conscious awarene •• , and
without interfer.nce with other mental activity. They are
distinguished frOM operations performed by the con.cious
- 12 -
processing system since the latter system is limited
capacity and thus its commitment to ~ny operation reduces
its availability to perform any other function (p.81).
This distinction between automatic and conscious Attentional processes
is accepted by many authors (Neely, 1977; Laberge, 1975; Shiffrin and
Schneider, 1977; Logan, 1980; Duncan, 1980; Marcel, 1980, 1983b; Fowler et
al., 1981). Posner and Snyder propose that automatic processes have three
characteristics, in that they operate (i) "without intention", (ii) "without
awareness", and (iii) "without interference". However, there is evidence
that these three components may describe different aspects of automaticity.
For example, alphabetic encoding was thought to be an entirely autom~tic
process (Keele, 1973; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). PAap and Ogden (1981),
however, have provided results which suggest that two ~spects of
automaticity, "without intention" and "without interference", ~re discrete
and separable in letter encoding. Letters which automatically activated
their lexic~l representation (in a letter matching task) nonetheless
utilised some limited capacity resources and interfered with the second~ry
task (probe Rn. Paap and Ogden's conclusions, that the criteria of "without
intention" and "without interference" should be dissociated as cri teri~ for
automatiCity, have been supported by Regan (1981) and Kahneman and Chajczyk
(1983). In K~hnem~n ~nd Chajczyks experi ..nt, the cl~s.ic c~se of "automAtic
access" to the leKicon d.ftOnstrated by the Stroop task (Ke.le, 1972, Marc.l,
1983a) was found to be liAble to attentional interference and dilution.
Kahneman And Treisman (1983) suggest that the distinction b.twean
automatic And Attentional proe ...... ay not be A si.pl. one. They
distinguish between proce.s.s which are ".trongly autoaatic" and not liable
to interference, and "pArtly automatic" proc ••••• which Are. Th. involuntary
reading of the colour word in the Stroop task (Kahneaan and Chajczyk, 1983)
lIIaybe regarded a. only "partly auto.atic" Nithin th.ir d.finition.
The adoption of 'Nithout conscious aNaran ... ' as an identifying
criterion for automaticity (Posner and Snyd~, 1975; Luca. and Bub, 1981,
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Marcel, 1983b) is also problematic. Determining that a process is operating
outside of awareness incurs the problems associated with subject
introspection (Neisser, Hirst, and Spelke, 1981; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977,
Evans, 1980a). Some of these problems will be discussed later. Marcel
(1983b) attempts to link two of the criteria for automaticity ("without
awareness" and "without interference") in claiming that "unconscious
automatic processes are not bound by capacity" (p.252). In view of
demonstrations that the "without intention" and "without interference"
criteria for automaticity are conceptually and empirically independent (Paap
and Ogden, 1981; Regan, 1981; Kahneman and Chajczyk, 1983) Marcel's claim
may be premature.
Some authors have proposed that automatic processes may be distinguished
from conscious attentional processes by the time onset of activation, and a
lack of inhibitory effects (Neely, 1977; Fischler and Goodman, 1978; de
Groot, 1983). These authors investigate the distinction between automatic
and conscious attentional processes primarily within the lexical deci.ion
and naming tasks.
!~~~8~!Qm!!i~ !QQ ~QQ!~tgy! 8!!!Q!tQn!~ e[2£!!!!! in b!!t~!~ Q!~t!i9Q !QQ
~imiQg Ii!~!
Meyer and Schvaneveldt's (1971) lexical decision task (LDT) experiments
show that when subjects are asked to judge wheth.r a letterstring is a word,
the decision to a word is .ore rapid follOMing a sa.antic.lly related word
than when following an unrelated word. They .ugge.t that this facilitation
is due to "semantic context". According to Schvaneveldt and Meyer (1973) an
auto.atic .pread of excitation (Collins and Loftus, 1975) proceeds fro. the
node representing the first word of the pair to the node representing the
second word. Subaequent acc.s. to th... nod •• requir •• Ie••• ti.ulus
information, thereby providing facilitation. Posner and Snyder (1975),
however, insist that priming effect. are produc~ by conscious attentional
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processes as well as the automatic processes described by Schvaneveldt and
Meyer (1973).
In an experiment designed to test the two models, Neely (1977)
manipulated four variables: (a) whether the word target was an exemplar of
either the category the subject expected (Expected) or a category the
subject did not expect, (b) the semantic relatedness of prime and target
(Related/Unrelated), (c) whether attention was directed to the prime
category meaning (Nonshift) or a target category meaning (Shift), and (d),
the SOA between prime and target (250, 400, 700, 2000 msec). Results showed
that at 2000 msec SOA, E>(pected/Related targets were facilitated, but
Expected/Unrelated targets were inhibited. As SOA decreased facilitation
remained constant for Expected/Related targets but inhibition decreased for
Expected/Unrelated targets, disappearing at 250 msac SOA. For
Unexpected/Related targets there was inhibition at 2000 msec SOA which
decreased with SOA until it became a facilitation effect at 230 msee SOA.
From the pattern of inhibition and facilitation effects, Neely concludes
that (i) fast-acting automatic processes produce an inhibitionless spread of
activation which provide only facilitatory priming effects at 230 msec SOA,
(ii) a slow acting conscious attentional co~onent begins to affect
processing at SOA's above 250 .sec, producing inhibition for nonpredicted
items. The conclusion that slow-acting con.ciou. attentional proce.s.s also
contribute to priming provides strong support for Posner and Snyder'. (1975)
two process model and is contrary to Schvaneveldt and Mayer~. (1973)
proposal that the semantic context effect is provided aclely by auta.atic
spreading activation. Work subsequent to ~ly~s experiments has developed
in four main direction.: (a) further examination of the ti.e cour.e of
automatic processing, (b) the effect of different type. of associ.tive
relationship., (c) the nature of conscious .ttention.l effects such ••
"expectancy", and (d) the extent of nonconscious automatic processing.
- IS -
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In a LDT experiment Fischler and Goodman (1978) found that associative
priming effects at 500 msec SOA disappeared when SOA was reduced to 90 msec.
Although this finding supports Neely's results, evidence of semantic priming
at 40 msec SOA in another of Fischler and Goodman's (1978) experiments
paints to a much earlier locus for some automatic facilitatory effects.
However, if "automaticity" is determined by lack of inhibition, then
measures of the time course of activation depend on the type of baseline
used to determine relative facilitatory and inhibitory effects. For example,
de Groot, Thomassen, and Hudson (1982) claim that Neely's method of using a
row of X's as neutral prime inhibits processing of subsequent targets
relative to the neutral prime "blank". The possibility that facilitation
effects in Neely's experiment may have been overestimated and inhibition
effects underestimated has been raised by de Groot et al.·s claim that
inhibition effects may be demonstrated at 240 msec SOA when measured from
the neutral "blank" baseline. De Groot (de Groot et al., 1982, de Groot,
1983) discusses the positive and negative aspects of different types of
neutral baselines, concluding however: "All in all, we have no guarantee
that a proper neutral condition will ever be achieved" (de Groot, 1983,
p.422). The sensitivity of measures of inhibition and facilitation to the
type of baseline adopted suggests that a preCise locus for the on.et of
conscious attentional processes will be difficult to obtain. Nonethele.a,
most recent findings indicate that both automatic and conscious attentional
processes contribute to the semantic context effect, and that automatic
proces.es (determined by lack of inhibition) have a much faater rate of
activation. For example, Warren's (1977) result. indicate early automatic
effects in a word naming task. The amount of semantic facilitation increased
as prime-target SOA increased from 7~ to 225 msec. In addition, Warren'.
result. indicate that different types of semantic relationship (e.g.,
antonym, synonym) may produce differential te.por.l patterns in the time
course of activation <and decay).
- 16 -
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Several experiments indicate no difference in facilitation between
category primes which are either high or low dominance exemplars of that
category (Neely, 1977; Becker, 1980). Although Warren (1977) and Fischler
(1977b) also found no effect of strength of association on amount of
facilitation for associated word pairs, some authors demonstrate the
opposite (Fischler and Goodman, 1978; de Groot, 1982, 1984). Becker (1980)
suggests that these varied results may be explained by different patterns of
facilitation dominance or inhibition dominance determined by the overall
distribution and type of related words.
Priming by the same word (which will be called repetition priming)
produces substantial facilitation (Scarborough, Cortese, and Scarborough,
1977), which is greater than semantic priming under the sa.e conditions
(Dannenbring and Briand, 1982). Furthermore, some forms of repetition
priming are unaffected by words intervening between prime and target
(Scarborough et al., 1977; Dannenbring and Briand, 1982) and may be
longlasting, producing some facilitation even after a lapse of two days
(Scarborough et al., 1977). The effect of intervening words on associative
facilitation is inconclusive, although semantic effects are unlikely to
survive more than one intervening item (Dannenberg and Briand, 1982J
Davelaar and Coltheart, 1975). Differences between a.sociative and
repetition priming effect. have important i~licatiDns for spreading
activation theories which will be discus.ed later.
!~~~~~Ib! [Q!! Qf !~Q!£!!n£~in Q[!!!~g
Associati ve fad 11tation in a ledcal decision task (LDT> is "autOl\atic"
in that it occurs regardless of subject'. expectancy (Fischler, 1977b;
Tweedy, Lapinski, and Schvaneveldt, 1977). However, adaptive .trategi.s
based on expectancy can influence the siZe of the pri.ing effect (Tweedy and
Lapinski, 1981, Tweedy et al., 1977, de Groat, 1984). A ca.prehensive study
by de Groot (1984) linked the cOMbined ~f.cts of overall .... ntic context
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with the time course of priming. Four proportions of related items (0.25 -
1.0) and three SOA's <240; 540; 1040) were varied. Semantic priming was
found for all combinations. The amount of priming varied with proportion for
all SOA's, but varied with SOA only for high proportions. De Groot concludes
that both results demonstrate a priming effect due to conscious attentional
strategies based on expectancy. Neely (1977) suggested that expectancy leads
subjects to adopt a "predict and match" strategy congruent with the overall
semantic context. Facilitation may be due to reduction in the pool of
possible matches (Forster, 1979), or due to changed activation thresholds in
the logogen units consequent on attentional allocation (Morton, 1969; Neely,
1977). Several authors have also suggested a post-lexical mechanism where
hypotheses about stimulus identity produced on a first pass through the
system are checked against stimulus characteristics on subsequent passes
<Schvaneveldt and McDonald, 1981; de Groot, 1982, 1984, Becker, 1980).
!~~~~~In! [Q!! Qf ~Qn£Qn!£lQ~!!~~Qm!~l£ ~[Q£!!!!!
Most of the foregoing studies have used the ti.e onset of activation and
lack of inhibitory effects to determine that a process i6 automatic rather
than attentional. In an attempt to remove the conscious attentional
component altogether, Posner and Snyder"s (1975) suggestion that automatic
processes can occur "without awareness" has be." investigated. Recent
studies using this criterion have reported that priming effects in • LDT are
independent of conscious attentional proce.ses (Marcel, 1980, 1983., Fowler
et al., 1981; Evett and Humphreys, 19811 Humphreys, Evett, and Taylor, 1983;
Humphreys, Quinlan, and Evett, 1984J de Broot, 1983). Evidence has been
obtained from a variety of experiment. where the prime word. have be."
masked to prevent awarene •• and consequently the u•• of con.cious
attentional strategies. Prime words .asked so that .ubject. could not
accurately detect their pre.ence neverthele •• produced a••ociative
facilitation for related target. (Marcel, 1990, 1983a, FOMler et al., 1981,
Evett and Humphrey., 1981). In seae ca.e. facilitation fro. ... ked pri ...
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was equal to that produced when both prime and target were clearly visible
(Marcel, 1983a; Fowler et al., 1981). Repetition of the prime had no effect
on detection of the prime although it did increase the priming effect
(Marcel, 1983a, Experiment 5). However, in at least one experiment there was
no evidence of associative facilitation at an SOA of 200 msec (Fowler et
al., 1981), a result difficult to explain given other evidence for early
automatic activation (Neely, 1977; Warren, 1977; Fischler and Goodman,
1978).
Several other studies have demonstrated both word repetition and
associative facilitation effects attributable to masked primes (Evett and
Humphreys, 1981; Humphreys et al., 1983; de Groot, 1983). De Groot (1983)
used a backward masking technique where determination of level of awareness
depended on post experimental subject report. In this study associative
facilitation was obtained for those subjects who were unaware of the prime,
but it extended only to primes closely or directly related to the target ••
Mediated primes ie. primes requiring two steps for a primary association,
such as Bull - Milk, were not facilitated. De Groot claims that this finding
has serious consequences for theories of automatic spreading activation.
Evett and Humphreys (1981) used a four field masking paradigm
(mask-prime-target-mask) which did not prevent prime identification on all
occasions, although prime identification amounted to less than 2;' of total
trials. For those subjects who did not report seeing the prime, both
repetition and as.ociative priming effects were obtained, with greater
facilitation for repetition priming. The repetition effect., indapendent of
case, were attributed to both lexical and abstract graphemic priming. The
abstract graphemic information appear. to be derived from an autoaatic
orthographic parsing procedure where level of facilitation effect is
dependent on relative letter positions and number of common letters between
prime and target (Humphreys, Quinlan, and Evett, 1984). However automatic
phonological priming requires considerable phonological congruence between
prime and target, and is dependent on lexical ace••• (Evett and Humphreys,
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1981; Humphreys et al.~ 1983). Carr, McCauley~ Sperber~ and Parmalee, (1982)
have used a naming task to compare associated word and picture primes with
word and picture targets. Under conditions where subjects were unable to
identify the primes ("zero threshold" condition)~ there was no associative
priming for related word targets, although both words and pictures provided
associative facilitation for pictures.
The resul ts of the above e>:periments investigating nonconscious
automatic processing have major implications. First, the claim that the
amount of associative facilitation is equal both with and without the
contribution of conscious attentional processes (Marcel, 1983a; Fowler et
al., 1981>, suggests that consciousness is unimportant to some alipects of
priming in the lexical decision task. The nature of the effect of conscious
attentional processes on priming is still under dispute. Although Fischler
(1977b) claims that associative priming effects are independent of
expectancy, other authors claim that conscious attentional strategieli can
determine both the level (Tweedy and Lapinski, 1981; Tweedy et al., 1977; de
Groot, 1984)~ and pattern of facilitation (Becker, 1980).
Second, as de Groot (1983) has pointed out, the finding that automatic
associative facilitation spreads only to primary associates and no further,
implies a considerable limitation on automatic spreading activation (Collins
and Loftus, 1975). The notion of "spread" implies that activation from
"Bull" would spread to "Cow" which in turn would activate "Milk". Failure to
gain these results may be attributable to the specific stimulus set. On the
other hand, the notion of spreading activation may be too simplistic in it.
present form. De Groot·s (1983) result can be accommodated within either
Posner and Snyder's (1975) theory or Morton's (1970) logogen model only if
the assumption is made that activation decays as a function of "sellantic
distance".
Third, the level of facilitation afforded by nonconscious automatic
processing appears to be dependent on the type of associative relationship
between prime and target (Evett and Humphreys, 1981). In addition, neither
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Posner and Snyder's nor Morton's model is able to predict the finding that
decay of activation is nonlinear across different relationships between
prime and target (Dannenberg and Briand, 1982; Scarborough et al., 1977).
Differential effects produced by nonconscious automatic processes and
dependent on stimulus characteristics suggests the possibility of automatic
selection. Some aspects of this suggestion are explored later.
1~2~g[i!![i! fQ[f!!iming !n!! !!im~!i ![! e[QS!!!!g :~i!nQ~! !~![!n!!!:
Neisser, Hirst, and Spelke, (1981) claim that adopting the criterion of
"without awareness" to determine automaticity involves using subject report
and all the problems this entails (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). Several of the
authors above (Marcel, 1980, 1983a; Fowler et al., 1981) have attempted to
overcome this problem by adopting a two-task method similar to the technique
used in some of the subliminal perception experiments. In Marcel'. (1983a)
masked prime experiments, the first task was to determine a critical
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and mask where .ubjects were
unable to accurately detect whether a word or a blank field had been
presented before the mask. The effect of the masked "subliminal" prime was
then measured indirectly by perforlllance on the second ta.k, an LOT. However,
claims of subliminal perception, or "perception without awarenes.", are
still controversial (Merikle, 1982, Eriksen, 1960, Dixon, 1971, 1981.
Diaper, Notes 1 and 2). Dixon (1971, 1981) provide. ext.n.ive reviews of the
subliminal perception literature and brings tog.ther consid.rable evidence
in support of the view that nonconscious proce.sing ",ay extend to a lexical
and semantic level. He acknowledges the problem. involved in det.raining
that a stimulus is processed without awareness and propose. three principle
criteria for assessing sublilll1nality. Three crit.ria are of particular
relevance in determining whether .timuli have b.en proc •••• d "without
awareness". In d.scending order of restrictivene •• th••• ar••
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1. The eliciting of contingent responses by
stimulation below the absolute awareness threshold,
where this threshold is itself defined as the lowest
level of stimulus energy at which the sUbject ever
reports hearing (or seeing) anything of the stimulus
(1971, p ,12) •
The procedure adopted by both Marcel (1983a, Experiments 3, 4, and 5)
and Fowler et al. (1981, Experiments 4, 5, and 0) was intended to meet this
criterion. Criticism of their procedure has centred on the technique for
establishing the "threshold" for absolute awareness. First, the
psychophysical methods used to establish the awareness threshold are often
inadequate (Merikle, 1982; Eriksen, 1960; Diaper, Notes 1 and 2). Failure to
use a sufficient number of presence-absence trials or to provide adequate
instructions to subjects may produce measures which will not guarantee
below-threshold performance on subsequent trials (Merikle, 1982; Diaper,
Note 2). Second, as the number of observations are increased the performance
on the detection task may improve, thus invalidating the concept of a fixed
awareness threshold (Diaper, Notes 1 and 2). Diaper, in a two-task
procedure, demonstrated that when the ratio of detection to nondetection
trials is low, "subliminal" effects on a subsequent task can be obtained
when the subject is performing at chance on the detection task. He argue.
however, that the detection task i. insensitive undar th••• conditions when
compared to a task that uses a reaction tima .aaaure of performance. When
only a small number of detection trials are uaed the critical SOA ..aaure
does not ensure that the subject is unable to detect on the sub.equant task.
Diaper claims that if the ratio of detection to nondetection trial. is high
then subliminal percaption effects will not be found. Unfortunately there is
no method for determining an appropriate ratio betw ••n detection and
nondetaction trials. Further.are, it should be noted that d.taction
performance may be better than chance aven when tha aubject ia phenomenally
unaware of the pr..ence of a .ti.ulus. For .xa~la, the "blind.ight" patient
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A.B. (Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, and Marshall, 1974) was able to
detect the presence and location of stimuli presented in his "blind"
hemifield with above chance accuracy, even though he was apparently unable
to "see" the stimuli.
2. The retrospective reporting by the subject that
he neither saw nor heard anything of the stimulus.
This second criterion is open to the further criticism that
retrospective reporting confounds perceptual and memory factors, and is
particularly susceptible to the effects of both subject strategy and demand
characteristics (Orne, 1962a; Rosenthal, 1963). Dixon's second criterion
varies in manner of application. For example, in some of the experiments
which follow, retrospective reporting of the prime may be (a) pre-LOT trial,
(b) post-LOT trial, or (c) post-experimental. The level and type of probe
questions, and degree of post experimental debriefing are important in
determining what the subject was aware of. It should be noted that these
factors vary widely across different experiments. Evett and Humphreys
(1981), for example, first set a threshold at which subjects could not
accurately identify a prime. Post experimental questioning determined that
subjects were able to identify primes on only a small proportion of trial ••
De Groot (1983), on the other hand, used a brief presentation of a masked
prime with a high probability of report. After post e~perimental questioning
subjects were allocated to "aware" or "unaware" treatment groups depending
on whether or not they had been able to identify the prime. Th. r.sult. of
the "unaware" group were considered to reflect nonconscious prce.s.lng. Th.
differences in criteria for determining awaren ••s between the Marcal
(1983a), Evett and Humphreys (1981), and de Groot (1983) procedure. i.
substantial, and are important in intarpreting or comparing their result ••
3. Tha occurrence of contingent r••pons •• , without
reported awarene •• of the .timulu., which differ
qualitatively from those elicited by the .a..
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stimulus when presented above the awareness threshold.
Dixon states that this criterion provides the strongest evidence for
subliminal perception. Why qualitative differences in response to subliminal
and supraliminal targets necessarily demonstrate subliminality is unclear.
Marcel (1980) adopts this criterion to claim that the primes must have been
subliminal. However this criterion is better seen as showing that there are
·other differences in internal processing that are associated with
differences in awareness as indicated by detection criteria. If this were a
definitional criterion then Marcel could not also claim that the primes in
his (1983a) Experiment 4 were subliminal, as performance was the same under
both mask and nomask conditions.
Marcel's (1983a) experiments, some of which were later replicated by
Fowler et al. (1981), are central to this thesis. The experiment of
particular interest (Experiment 4) uses a two-task paradigm, which, Marcel
claims, demonstrates nonconscious priming under conditions which conform to
Dixon's criterion 1. This experiment will be discussed in detail in the next
section. However, an earlier experiment in the same series (Experiment 1),
which has attracted a great deal of interest because of it. theoretical
importance, will be discussed first.
!~Z~~![£!l:!l!~§~!t~~e![l!!n~!gn Qgn!~lgy!nQ~n~qn~l~! e!r~!Q~lgn
Marcel's experiments fall into two di.tinct methodological categori •••
In the first, the dependent variable was direct report of ASp.cts of the
masked word (Expariments 1 and 2). In the second, an indirect ... .ur. w••
taken of the effect of the masked word on a subsequent supr.limin.l target
(Experiments 3, 4, and 5).
!~Z~!~g~e!(!m!n~! Y!!ng ! g!(!st m!~!Y(! gf e(gS!!!!ng~
In Experiment 1, binocular presentation of a word or blank field was
followed by a pattern mask. The pattern mask was presented under conditions
intended to produce central masking without producing peripheral ma.king
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(Turvey~ 1973). The SOA between target and mask was reduced until subjects
began making errors in deciding whether or not a word had been presented
(the starting SOA). Before each trial subjects were told that they were
required (a) to say whether the stimulus was present or absent, (b) choose
one of two choice alternatives which was most graphically similar to the
masked word, or (c) choose one of two choice alternatives which was closest
in meaning to the masked word. Six experimental SOA's of 5 msec intervals
were tested, ranging from 5 msec above the starting SOA to 20 m»ec below.
Results demonstrated that as SOA was reduced, subjects performance on the
forced-choice decision fell to bOr. correct first on presence-absence
judgements, second on graphic similarity, and third, on semantic similarity.
The results are particularly important to that aspect of Marcel's theory
which deals with the processes of recovery for consciousness. His hypothesis
is that the recovery of the records of perceptual analysis is accomplished
in reverse order to the processes of perceptual analysis itself. This view
is in contrast with most other models of reading; either the traditional
notions of discrete stages of proceSSing from visual analysis through
graphic to semantic analysis (Rubenstein, Lewis and Rubenstein, 1971; Smith
and Spoehr, 1974), or a cascade model such as McClelland's (1979).
Furthermore, these experiments "provide perhaps the most substantial
evidence" (Marcel 1983b, p.2b3) for the view of consciousness as an active
process of recovery and synthesis. Experi.ent 1 attracted a great deal of
interest and serious problems of validity have bean expos.a both by
attempted replications and by criticisms of expari ..nt. u.ing .ubstantially
the same methodology. Thes. problems involve two main areas. (a) criticism
of the method and (b) proble.s with replication.
l!l ~~!~i'i!m!gf ~!!b~ I Critici .. centres on HArcel's procedure for
presenting sti"uli "without awarene •• ". He a.sert. that at "that BOA at
which subject. perfor.ance fell beneath bOX correct" (p.204) on a
presence-absence discri.ination task, subjects were not aware 04 the prime.
The assertion that "se.antic information was available Nhen visual
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information was not" (p.206) depends entirely on this criterion. As a 60%
performance level is, in absolute terms, greater than chance performance,
this leaves the criterion open to question (Nolan and Carramazza, 1982;
Fowler et aI., 1981; Merikle, 1982). The number of trials to determine this
criterion was also inadequate (Merikle, 1982; Diaper, Notes 1 and 2).
Furthermore, no attempt was made to separate response criteria from
sensitivity as could be done, for example, by using Signal Detection Theory
(SOT) techniques. Similar criticisms have been made by Merikle (1982)
against both Marcel's method and Fowler et al's (1981) replication.
Nolan and Caramazza (1982) point to a different problem in Marcel'.
method. There were 120 trials at each of the six SOA's, (40 for each of the
three decisions), amounting to 720 trials overall. As there were only 240
words in the stimulus set, half of which were used for the presence-absence
condition, each subject must have received some of the words twice and other
words at least three times. Repetition tends to decrease response latency
(Keele, 1969) and as Marcel (1983a, Experiment 5) has shown, repetition of a
masked word increases the effect of semantic association. These observations
led Nolan and Caramazza to conclude that the effect of repetition on the
different judgements was unequal, providing a further source of artifact in
the experiment.
Fowler et al. (1981), provided two convincing replications of Marcel's
Experiment 1, but then proceeded to demonstrate that their own results were
artifactual. In Marcel's Experiment 1, subjects had to make a forced choice
decision on which of two probe words were similar either (a) graphically or
(b) semantically, to the masked word. In a control "nonexperimant" (Fowler
et al., 1981, Experiment 3), subjects were asked to rate the choice
alternatives on the basis of which alternative "had more words like it" on
the same criteria (graphic or semantic similarity). "Correct" alternativ ••
were chosen more often for semantic than graphemic pairs, eV8n though the
test words were not presented. The pattern of results for the control
experiment was essentially the sam•• s tho •• in their .arlier .~p.ri ..nt.
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(and Marcel's original experiment). Fowler et ~l. conclude th~t effects
attributable to the masked word in the earlier experiments are more
parsimoniously explained by guessing strategies.
In a similar experiment derived from Marcel's Experiment 1, Allport
(1977) found that a small proportion of report errors to backward m~sked
target words, while graphically dissimilar to the target, were semantically
related to it. His assumption that the 6% - 9Y.of semantic~lly related words
was significantly greater than chance, and thus providing evidence for
nonconscious semantic access, has since been challenged by Ellis ~nd
Marshall (1978). They estimated that a similar percentage of semantically
related words would be obtained from a random ordering of pairs, weakening
Allport's claim for nonconscious semantic access. Williams and Parkin (1980)
suggested that the effects could also be accounted for by guessing
strategies derived from the knowledge that the experimental word set
consisted solely of concrete nouns. The effect of guessing 6tr~tegies is
equally important in evaluating Marcel's claims, as the results of Fowler et
al.'s nonexperiment demonstrates.
1~1 e[Q~~!m!~ttQB!Q~t£!ttQn: Two failures to replicate Marcel's
(1983a) Experiment 1 have been reported (Nolan and Caramazza, 1982, Forster
and Creighton, Note 3), and the results of a successful raplication have
been more parsimoniously attributed to alternative hypothes.s (Fowler et
al., 1981). Nolan and Caramazza (1982) found no evidence that eith.r
semantic or graphic information was available when the subject was un~ble to
detect the presence of the word. Thare was also no avid.nc. that ••• antic
information was available when graphic inform.tion was not. In Forster and
Creighton's failure to replicate, backward masked words were pras.ntad
dichoptically. Thresholds for different criterial judg..ants war... asured
by a sensitive up-down procedure for setting the target-mask SOA. Th.y found
a number of different thresholds ranging between identification .nd
detection. In their experiment the thr.shold whar. dacisions on .... ntic
similarity fell to chane., whila being equal to that of graphic decisions,
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was significantly higher than the point where detection W~5 at ch~nce. This
result does not support the findings reported by Marcel.
One overall criticism of Marcel's direct report experiments is the use
of direct report itself. Subjects were requested to make graphic or semantic
comparisons based on words which they thought they could not see. This
unusual request led to three refusals to continue and to the adoption of
possibly abnormal strategies by four other subjects who were trying to
comply. Experiment 1 has been discussed in some detail for two reasons.
First, the notion that the recovery of records for conscious representation
occurs in reverse order to the sequence of information processing, was b~sed
on this experiment. The criticisms above imply that the experiment does not
sufficiently support such conclusions. Second, the criticisms also cast
doubt on Marcel's claim that Experiment 1 provides strong evidence for a
dissociation between conscious and nonconscious processes.
l~Z~~~~~~!(im!Q!!!QQ~!iQg !Q iQQi(!£! m!!!~(! Qf ~[Q£!!!iQg·
In Marcel's (1983a) Experiments 4 and 5, nonconscious information was
indirectly determined by the effect of a masked word on a subsequent lexical
decision response. The existence of nonconscious information was determined
by the presence of semantic priming between associated word pairs, Dna of
which was backward pattern masked in order to prevent awareness. Experi.ent
4 is critical to Marcel's theory as he claims that it provides "The raason
for the necessity of the sensory record for consciousness" (Marcal, 1980,
p.427). Dichoptic presentation ensured that any masking which occurred WAS
central (Turvey, 1973). This experi~nt was the starting point for the
following work, and it will be examined in so.. detail.
There were three conditionsl (a) suprathreshold, (b) noi ... ~sking, ~nd
(c) backward p~ttern masking. Only the latter condition will b. discussed in
detail as it is the only one which is claimed to d.monstrat. priming without
awareness. In common with Experiment 1, a two p~rt procedure was used. In
-~-
the first part the critical SOA was determined using a modified descending
staircase technique. Once subjects began making detection errors, 40 further
SOA trials were used to push down the SOA until sUbjects performed .t no
better than 60% correct. This "critical SOA" value was used without further
reduction throughout the e>:perimental tri als. In part two Marcel adopted
stimuli and procedure similar to Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971). Two
letterstrings were presented in succession where the subject's task was to
provide a speeded manual response to the second letterstring (target) on the
decision of whether it was a word or a nonword. Meyer and Schvaneveldt found
that where the letterstrings were words, and where the target was
semantically related to the first word, reaction times on the lexical
decision were significantly faster than when the two words in the pair were
semantically unrelated. Marcel replicates this finding in the suprathreshold
condition. Response times for semantically related word targets were 62 msec
faster than those to unrelated targets. When the prime was dichoptically
backward pattern masked facilitation was 56 msec. On the basis of these
results Marcel argues that backward pattern masking under specified
conditions does not prevent further processing of the masked word. It only
interferes with those processes which are responsible for phenomenal
representation.
Fowler et al.'s (1981) replication of this experiment provided the same
pattern of results but with considerably reduced effects. In their
experiment semantic priming in the pattern .asking condition was only 29
msec. When the prime-target SOA was reduced from 2000 msec to 200 msec there
was no evidence of semantic priming. A comparable experiment by Carr et al.
(1982) failed to demonstrate any evidence of nonconscious semantic priming
on word naming latency. Word targets preceded by a related prime word were
responded to !!9~~t than those preceded by unrelated primes.
Marcel elai •• that the technique for choosing the critical SOA produce.
a situation where subjects £~!~D9! b!y! ~!!O'90!'!9Y! of the pri .. in the
LDT. The validity of this claim is of paramount i~ortance, and a clo.e
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critical e){amination of the method involved is necessary. Marcel's procedure
for the critical SOA setting, was as follows. The subject was presented with
Ii display of a word or a blank card for 10 msec followed by a dark field for
a variable duration and finally by the mask for 20 msec. Subjects were told
that on half the trials there would be Ii word and that on the other half
there would be Ii blank space. They were required to make a decision on
whether there was a blank or a stimulus before the mask. The objective was
to reduce the SOA until the subject was at chance level on the
presence-absence decision. A total of 40 trials (8 blocks of 5) were used to
establish the critical SOA. This was determined as the value at which the
subject could not perform at better than 60% correct, that is, 3 out of 5
correct. The procedure commenced by adopting a long SOA (100 msec) and
reducing this until the subject started making errors. At this point the
"steps" in the staircase were made smaller, continuing over the 40 trials
unti 1 the cri tical value was reached. Thi s method - "hunting" or IImodi fied
descending staircasell was a crude method of measuring a psychophysical
threshold. It relied heavily on a few observations over a short period of
time to establish a threshold which, it was assumed, would remain stable
during the experimental series of 126 LOT trials which followed. The
presence-absence task was considered difficult by most subjects, especially
towards the end of the series of trials. When subjects were approaching the
"3 out of 5" criterion on a forced choice presence-absence deci.ion they
were rarely confident of their judgement ••
Marcel's claim is that as subjects were unable to perform above 3 out of
5 on the presence-absence trials, they could not be aware of .ny a.p.ct of
the prime throughout the LOT trial •• FurtherMOre he •••• rt. th.t the
procedure satisfies Dixon's (1971) first crit.rion for establi.hing
subliminal perception. The following chapter (i) investigates condition.
under which nonconscious priming effects occur, and (ii) investigates the
claim that these effects occur without awareness.
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CHAPTER TWO
The first objective of the research reported in this thesis was to
replicate Marcel's (1983a) Experiment 4, and then to use the paradigm to
further explore perception without awareness. The apparent simplicity of
Marcel's procedure obscured several problems, particularly in the procedure
for determining the critical SOA.
6~1~Ei!Q~§!~Qi~~
Preliminary experiments were designed to establish a comparable
experimental situation. Eighteen first year psychology undergraduates took
part in both structured and informal tests. An Electronics Development three
field tachistoscope was adapted for dichoptic presentation. The general
procedure was similar to that described by Marcel (1983a, Experiment 4) for
dichoptic backward pattern masking (see Section 1.7.2). The stimulus
presentation sequence is represented in Figure 1(a). Binocular presentation
of the same stimUlus set was also investigated. The general procedure for
this condition was similar to that described by Marcel (1980, 1983a) for
binocular presentation. The stimulus presentation .equence is represented in
Figure 1(b). Twenty high frequency concrete nouns were u.ed as primas in the
presence-absence detection task. Two broad cia •••• of probl ••• were
encountered: (a) tho.e involving the relation.hip between pri .. and Ma.k,
and (b) the number of presence-ab.ence trial. to criterion.
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!Prime
!Onset
!Target
!Letterstring
!Onset
Mask
Dam. Eye f\\\\\\\t VIZllllt
!< 500 >!
!<------------- 2000 -------------->!
!Prime
Non Dom. Eye V/m VIZIIZlt
!( 500 )!
x = Critical SOA (msec)
Figure l(a)
!Prime !Target
!Onset !Letterstring
!Onset
!Prime Mask
Both eyes Iollit IS \\ \\\1 V 7fZllr,
!<10> ! !( 20 >! !( 500 >!
!< x )!!<------------- 2000 --------------)!
x = Critical SOA (msec)
Figure l(b)
There is no precise formula for the construction of a pattern .ask
relative to a particular target. Slight difference. between target or ma.k
characteristics, or in energy relations can altar the outcome of otherwise
similar experiments (Kinsbourne and Warrington, 1962bl Turvey, 1973). Early
informal experimentation varying the constitution and density of different
masks became extremely tim. consuming, so a .ask based on a replica of
Marcel's was constructed. The mask used in the following .xpari ..nts was
larger in proportion to the primes than that u••d by "arc.l. In later
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experiments a red cross appeared in the centre of the mask to provide a
fixation point. The background luminance for the mask field was reported as
16 ft lamberts in Marcel's experiment. This experimenter was unable to
achieve 16 ft lamberts for any field on the same model of tachistoscope
(recently reconditioned) with the polaroid filters in place. The maximum
background luminance obtained with polaroid filters was 14 ft lamberts
(S.E.I. Spot photometer, cross-checked by a United Detector Technology 40X
Opto-meter). The interaction between absolute and relative levels of
luminance on pattern masking and nonconscious processing is unclear.
Consequently, during informal studies, mask effectiveness was tested when
luminance values were in the same ratio as Marcel's experiment.
~~!~~~Q!i!Si~gU~~~~i!~g S~~~!~~gQ~
The critical SOA in Marcel's experiment was determined on the basis of
the final block of eight blocks of five trials. In other words, this most
important aspect of the experiment depended on a score of less than three
out of five correct for only gQ~ block. The principal criticism of Marcel's
procedure at this point was that both the number of steps and the number
trials to assess the critical SOA was inadequate. During informal testing 40
presence-absence trials were found to be insufficient to detar.ine a stable
threshold. On some occasions the subject's presence-absence performane.
improved over further trials at the critical SDA. One subject, for exa~ple,
who reached criterion at 30 msec SDA after eight blocks (40 trials) was able
to identify the masked word at that SOA after 100 trials. The way in which
this subject became aware of tha stimulus is important. Apparently the prima
did not appear gradually over trials, first as a blur, then as letters, then
as an unidentified word and finally as an identified word. Instead it
suddenly and completely appeared to the subjact as a clearly identifiable
word. When the number of trials to critarion was incraased to 100 a .are
stable threshold was obtained. Consequently, ten blocks of ten trials were
used in the SOA determination in the present experiments, using the sa.. 60'"
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criterion as Marcel. The final (critical) block was always repeated once,
where the second block at this value was scored independently. The increase
in detection trials to criterion reduces but does not remove the problems
later reported by both Merikle (1982) and Diaper (Notes 1 and 2). Although
Marcel's 60i. criterion is greater than the 50i. "chance" criterion normally
adopted for a two alternative forced choice deciSion, the 601. criterion was
retained for the present experiments in order to facilitate replication of
Marcel's original results.
One consequence of the increase in detection trials was a difficulty in
achieving effective dichoptic masking above 10 msec SOA (ie 0 m.ec ISI).
Many subjects could identify the prime word at 10 msec SOA under these
conditions. Note that the mask, size and font of the primes, prime-mask
luminance ratio, mode of presentation, and apparatus were all similar to
those used by Marcel. Reducing the duration of the prime increased
effective masking, but the 10 msec exposure duration was found to be only
just sufficient to ensure 100i. accurate identification without masking. Any
reduction in the amount of information available at this point would reduce
the chance that sufficient stimulus energy remained to allow nonconscious
processes to operate.
Two methods were found which overcame these problems. First, binocular
presentation increased the critical SOA for all subjects, but also allowed
the possibility of peripheral masking (Turvey, 1973). Second, dichoptic
masking was more effective and SOA's correspondingly longer when the size of
the prime (and corresponding mask) was reduced. The results of the pilot
studies demonstrate that a close replication of Marcel's Experi ..nt 4 was
not possible. However comparable experiments ware d.sign~, utilizing the
same general approach as Marcel, i.e., a Critical BOA tachniqua to dater.ine
lack of awareness of primes prior to a lexical decision task.
The following three experiments were concaived .s a •.ries. Each of the
experiments differs from Marcel's Experim.nt 4 in various ways. Th•••
differences will be more fully described in the introduction to the
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experiments. The general strategy was to ma>:imize nonconscious priming
effects using repetition priming, and then to test for associative priming
under the same experimental conditions. Repetition priming by unmasked
primes was known to produce greater facilitation than that produced by
associative priming (Scarborough et al., 1977; Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971;
Marcel, Note 4). A stimulus set of associated word pairs was compiled which
is fully described in Experiment 3. In E>:periments 1 and 2 the target words
from these associated pairs were used as the primes for repetition priming.
~~~~1~!~~[Qg~£~iQ~
Repetition priming was examined in order to maximise the probability of
a nonconscious priming effect. A single presentation of the target word was
used as its own prime in the following experiment. The small stimuli, known
to allow effective masking, were presented dichoptically. This ensured that
masking was central (Turvey, 1973). The main differences between this
experiment and Marcel's are (i) smaller stimuli, (ii) letterstrings were
printed in upper case rather than lower case, (iii) only word prime. were
used (Marcel used both words and nonword.), (iv) 100 pre.ence-ab.ence
detection judgement. were used to deter.ine the critical SOA instead of 40,
(v) repetition priming was tested rather than a.sociative priming, (vi)
overall luminance levels were slightly lower.
~~~~~~~~bQg
iil§~~i!!;~!
Six male and six female first year psychology students, aged betwean 17
and 21 (mean age 19), participated as part fulfillment of cours.
requirements. Subjects were t.sted for visual acuity using a 'Lizars'
eyesight test card. Only those subjects with 6/6 vi.ion war. accepted for
the experiment.
- ~-
.H.il 8QQ~r:~1'=!§
An Electronics Development Three Field Tachistoscope was adapted for
dichoptic presentation. Polaroid filters were inserted across two of the
fields within the apparatus. An external slide arrangement between the
viewing hood and the machine body allowed the two sets of filters to be
either crossed or uncrossed. Field luminance intensities were fixed at a
level which, on the basis of findings of the previous experiments, would
maximise masking under these conditions. Luminance of (a) the mask field was
7 ft lamberts, and (b) both the prime and target fields was 4.5 ft lamberts.
The response board consisted of three response buttons 3.3 in. apart
arranged in an inverted triangle. The lower button was marked "START" with
the other two marked "YES" and "NO". The "YES" response button was always to
the subject's dominant hand, and both response buttons were connected to a
"Forth Electronics" millisecond timer.
liH.l §1im'=!!i
The stimulus set consisted of 80 pairs of four-character letterstrings.
The first member of the pair (the prime) was always a word. Half of the
targets were words and half were nonwords. Target word frequency was between
10 and 872 with a mean freqency of 98 per million (Kucera and Francis,
1967). Nonwords were constructed by selecting four letter words of similar
frequency and changing one consonant. There were two word lists, A and B,
such that repetition targets in List A were unrelated targets in List B.
Half of the subjects received each list. The list of words and nonwards used
in experimental trials is given in Appendix A.l.
All stimuli were drawn in the centre of white 6 in. by 4 in. cards using
10 pt. Helvetica Light Letraset. All letters ware capitals. Maximum latter
size was 0.1 in. by 0.1 in. (0.3 degree. visual angle). Letterstrings
measured 0.4 in. wide by 0.1 in. high, subtending a horizontal visual angle
of 1.2 degrees and vertical angle of 0.3 degrees when viewed in the
tachistoscope. The pattern mask was constructed using broken latters of the
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same Letraset typeface as the words, arranged in different orientations to
give a uniform and approximately equal black: white ratio. The mask
measured 2.3 in. by 1.2 in., subtending a horizontal angle of 6.~ degrees
and a vertical angle of 3.4 degrees.
Subjects were tested for eye dominance and then randomly allocated to
condition: either (a) Mask condition first or (b) Nomask first. In the eye
dominance test, the subject stood at three metres from the scale and was
asked to point at the centre line with a pencil. Closing first one eye then
the other the subject reported the apparent movement of the pointer on the
scale. The test was repeated three times and the score was averaged. The
dominant eye was assumed to be the one where closure elicited the greatest
amount of apparent movement on the scale. In cases where the score was equal
for both eyes the subject was assessed as having no dominance, and in these
cases the mask field was presented to the eye ipsilateral with hand
dominance.
(a) Mask condition: (i) the critical SOA.--- ---- ---------- --- --- -------- ----
As this is an important part of the experiment it will be described more
fully at this pOint. All experiments in this series utilising a critical SOA
follow the same general procedure. The presentation sequence i. shown in
Figure 2.
Subjects were seated at the apparatus and w.r. told that they would be
receiving stimuli presented to each eye separately. Subjects ware told that
they would be given a series of trials where a ward or a blank would be
presented followed by a mask, and that on half the trials there would b. a
blank and half the trials a word. The subjects task was to decide which was
which, and to say "something" if there was a word and to state Mhat they
saw, or "nothing" if there was a blank. Subjects ware told to take. blur or
a dark patch as evidence for "something·.
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!Prime
!Onset
!Target
!Letterstring
!Onset
Dom. Eye
Mask
t\\S\\\\1 Illllt/lfll
!< x )- '( 20 >, !( 500 >1
!<------------- 2000 --------------)!
!Prime
Non Dom. Eye VllLlJ 'tLlltUd
.<10>1 !( 500 >1
x = Critical SOA (msec
Figure 2
A word or blank white card was presented to the nondominant eye for 10
msec. This was followed by a dark field for a variable SOA. The pattern mask
was then displayed to the dominant eye for 20 msec. The initial SOA was 100
msec. The SOA was progressively reduced using a "modified descending
staircase method", where the size of the reduction (step) was determined by
the subject's performance level. Reduction was in 10 msec steps until the
subject began making errors on a correct decision of presence- absence. At
this point the step was reduced to 5 msec, and then to 2 msec when the
subject began approaching criterion. Ten blocks of 10 trials were used to
determine the critical SOA (ta. the setting where the subject was responding
at or below 601. correct).
Subjects were raad tha instructions for the second part of the
experiment (sea Appendix A.2>. In brief, the subjects were told that they
would see some flashes and a mask followed by a letter.tring. The task wa.
to watch the presentation sequence clos.ly and to re.pond as quickly a.
possible whan the letterstring appeared on the basis of whether it was a
word or a nonward. Subjects were shown ftve exa~les of nonwards .s
illustration, none of which were used in the experi ..nt. The pr••entation
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sequence is shown in Figure 2. Subjects initiated each trial by pressing the
"Start" button. A one second dark period was followed by a 10 m.ec display
of the first letterstring (prime) to the non-dominant eye followed by a dark
field for the predetermined SOA. A pattern mask was displayed to the
dominant eye for 20 msec followed by a dark field for a second variable
period. Finally a second letterstring (the target word) was presented to
both eyes and remained on for 500 msec during which time the subject was
expected to respond. The second variable period was calculated 50 that the
prime-target SOA remained constant throughout the e>:periment at 2000 msec.
Each subject received 20 practice LDT trials followed by 40 experimental
trials. Stimuli for the practice trials were derived in the same manner as
those for the experimental trials. At the end of the experimental trials the
subject was given another series of 40 presence-absence trials to give a
post-experimental critical SOA. Subjects were then asked how many words they
had seen on each presentation and asked to describe the display sequence.
They were specifically asked if they had seen more than one word on any
trial, or if they had noticed anything peculiar during the experiment.
!Prime
!Onset
!Target
!Letter&tring
!Onset
! Prime
'vi/VOlA Vllll/ll1Dom. Eye
!< 500 >. !< 500 >1
!<------------- 2000 -------------->!
Non Dom. Eye ~717777A
!( 500 >t
.Figure 3
- 39 -
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The presentation sequence, similar to th~t used by M~rcel (1983a) and
Fowler et al. (1981), is shown in Figure 3. Subjects initiated e~ch trial by
pressing the "Start" button. A one second dark period was followed by the
first letterstring which was displayed for 500 msec. A dark period of 1500
msec before the second letterstring, (which was displayed for 500 msec),
ensured a 2000 msec prime-target SOA. Subjects were asked to read the first
letterstring but respond only to the second letterstring on the basis of
whether it was a word or not ("Yes" or "No").
~.!.~.!.~.!. 8!~!:!!~!
Critical SOA's ranged from 10 to 90 msec (mean = 36 msec). There were no
differences between pre- and post- experimental critical SOA values. Error
rate was 1.97. for "Yes" responses and 3.07. for "No" responses.
Table 1
~~!DBI:! lm!~£L ~Q B!Q!~~~~QQ!QQ YQ[!!!1!Q Q[~!!Q 1~g!1! ~Q S~Q![~m!Q1!~
-----------------------------------------------------------------
"Yes" Responses "No" R.spons ••
Repetition Unrelat.d
689
571
694
677
764
715
-----------------------------------------------------------------
(1) A two way within .ubjects analysis of variance (ANOVA), with factors
Masking (Mask, Nomask) and Respon •• (Yes, No), de.anstrates that both the
effects of Masking (E (1,23) = 9.05, e < .01), and R.spons. CE (1,23) •
48.79, Q < .0001), are significant. Further analysis i. of "Y•• - r••pons ••
only.
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(ii) A two way within subjects ANOVA, with factors Masking (Mask,
Nomask) and Prime Type (repetition, unrelated), demonstrates that both the
main effects of Masking (E (1,11)= 7.36, ~ < .05), and Prime Type (E (1,11)
= 24.70, ~ < .(01), are significant. There is also a significant interaction
between the two main effects (E (1,11) = 13.60, 2 (.01). Separate one way
ANOVA's were performed for the Mask and Nomask conditions:
(a) In the Nomask condition the 106 msec faster response to repetition
compared with unrelated targets is significant (E (1,11) = 36.05, 2 <
.0001) •
(b) In the Mask condition the 5 msec faster response to repetition compared
with unrelated targets is not significant.
g~6~~~Qi§£~§!i2n
l!L ~[ii![i! i2[ !~![!n!§§: The critical SOA measurements and
post-experimental subject report imply that subjects were not aware of the
prime word at any time during the courSe of the experiment. The lack of a
difference between the critical SOA value pre- and post- le~ical decision
task suggests that subjects perceptual discrimination did not change during
the course of the LOT trials. As presence-absence discrimination was at or
below 60%, it is unlikely that subjects could have identified the words. The
second measure, post e~perimental report is supportive. When questioned, all
subjects reported that they were unaware that prime words had been
presented.
l~L e[iming !ii!£i!
(i) In the Nomask condition the hypothesis that Repetition priming would
produce a large priming effect is supported by the results. Repetition
priming of 106 msec in this e~periment is comparable to the 117 ms.c
repetition priming in Scarborough et a1.'s (1977) experiment. It is also
considerably greater than associative priming by non-masked as.ociated words
in related experiments (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971; Marcel, 1983a; Fowler
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et al., 1981). No direct comparison can be made between repetition and
associative priming as there is no reason to suggest that lexical access has
been achieved in the present experiment. In lexical decision tasks which
demonstrate associative priming~ lexical access must necessarily have
occurred to produce such an effect. In this e>:periment facilitation could
have been provided at any level within the information processing system
from feature descriptions to the whole word lexicon.
(ii) In the Mask condition the stringent criteria for establishing lack
of awareness allow strong claims that priming effects are attributable to
nonconscious processes. However, the 5 msec priming effect was much less
than when the prime was clearly visible. The results show that there are
conditions where centrally masked words produce little or no priming. It is
not the case therefore that automatic access to the lexicon is guaranteed by
central masking~ as Marcel would suggest.
The lack of significant nonconscious repetition priming is puzzling, but
supports the general thesis (which will be described later), that
nonconscious priming is "selective". As presentation is dichoptic, failure
to achieve significant nonconscious priming effects cannot be accounted for
by peripheral maSking. Every effort had been made to ensure that priming
would be maximised. If nonconscious processing is limited by physical
properties of the stimulus such as size or spatial frequency, then the prime
word in this experiment may be insufficient in these respects. However the
size of the prime had already been determined as the largest that dichoptic
masking would allow. Smaller words of higher spatial frequency may have
contributed to a reduced effect, but it's hard to see how this could
eradicate it altogether. Each subject had been able to identify a non-masked
prime presented for 10 msec, which ensured that sufficient information was
available for identification. It may be that a brief flash of such a small
prime is insufficient to produce the activation necessary for nonconsciou5
priming.
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£~~~!~IntcQg~~ttQn
If failure to produce priming in the mask condition in Experiment 1 is
attributable to the small size of the letters used then increasing their
size should produce priming. The pilot studies provided one condition which
produced effective masking for large stimuli, but only under binocular
presentation. The problem with binocular presentation is the risk that
peripheral masking will eradicate any trace of processing (Turvey, 1973;
Marcel, 1983a). Backward pattern masking with binocular presentation has,
however, been reported to produce nonconscious priming under some conditions
(Marcel, 1983a). The following experiment used the same word set as in
Experiment 1, but presented in the same typeface, case and size as in Marcel
Experiment 4. It differs from Marcel's experiment in that (i) presentation
was binocular rather than dichoptic, (ii) 100 presence-absence detection
trials were used to determine the Critical SOA, instead of than 40, (iii)
repetition priming is investigated rather than associative priming, (iv)
luminance levels were lower in the present experiment. The Nomask condition
was omitted on the assumption that repetition priming would be as effective
for binocularly presented, lower case stimuli as it had been for the same
stimulus set dichoptically presented in upper case, where SUbstantial
priming was produced (Experiment 1).
~~~~~~~~1nQg
1il §H~j~S1!
Seven male and five female first year psychology students, aged between
18 and 38 (mean age 25.8) participated as part fulfillment of course
requirement. Subject testing and acceptance criteria were the same as for
Experiment 1 (Section 2.2.2).
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The Electronic Development Three Field tachistoscope described in
Experiment 1 was used in this experiment. As dichoptic presentation was not
required the polaroid filters were removed. The field luminances were set on
the basis of the results of the earlier pilot studies. The luminance for all
fields was 5 ft lamberts.
1iii1 §1im~!i
The words and nonwords were the same as for Experiment 1, except that
they were printed in larger lower case letters.
All stimuli were drawn in the centre of white 6 in. by 4 in. cards using
16 pt. Helvetica Light Letraset. Maximum letter size was 0.1 in. wide by 0.2
in. high. Letterstrings measured 0.5 in. wide by 0.2 in. high, subtending a
horizontal visual angle of 1.6 degrees and vertical angle of 0.6 degrees
when viewed in the tachistiscope. The pattern mask was constructed using
broken letters of the same Letraset typeface as the words, arranged in
different orientations to give a uniform and approximately equal black:
white ratio. The mask measured 2.5 in. by 0.5 in., subtending a horizontal
angle of 7 degrees and a vertical angle of 1.S degrees. A small cross
illuminated from behind by a red LED provided a fixation mark in the centre
of the mask slightly above the point of appearance for the stimuli.
ii~l e[Q£!Q~[!~
Subjects were randomly allocated to Group A or Group B. Each Group was
presented with the same target words. Repetition primes for Group A were
Unrelated primes in Group B. In this experiment the Nomask condition WAS not
included. As presentation was binocular the eye dominance measure was not
required. With these exceptions the procedure was the same AS in the Mask
condition in Experiment 1. The presentation sequence is shown in Figure 4.
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I( x >f!<------------- 2000 -------------->!
x = Critical SOA (msec)
Figure 4
Table 2
(Mean RT's in msec)
"Yes" Responses "No" Responses
-------------------------------------------
Repeti tion Unrelated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Masked 524 ~49 694
Critical SQA's ranged from 10 and 35 ms.c (mean = 16.7 •••c). Th.re were
no differences between pra- and post- eHperimental critical SOA value••
Error rate was 1.7% for "Ves" responses and 3.2% for "No" r••pon••••
(i) A one way within subjects ANOVA show. that the RT differ.nce b.tween
"Yes" and "No" respons.s is highly significant (E <1,23) a: 104.07, lit <
.0001) •
(ti) A one way within subject. ANOVA on the "Ves" r••pon••• alone
demonstrates that the main effect of Pri.. Type (rep.tition, unrelated) i.
significant <E (1,11) = 6.21, lit < .05).
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i~l~~i~~~i~!Q~~~~~~n~§!
The two measures for lack of awareness (Critical SOA and
post-experimental questioning) support the claim that subjects were not
aware of the primes during the LDT trials. Backward pattern masking with
binocular presentation provides effective masking under these experimental
conditions. Priming effects obtained are therefore attributed to
nonconscious processes.
iQlE~iming!!!!£~!
The results demonstrate that repetition priming can be obtained
binocularly. The priming effect is far smaller than would have been expected
from Marcel's results or those of Fowler et al. (1981). Associated priming
from masked primes was greater in their experiments (56 msec and 29 msec
respectively) than the 25 msec repetition effect in this experiment. It was
argued earlier that repetition primes would provide greater facilitation
than associated primes, a suggestion which was supported in part by the
large Nomask priming effects in Experiment 1. The meagre priming here may be
due in part to some contribution of peripheral masking (Turvey, 1973).
Binocular presentation is liable to peripheral affects, which, according to
Marcel's Experiment 4, would prevant further proce.sing of the ••• ked prima.
The confounding of form and meaning in .a..-ca.a rapatition priming
precludes any strong claims for the locus of priming affacts. A. in
Experiment 1, facilitation could be provided at any or all level. within the
information processing flow.
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~~1~!~!n~[QQ~£!iQn
The results of E~periment 2 demonstrate that repetition priming can be
obtained binocularly. The following experiment was designed to see if
nonconscious associative priming can be obtained under the same conditions
that elicits nonconscious repetition priming.
Experiment 3 follows essentially the same procedure as the previous two
experiments. A set of associated word pairs intended to maximise associative
priming was compiled. Marcel's word pairs were derived in the same manner
and from the same source as in Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) i.e., from the
Connecticut Free Association Norms (CFA Norms; Bousfield, Cohen, Whitmarsh,
and Kincaid, 1961). The CFA Norms consist of associated pairs of words of
varying word length, word frequency, word type, association type, and
association strength. The selection of exactly the same stimuli was not
possible from this description. The resulting decision on what stimuli to
use was thus somewhat arbitrary.
A distinction can be drawn between word relationships baaed directly on
shared semantic attributes and those based more on the predictive
relationship between words, such as butterfly and net. The latter type of
relationship is usually ascertained by free as.ociation techniques, but the
two referents do not necessarily share common physical properties. The
spreading activation theorists (e.g., Collins and Loftus, 197~) posit that
following access to the representation of a particular word, activation
spreads automatically through the paths of the memory network. Preci •• ly how
this network is organised is as yet uncharted, but it .eams clear that the
activation of the representation of the word BOAT should result In apreadlng
activation to SHIP, on. of its synony ••• Whether the con ••quant rai ..d
activation for SHIP would be greatar than that for a non-synony •• ssociat.
such as DOCK, providing acr. or 1••• facilitation, d.pend. on the .tructure
of memory. Organi.ation on the b.sts of BaMantic si.il.rity MOUld provide
greater activation for synony.s, wher ••s organis.tion on the b.si. of
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non-semantic association, or the probability of one word following another~
would produce a lesser effect. Given that synonyms constitute a high
proportion of the CFA norms, and that these norms had consistently provided
stimulus pairs known to produce priming, the decision was made to select
only synonym pairs for Experiment 3.
There are several differences between this experiment and Marcel'.
Experiment 4~ (i) presentation is binocular rather than dichoptic, (ii)
synonym word pairs are tested in this experiment whereas in Marcel's
experiment association type was unspecified, but probably not just synonymy~
<iii> luminance levels are lower in the present experiment, t i v) nonword
priming is not examined in this experiment, and (v) there is no energy
masking condition.
£!.~!.£!.~!!t1QQ
.H.L §!dQj!£!~
Twenty-eight first year psychology students (14 male, 14 female)
cooperated as part of course requirement. Age range was 17-23 (mean = 20).
Subject testing and acceptance criteria were the same as in Experiment 1
(Section 2.2.2). Subjects were randomly assigned to Mask condition first or
Nomask condition first.
H.!.!. B22~~!1~!
The same apparatus and same field luminance setting were us.d aa in
Experiment 2 where both are fully de.cribed.
H.!.!.!. §U.!!~!.!.
Stimuli were presented in the same cas. and size as in Experiment 2. As
there were not enough synonym pairs in the CFA Nor •• to provide a sufficient
set the extra pairs were derived from Cassell's Dictionary of Synonyms. A
total of 20 four-letter word pairs were initially derived in this way. The
pairs were then rated for synonymity by ten independent judge. and the ten
highest rated pairs chosen for the experimental trials. The five next
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highest were used in the practice trials. The list of words and nonwords for
e>:perimental trials is given in Appendix A.l. Word frequencies ranged from 4
to 872 with a mean frequency of 81 per million (Kucera and Francis, 1967).
H.~l.ECQS!!;!!:!!:'!
In the Mask condition procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 (see
section 2.3.2 (iv». For the Nomask condition the procedure was the same as
the Nomask condition in Experiment 1, but in this case presentation of all
stimuli was binocular.
Table 3
~!2n BI:i l~i!Sl. iQ a!!QS~!i!~ !n~ Mn!:.!l~i!~e!:.~m!~i~!:.g!i!in ~~e!!:.~m!nt~
IIYes II Responses "No" Responses
Synonyms Unrelated
Masked
Not Masked
698
653
707
654
876
724
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Critical SOA's ranged between 10 msgc and 60 msec with a maan of 17.3
msec. For 25 subjects there was no difference between pre- and poat-
experimental critical SOA's. Three subjects gave a post-experi.ental
Critical SOA which was lower than their pre-experimental Critical SOA (2
msec, 2 maec, and ~ msec, respectively). Non. of thes. three subjects
reported being aware of a prime, or any part of it, during the cours. of the
experiment. Error rate was 2.0% for "V•• " re.pons •• and 2.9% for "No"
responses.
(i) A two way within subjects ANOVA, with factors Ma.king (Mask, Nomask)
and Response (Ves, No), demonstrate. that both the effects of Ma.king (E
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(1~55) = 59.02, Q < .0001>, and Response (E <1,55) = 92.82, Q < .0001>, are
significant. Further analysis is of "Yes" responses only.
Hi) A two way within subjects ANOVA on the "Yes" responses alone, with
factors Masking (Mask~ Nomask) and Prime Type (synonym, unrelated),
demonstrates that only the main effect of Masking is significant <E (1,27) =
8.61, Q < .001). Separate ANOVA's on the critical comparison between synonym
and unrelated pairs showed that the neither the 9 msec difference in the
Mask condition, nor the 1 msec in the Nomask condition were significant, nor
were probabilities even suggestive.
£~1~1~Q!§S~§§!gD
l~l Gr!t~ri~!gr ~~~r~D~§!
The Critical SOA measures pre- and post- LDT trials differed for three
subjects but none of these three subjects reported awarene •• of primes.
lQL EcimiDg~ff~st!
The most important result is that there is no priming effect in either
the Nomask or the Mask condition. Several investigators have found
facilitation for other-associative pairs (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971,
Marcel, 1980, 1983a; Fowler et al., 1981) in comparable experi_ents. It is
surprising therefore that in the Nomask condition there i. no significant
difference between the word groups. Given this failure the lack of priming
effects in the Mask condition is predictable. These results suggest that the
logical difference between synonyms and other associates may be reflected in
RT differences in a lexical decision task. Whether the failure to find
associative priming in this experiment is due to the us. of • particular set
of associated pairs, or because they were synonyms rather than other kinds
of associated pairs, will be examined in Experiment 5.
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~~~~1~l~trQg~~tiQ~
Shortly after Experiment 3 was completed, pre-publication details of
some e>:periments by Slade (Note 5) became available. These experiments were
later published, with additional material, by Fowler, Wolford, Slade, and
Tassinary (1981). Fowler et aI's paper reported replication of some of
Marcel's (then unpublished) series of experiments, while failing to
replicate the findings of others. They support Marcel's claim that dichoptic
presentation of a backward masked associated prime in a LDT produced
nonconscious priming effects. Their procedure was similar to Marcel's, but
apparatus and display conditions were dissimilar. The significant
associative priming effect they obtained in the Mask condition was only 29
msec compared to the 56 msec reported by Marcel. In their pre- publication
report the associated word pairs and display conditions were specified in
detail, although there was some disparity between reported and actual
generation of stimuli. Fowler et al. claim to have generated the stimulus
set using the same technique as Marcel (i.e. as in Meyer and Schvaneveldt,
1971). Closer examination revealed that only about 50r. of the stimuli could
have been derived from the CFA norms, and the remainder constructed on an
ad-hoc basis. Fowler et al. do not describe the process of generating these
remaining associated word pairs. Nonetheless the important factor was that
an associated word set was available which was known to produce both
conscious and nonconscious priming under the given conditions.
Both Fowler et al. and Marcel presented stimuli dichoptically. The
difficulty in obtaining effective dichoptic masking for large stimuli and
the failure to obtain nonconscious repetition priming dichoptically has
already been discussed. The present experiment uses a combination of the
binocular presentation condition of Experiment 2, which produced
nonconscious repetition priming, and the stimulus set used by Fowler et al.
This combination of conditions was expected to produce nonconsciaus
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associative priming. The apparatus and binocular presentation conditions
were similar to several of Marcel's experiments which had also provided
evidence of nonconscious as.ociative priming (Marcel, 1980; Marcel, 1983a,
Experiments 1, 2, 5, and 6).
The pilot experiments, already described, demonstrated clearly that 40
detection trials were insufficient to determine a stable detection
threshold. Fowler et al. however, use only 40 pre-experimental detection
trials to determine the critical SOA, but they note that:
It is true that had we used larger number. of presence-
absence judgements, we might have found that subjects
responded with greater than chance accuracy (p.360).
Perceptual adjustment could occur subsequent to the critical SOA
procedure and subjects would be aware of the prime word on some occasions
during the course of the LDT trials. The validity of the results would then
rest entirely on subject report. Should subjects become aware of the true
purpose of the experiment by seeing a prime ward, then report is susceptible
to the demand characteristics of the experiment (Orne, 1962a). "Good"
subjects (Orne, 1962a) would be reluctant to disappoint the experimenter by
telling him or her that the prime was visible, or in ather wards, to tell
the experimenter that, after an hour's hard work, the experiment had failed.
Neither Fowler et al. nor Marcel indicate the for. of the past-experimental
probe questions they used, nor how detailed they wer •• The .tyle and method.
of probe questioning and debriefing are known to be important in eliciting
maximum report from .ubjects (Morris, 1981b,c, Ericsson and Si.an, 1980,
Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). To test the suggestion that 50" subjects are
able to detect some pri ... when only 40 detection trials are used, two
separate post experimental probe se.sion. were designed into the following
experiment. The first sat of probe que.tions directly fallowed tha
post-experi.ental SOA trials. The subjact. were asked if they had any
comments or criticis.s of the experieent. The second set of probe questions
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was designed to overcome subject response bias. The intention was to offer
them the chance of being "good" subjects in Ii situation where "being good"
included disclosing that they had seen a prime word if they had done so.
:f~§~£!. t!~t.t!QQ
..U.L §!:!!U~£t.l!
Ten female and ten male first year psychology students took part to
fulfil a course requirement. Age range was 17-25 with a mean of 20. Subject
testing and acceptance criteria were the same as for Experiment 1 (Section
2.2.2)•
.H.!l ~eQ!!:.!t.!:!l!
The same apparatus was used as detailed for Experiment 3, with the same
exposure conditions •
.H..!.!.l §U.!!!:!H.
Letterstrings were taken from the Slade (Note 5) report of e~periments
later published by Fowler et al. (1981), and are given in Appandi~ A.3. Word
frequency ranged between 1 and 1207 per million with a mean of 95 (Kucera
and Francis, 1967). Sixteen of the 64 words had frequencies less than 10. A
few American to English spelling changes were necessary (e.g.,
vigor-vigour). Word pairs were organised into two lists (A and B) such that
associated pairs in list A were unrelated in list B and vise-versa. Subjects
did not see the same word twice in anyone condition. Tho.e receiving li.t A
in the Mask condition had list B in the Nomask condition, preventing the
possibility of confounding RT difference. with MeMorial factor. (both Fowler
et al., and Marcel presented the same word list to the .a.e subjects under
both conditions).
Letter~trings were drawn u.ing the ..thad described for EHperi.ent 2.
String length varied between three and eight letters, ••asuring 0.4 in. wide
and 1.2 in. wide respectively. String. subtended a horizontal angle of
between 1.2 degrees and 3.4 degrees, and a vertical angle of 0.6 degr ...
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when viewed in the tachistoscope. The mask described for Experiment 3 was
used in the present experiment •
.i!.~Ler.Q£~Q!'!r.~
Procedure was the same as in Experiment 3~ except that the critical SOA
was derived on the basis of 40 rather than 100 detection trials. This
entailed a modified descending staircase method using coarser steps than in
Experiment 3. Twenty four Practice LDT trials were followed by 64
experimental trials. Following the e>:perimental trials 40 post e><perimental
detection trials were given to re-assess the subjects critical SOA. At the
end of the post-experimental detection trials <Mask condition only)~
subjects were given the two sets of probe questions. In the first set,
subjects were asked if they had any comments or criticisms to make. If
subjects had completed both Mask and Nomask conditions they were debriefed
on the aims and method of the experiment~ and the experimenter signed the
subject's attendance card. This procedure normally signifies the end of the
subject's experimental requirement. As the subject was about to leave the
room the experimenter introduced the second set probe questions. These
questions were primarily addressed to what was being displayed, as
contrasted with what the subjects had seen. The experimenter requested some
extra help with the experiment, saying that he "was concerned that it was
not running properly" and asked for the subject's cooperation. The subject
was asked to describe the experimental display sequence in as much detail as
possible. This open-ended question was followed by a gradually more specific
set. Subjects were asked if they saw: (a) anything (b) any letters and (c)
any words, before the mask at any time during the experiment. If subjects
reported seeing a word they were asked (a) what the word(s) were, (b) how
many there were, (c) where in the experiment they were, and (d) the position
in the display they appeared in. If subjects had not reported words or
letters before but did so at this point they were asked why this was.
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Table 4
~if~£!Qi E[im~I~Q~~~~§~ing~~nQ 8~QQ[iQn ~~~§~~nQ ~~Q~8~§QQn§~
6~!~n£i~§in ;~~~~im~n!~~ 1~~~nBI:~ in m§~£t
"Yes" Responses "No" Responses
n Associated Unrelated Word
Q~~r~!!B~§!:!!!§
No Mask 20 624 650 725
Mask 20 615 640 750
B£!~[£i~§!QQ§!=
;~~~~!.m~n!~!~QQ~!
Mask: Report 5 658 707 796
Mask: No Report 15 601 618 739
Bf.!~[!!~£QnQQ!!=
s~Q~!:!.!!l@n!~!.!:@QQ!:!
Maskl Report 14 617 657 764
Mask: No Report 6 612 602 707
-----------------------------------------------------------------
n = number of subjects in each category.
Critical SOA's ranged from 10 to 48 msec (mean = 26 m.ec).
Post-experimental critical SOA's were lower for 13 subjects with a mean
difference of 12.3 msec between the pre- and post- experimental assessment,
ranging from 35 msec in one case to only 4 m.se in others. The modal
difference was 5 msec.
111 Qy~C!!!!o!!~!1!
(a) A two way within subjects ANOVA, with factors Masking (Mask, Nomask)
and Response (Yes, No), demonstrates that only the .ffect of R••pons. is
Significant (E <1,39) = 99.42, Q < .0001>. Further analysis is of "V....
responses only.
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(b) A two way within subjects ANOVA, with factors Masking (Mask, Nomask)
and Prime Type (associated, unrelated), demonstrates that only the main
effect of Prime Type is significant (E (1,19) = 10.14, Q < .01). Separate
analyses of the critical comparison between associated and unrelated target
RT's revealed that in the Nomask condition the 26 msec facilitation was
significant (~ (19) = 1.8, Q < .05 (one tailed». The 25 msec difference in
the Mask condition was significant at the same level (t (19) = 1.9, P < .05
(one tailed).
l~~lef~~[f~[§tQ[QQ~~Y~!i~Qn!
When subjects were asked the first question: "Have you any comments or
criticisms of the experiment?", it emerged that five subjects reported
seeing something other than the target word. Reports ranged from seeing
"possibly some letters" to seeing several words, but no subjects reported
seeing words from the beginning of the experiment. Response times in the
Mask condition were assigned to a "Report" category if subjects reported
seeing a word prior to the target word at any time during the experiment
(subsequent to the SOA procedure). Subjects who said that they saw only
targets were included in the "No Report" category. The critical comparison
between associated and unrelated primed target RT's was re-analysed on this
basis.
1~~8!eQ~i8!!~tt!:The 49 msec difference attributable to pri.ing was not
significant (t (4) = 1.16). The failure to achieve significance for such a
large priming effect is probably due to the small number of subject. (5) and
the high variance in the RT score ••
lQ~~Q 8~QQ[! 8!!yt!!1 The 17 ... c differance attributable to priMing was
also not significant (!(14) = 1.~B), though it approaches .ignificance at
the 5% level (critical t (14) • 1.76);
liii~ Bft!t §!SQD~e~~! 9Y!!t!9D!
When subjects were asked to help the experimenter in the second set of
questions - which were addre.sed to what was being displayed rather than
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what the subjects had seen - a further nine subjects reported having seen
something they took to be a word or letters on some occasions, prior to the
target word. Report categories were assigned on the same basis as in the
analysis following the first series of questions.
ieL 8~~Q~!8~~~1!~:For the fourteen Report subjects the 40 msec. difference
attributable to priming was significant (! (13) = 2.33, 2 < .05).
igl~Q B~eQ[!B~~~l!~:For the si>: No Report subjects the 10 msec
difference, in the Q2eQ~i!~direction to that predicted, was not
significant.
6~~~~~Qi~£~§~tQn
(a) ~[i!~~~!iQ[8~![~n~§!
The critical SOA procedure was insufficient in the present experiment to
ensure effective masking throughout the experimental LDT trials. Seventy per
cent of subjects later reported having seen ~t least letters of the prime,
and sever~l subjects reported seeing words. Moreover a subject report bias
was clearly demonstrated by the nine subjects who initially did not report
that they had seen something. Comparison with subject report in Experiments
1, 2 and 3 indicates that the number of trials to criterion influences the
effectiveness of the critical SOA technique. The implic~tion is th~t the SOA
technique m~y also have been ineffective in producing lack of aw~reness in
both Marcel's ~nd Fowler et ~l.'s experiments. However, there ~re
differences in mode of presentation. How important this is to the fact th~t
subjects became aware of the prime word is difficult to decide. There are
noticeable similarities between the two experiments and certain conjectures
may be permis5able. The range of critical SOA's in Fowler et al. (1981) was
10 - 70 msec with all but one between 10 and 30 m.ec. In the present
experiment, although the range was less (10 - 48 msec), there were five
subjects whose critical SOA was in excess of 30 msac. In the present
experiment the critical SOA for thirt.en subjects was lower on the post
experimental test than on tha prior one where~s in Fowler .t ~l.·s there
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were only nine. Furthermore, perceptual adjustment may have occurred for
other subjects whose initial SOA was the minimum 10 msec. The number of
SOA's at 10 msec was not reported in Fowler et al.'s paper, but in the
present experiment with comparable (and slightly higher) SOA's there were
seven subjects with a critical SOA of 10 msec. As 10 msec was the ~inimum
SOA used, subjects with pre-experimental SOA's of 10 msec will have post
experimental SOA's of 10 msec, regardless of any change in their detection
sensitivity. The reduction between pre- and post- experimental detection
thresholds for both Experiment 4 and Fowler et ai's comparable experi_ent
(Experiment 5) lends credence to the suggestion that some form of perceptual
adaptation may take place. This may be due to (a) a change in task
sensitivity between the detection and lexical decision tasks, or (b) to
repeated presentations of a prime word during the experi.ental trials
leading to adaptation, or both.
1~1e[!IDing !ff!~t!
In the Nomask condition the significant 20 m.ec associative priming
effect is comparable to the 32 m.ec obtained by Fowler et al. for the aa.e
set of word pairs, but considerably leBs than the 02 msec effect obtained by
Marcel with unknown associated pairs. The reduced conscious priming in the
present experiment may be attributed to the differences in word usage and
word association between American and British English speakers. For example,
"roosters", while recognisable in British english, is not a common a.sociate
of "chickens", nor are "power" and "vigour" or "crew" and "gang" colMKln
associates according to the Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, and Piper (1973)
Association Norms for British English.
When RT's are reanalysed according to the answers to the second set of
questions, then for the fourteen subjects who reported ... ing letters or a
word, there is significant priming of 40 ••ec. For the StH .ubjects who did
not report being aware of a prime word, the "pri.ing effect" ts
(nonsignificantly) in the opposite direction. The difference betw ..n the
-58-
overall analysis and the results after the two sets of questions is
striking. Merely asking for comments and criticisms does not appear to be
enough to gain the necessary information from subjects. The subject's active
cooperation has to be obtained and there must be some way of overcoming the
biases operating in the situation.
There are further factors involving subject report which may increase
the effect on response to the second questioning discussed above.
Post-experimental analysis relies on what the subjects can remember after
completing 40 critical SOA trials; 24 practice LDT trials; 64 experimental
trials; 40 post experimental SOA trials; thinking about comments and
criticisms; and possibly reorienting towards their next destination. It may
be that other subjects were aware of the prime word at the time it was
presented but subsequently forgot the event.
£~Q~ Qi§~~§§iQnl E[iming ~i!nQYi e~![!n!!! !n~ ~![£!t:! ~[iii£!! §QB
I!£!}l}ig!:!@~
~~2~!~8!§!:!lt! Q! eC@£!Qll}g ![e!Clmll}t!
The initial objective of the praceding experiments was to provide a
baseline working method to enable further investigations of nonconscious
processing. Marcel's Critical SOA procedure assumes (i) that there is a
detection "threshold", (i1> that this threshold is relatively stable, <iii)
that adequate criteria are used to determine this threshold. The r,sult. of
the preceding experiments demonstrate that.
1. It was not possible to replicate Marc.l's reported exposure
conditions on the same make and model tachistoscope.
2. Results of the pilot experiments and tho.e of Experiment 4 indicate
that 40 presence-absence detection trials are insufficient to adequately
determine a sensitive non-detection threshold. This is indicat.d by (a) the
high proportion of SUbjects who•• post-experiMental critical SOA wa. lower
than their pre-experimental critical SOA (Pilot experiment., Experi-.nt 4,
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Fowler et al., 1981, Experiment 5), (b) the ability by some subjects to
detect prime words and letters in the lOT when they were performing at 60%
correct or less in the detection task <Experiment 4).
3. A critical SOA assessed using 100 detection trials produced a more
sensitive measure. However, most subjects were able to identify
dichoptically presented primes at the minimum SOA.
4. When 100 detection trials were used, and presentation was dichoptic,
the size of the prime words was reduced in order to mask them sufficiently
to obtain performance at or below the 60% correct criterion. This technique
did not provide evidence for nonconscious repetition priming in a subsequent
lOT (Experiment 1).
5. When 100 detection trials were used, binocular presentation of
stimuli comparable in size to Marcel's produced evidence for nonconscious
repetition priming (Experiment 2).
6. When 100 detection trials were used, with presentation and exposure
conditions similar to Experiment 2, there was no evidence for nonconscious
associative priming (Experiment 3).
7. When only 40 detection trials ware used, with presentation and
exposure conditions similar to Experiment 2, there was marginally
significant evidence for "nonconscious" associative priming (Experiment 4).
However the "measure" of the detection threshold was insufficiently
sensitive to prevent identification of prime<s) by some SUbjects. Further
questioning of subjects indicates that (1) so•• subjects may have been aware
of the prime words or letters, (ii) thera is no evidence of associative
priming for those subjects who did not raport seeing a word (Expariment 4).
8. The experimenter had to rely on subject report in order to separate
out the contribution made by subjects who could have detected the masked
word on sOllieoccasions.
9. "Demand charilct.,.istics" m.ay generate a reluctance by SOlIe subjects
to report awareness of the pri .. word(s) (Experiment 4).
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The results seriously undermine Marcel's claim that in his Experiment 4:
(a) his critical SOA technique is effective in providing a situation where
subjects could not have detected the prime word in the LDT as they could not
detect the presence of words in the prior presence-absence detection task~
(b) associative priming effects can be demonstrated when subjects are unable
to detect the presence of the prime. These two issues will be dealt with
separatel y.
£~~~£~B~:~Y~l~~!iQQQf~[i!~[i~fQ[~~~[~Q~!!
Psychophysical thresholds are known to be subject to adaptation and
therefore require lengthy procedures over a period of time for reliable
establishment. A "threshold" derived from 40 trials over a short period of
time is neither sensitive nor stable and may decrease with continued
exposure to the same presentation and exposure conditions. Lengthy formal
and informal testing suggests that phenomenal awareness of a meaningful
stimulus such as letters or a word is not gradual and piecemeal but sudden
and complete. Kinsbourne and Warrington (1962b) also found that .everal
letters became identifiable simultaneously as SOA was increased. The results
of the above experiments demonstrate clearly the inadequacy of Marcel'.
critical SOA technique. Further support, subsequent to the experiments
reported here, comes from Merikle (1982) and Diaper (Notes 1 and 2).
Merikle (1982) presents a vigorous attack on the SOA procedure in both
Marcel's and Fowler et al.'s (1981) experiments. He paints out that the
validity of the claims for nonconscious processing IIdepends entirely upon
the adequacy of the procedures used to deter.ine the thresholds" (p.298).
Merikle suggests that subjects may fail to change their original response
criterion for Yes-No response. concommitant with the decrease in stimulus
availablity. His clai. that this leads to a "very stringent criterion for
deciding 'Yes''', and therefore a conservative detection threshold, cannot be
easily dismissed. It is true that Marcel, Fowler at al., and myself
encouraged subjects to respond "V•• " to a blur or dark patCh in the centre
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of the field, but this encouragement is not necessarily sufficient to en!lure
a change in subjects' response criteria. The point made earlier and endorsed
by Merikle, and the one which is absolutely central to the whole SOA
problem, is that there were far too few trials upon which to establish a
threshold.
Diaper (Notes 1 and 2) provides substantial empirical support for the
criticisms of the SOA reported above. He demonstrates that a low ratio of
detection to nondetection trials provides an insensitive measure for lack of
awareness, although evidence for nonconscious processing may be obtained
under such conditions. He concludes that it is not possible either
empirically or statistically to endorse Marcel's claim that subjects could
not have detected the prime in the LDT because they could not accurately
detect its presence on a different, prior task. According to Diaper there is
no known method for equating sensitivity on the two tasks.
The inadequacy of the critical SOA technique necessitated recourse to
subject report in order to determine lack of awareness in Experiment 4.
Subject's report strategies should therefore be seriously considered. In
Experiment 4 subjects may have been reluctant to report awareness of the
prime for the reasons discussed earlier. Subjects wishing to be "good"
subjects may not want to spoil the experiment. Subjects wishing to be "bad"
may withold information they thought was important. This experimenter became
very aware of the demand characteristics in the first series of experiments.
All subjects came from the same pool (first year psychology students). The
fact that participation in experiments was compulsory was not always
accepted with enthusiasm. Demand characteristics should not be trivialised
in the context of this type of experiment. After all, the experimenter is
practicing a certain amount of "deception" on the SUbjects. If subjects
notice this, it should not ba surprising if on some occasions they practice
a little of their own.
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~~~~~~Erimi~g~i~bQ~~~~~r~n~~~
Nonconscious repetition priming was demonstrated under binocular but not
dichoptic presentation conditions (Experiments 1 and 2). Failure to produce
nonconscious effects in Experiment 1 may be attributed to the small size of
prime words. There is no evidence for nonconscious associative priming when
a stringent criterion for lack of awareness is adopted. These findings are
supported by the results of three (so far) unpublished studies (Creighton~
Notes 6 and 7; Evett~ Note 8; Diaper~ Notes 1 and 2).
Creighton (Notes 1 and 2) reported similar dissatisfaction with the
critical SOA procedure. He found that under dichoptic presentation~ some
subjects had great difficulty in perceiving the masked word in the critical
SOA trials~ even at an SOA of 100 msec. Subjects had to be "educated" as he
put it~ in order to detect the prime <presented to the non-dominant eye)
because often the mask (presented to the dominant eye) was all that the
subject could detect. Subjects were "bullied" (Creighton) into not
responding "No" all the time, and to concentrate on the detection task. Once
subjects were able to perform this task they tended to be able to do so down
to very low SOA's. For example, 25Y. of Creighton's subjects were still
performing better than chance at 10 msec SOA (0 msec lSI), and critical
SOA's overall were between 10 and 25 msec. Marcel did not provide the
critical SOA values for his Experiment 4, which is a most important
omission. Creighton's results were similar to those of the present
experiments. He was also unable to find any nonconscious associative priming
effects "or even suggestive effects" when he used either Marcel'. original
technique or an improved up-down adaptive procedure for asse.sing the
critical SOA. Evett (Note 8) also found difficulty in replicating the
procedure described by Marcel and did not obtain evidence for noncon&ciou&
associative priming using his paradigm. Diaper'. (Note. 1 and 2) re.ult. are
that if the ratio between detection and LOT trial. is low then
pseudo-nonconscious effect. will be found. However if the ratio i. high then
nonconscious associative priming will not b. found.
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:f.!.9.!.1.!. §!:!!!!!!}~r.:t
The evidence from the present experiments and others (Creighton, Notes 6
and 7; Evett, Note 8; Diaper, Notes 1 and 2) strongly suggests that the
critical SOA procedure is inadequate and under some circumstances the prime
could have been detected by some subjects on some trials. Responses based on
this detection may be responsible for the supposedly nonconscious effects
observed (e.g., Marcel, 1983a, Experiment 4; Fowler et al., 1981, E>:periment
5). Whenever a more stringent criterion for establishing the critical SOA is
adopted by (a) increasing the number of trials, (b) using a more sensitive
up-down adaptive procedure (Creighton), or (c) adopting a careful
post-experimental probe procedure to determine awareness, then the
nonconscious associative priming effect disappears.
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CHAPTER THREE
~~1~Int[QQ~£~!Qn
Marcel's (1983a) claim that associative priming can occur nonconsciously
was not supported by the preceding experiments. In Experiment 2,
nonconscious repetition priming effects were observed when primes were
binocularly backward pattern masked. As both prime and target were
identical, priming could have occurred at any locus between early feature
level description and higher order lexical representation. Experiments 3 and
4 failed to provide evidence for associative priming. Various improvements
of method were needed to increase the chances that any such effects that do
occur would be revealed. The work described in this Chapter was undertaken
to: (a) provide improvements in method and procedure, (b) to establish large
association effects when both prime and target were clearly visible, and (c)
to investigate nonconscious associative priming under the conditions
established in (a) and (b). Experiments 5 and 6 were designed to maximise
associative priming effects in a Nomask condition, in order to increase the
chance of nonconscious associative priming in a Mask condition (Experiments
7, 8, and 9).
~~£~ !mQ[Q~!m!Q~!Q ~!~hQg~
Nonconscious priming effects are typically small, while variance under
some circumstances can be quite high (e.g., in Experiment 4). To reduce
variance the decision was mad. to (a) increa.e the number of experi.ental
trials per subject, and (b) provide the subject with trial by trial
knowledge of results in order to reduce both RT and errors. The apparatus
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used in the previous experiments did not easily enable these changes. The
tachistoscope is sensitive and finely adjU6table~ but effective operation is
slow over a large number of trials. As subjects were only available for 45
minutes the number of trials per session was limited by the speed and
accuracy with which the experimenter could manually operate the
tachistoscope. In order to fulfil these requirements an Apple II
Microcomputer was adapted to operate as a tachistoscope. Software was
developed to (a) present stimuli at a rate dependent only on subject
limitations, in order to allow a substantial increase in the number of
trials per subject, (b) to provide comprehensive knowledge of results to
subjects, and (c) to automate the procedure to reduce both experimenter
error and the possible extent of demand characteristics.
The procedure for assessing awareness was also changed. In the following
series of experiments~ awareness ia determined on the basis of retrospective
subject report. This will be more fully discussed in Section 3.6.1(b).
~~~~§~!~£!!QnQf ~!!Q~!~!~g~QCge!!~!
The second improvement was to compile a word set which could provide
large and robust priming effects. The failure to achieve synonym priming in
the Nomask condition in Experiment 3 is puzzling, considering the
substantial evidence for associative priming under similar conditions (Meyer
and Schvaneveldt, 1971; Marcel, 1980, 1983; Fischler, 1977; Fischler and
Goodman, 1978). It is possible that degree of associative priming may depend
on type of associative relationship.
The CFA Norms (Bousfield et al., 1961) provided the source from which
both Marcel and Fowler et al. claim to have derived their associated pairs
(using a method described by Meyer et al., 1971). The CFA Norms contain a
variety of parts of speech (e.g., nouns, verbs, adverbs) and variety of
associative relations (e.g., synonym, antonym, categorical). Association
strength also varies across pairs (association strength is calculated by the
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number of subjects giving a particular first associate to a particular word
expressed as a proportion of the total number of associates to that word).
As a first step in selecting a set of associated word pairs which
produce a large conscious priming effect, the following e~periment was
designed. It investigates differences in the degree of priming between
synonyms and other forms of associative relationships (the latter will be
simply called associates>.
~~1~!~!ni(QQY£iiQQ
In the Nomask condition of Experiment 3, synonym priming was only 5 msec
compared with 26 msec associative pri.ing in Experiment 4. The word pair. in
Experiment 4 however, consisted of 20 .ynony •• and 12 a.sociated words. A
by-word analysis of the data was undertaken to s.. if there were differencas
in the mean RT" •• Three as.ociative pair. were ~cluded from the analysis on
the basis that they were neither synonym. nor appaared in eithar the CFA
Norms or the Kiss et al. (1973) A.sociation Nor •• for British English (thes.
were power- vigour, crew-gang, and chickans-roostars). The by word analysis
showed that the mean RT for the 20 synony •• pair. was 630 ••ac cOMpared to
543 msec for the 9 associatad pair •• The 87 msec difference was significant
(i (28) = 4.77, Q < .001). This suggests that synonyms prime Ie•• than
associates. Experi.ant 5 was designed to test this possibility more
directly.
~~1~£~~~~Qgg
l!l §yqj~£t!
Eleven female and elevan .. la first year psychology studant.
participated a. part of cour .. requir..-nts. Age range was 18 to 31, with a
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mean age of 21.7. Subject testing and accept~nce criteri~ were the same as
for Experiment 1.
i~~La~~!~!i~§
As the situation and apparatus used in the following e~periment was the
same for all further experiments it will be fully described at this point.
Subsequent modifications will be detailed by experiment.
i~l ~~!~~!iQn
A new laboratory was used consisting of a testing room with
communication via a microphone and loudspe~ker link to a control room which
housed a microcomputer. Dixon (1971) ~nd Marcel (1983) have suggested that a
rela>:ed and passive attitude by subjects increases the effect of
nonconscious processing. In addition, several authors (e.g., Kolers, 1983;
Matula, 1981) h~ve reviewed evidence which indicates that prolonged viewing
of a CRT screen can produce visual fatigue and muscle str~in. The t~.k
environment itself seems to be an import~nt factor in producing fatigue, in
addition to glare from high contrast visual displays on the CRT.
Consequently every effort was made to provide ~ rel~~ing ~nd comfortable
experimental environment. Soft chairs were provided and the testing room w~s
b~cklit under low illumin~tion (background room luminance was 2.5 foot
lamberts). VDU brightness ~nd contr~st were reduced to a lev.l which ~IIDWed
comfortable viewing with ~ccurate performance.
i~l gg~i~!!Qt
The microcomputer was an Apple II with 48K of RAM Me.cry. A two disc
system allowed for independent program .torage and data collection. Output
was to a purpose built 15" VDU screen utiliainq a P46 <yellow-green)
phosphor. This phosphor gave an effectively instantaneous ri•• and fall time
for displayed material (decay time to lOX. 160 na), allowing accurate
display timing. Stiaulu5 lu.inance, det~.ined from a h • h array of
~sterisks, me~sured 3 ft lambert. <h microwatta), and r..ained at thia level
throughout ~ll of the follOWing experi-.nts. Timing waa effected via
-~-
additional hardware along with minor modific~tions to the microcomputer. A
John Bell Engineering dual 6522 VIA Board generated interrupts for timing.
The software necessary to run this (Hales, Note 13) was modified to provide
accurate millisecond timing from display onset to response. Timing accuracy
was increased by modifying the AN3 output game. port and the frame
synchronisation pulse line, enabling all operations to commence at frame
blank onset. The response board was similar to that used in E)(periments 1 -
4 and consisted of three buttons 3.3 in. apart arranged in an inverted
triangle. The top two response buttons were labelled "YES" and "NO" and were
changed according to subject's handedne.s. "YES" response. were alway. to
the subjects dominant hand. The "START" button initiated each display by
interrupting a "wait" command in the program.
Jiiil e[im! !DQ I![g!~ ~g[Q!
Words were all concrete nouns of between three and seven letters. Word
frequency for synonyms ranged from 1 to 1772 per million with a mean of 78.
Word frequency for associated words ranged from 1 to 1207 with a mean
frequency of 81 per million (Kucera and Franci., 1967). Synonym word pairs
were taken from the CFA norms, sel.eting for those pairs with the highest
associative strength. Supple ..ntary it.m. war. taken from Wilding and
Mohindra (1981) selecting for pairs rated highest in synonymity. The Wilding
and MOhindra ratings (a•••••• d on a 1 to 7 scale) ranged betw.en 4.13 and
6.14 with a mean of 5.49. Associated word pairs were tak.n from the CFA
Norms selecting for those pair. which had the highest a.sociative strength.
All were first a.sociat.s where the range of asacciattv. strength M••
between 131. and 821., with a ..an of 42X. Unrelated word pair. were produced
by recombination of synonyMS or as.oeiat •• to produce pairs which were not
related in any obvious way. Nonword targ.t. were generat.d by changing on.
letter, usually a consonant, in concrete nauns of st.tlar frequency to the
target word set. Synonyms and a.sociat •• were balanced •• far as po••ibl.
for (a) string length, (b) word fr~ueney, and (c) eonereten ... (Paivio,
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1968». The latter was difficult to achieve because of the restricted set of
stimuli for which concreteness ratings were available. However, all words
were concrete nouns. Where ratings were available (assessed on a 1 to 7
scale) they ranged between 5.83 and 7 with a mean of 6.71. Nonword targets
were all high approximations to English and balanced for string length only.
Two lists (A and B), were constructed such that individual prime and target
words appeared only once in each block of trials. Each list consisted of 12
pairs of each type of relationship. The practice list was constructed in
similar fashion with only 10 words in each group. All list items were
presented in random order. Words and nonwords used in experimental trials
are given in Appendix A.4.
Letterstrings measured between 0.7 in. and 1.3 in. wide by 0.2 in. high,
subtending a horizontal visual angle of between 1.3 and 2.85 degrees, and
vertical angle of 0.45 degrees when viewed at 26 inches. All stimuli
appeared as light green on a dark green background.
1!.~!. eCQ£!2!:!!:!
Subjects were tested for acuity and seated in front of the VDU. The
screen position was adjusted to provide a viewing distance of approximately
26 inches. The experimenter started the program from the control room, and
thereafter subjects controlled the experiment at their own pace, via the
program. Four pages of instructions were displayed on the scr.en, the full
text of which is given in App.ndix A.~. Bri.fly, the subject was
familiarised with nonwards (definition, d.scription and exaapl .. ), and told
that two arrows would app.ar in the centre of the screen. Shortly after
pressing "START" a word would appear beb~ ..n the arrOMs, then disappear,
followed by a string of letters which would b. either a word or a nonward.
The subject's task was tc r.spond as fast .s possible to the second
letterstring by pressing the appropriate button (-YES" for ward, "NO- for
ncnword) •
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During the resting stage 2 arrows were displayed ( -) <- ) 1.4 in.
apart in the centre of the screen. The arrows remained on throughout the
trial. The subject initiated each trial by pressing "START". A 500 msec
waiting period was followed by a 500 msec display of the prime word
immediately between the arrows. A 1500 msec display of arrows only was
followed by the target word which remained on until subject response. This
was the end of the trial, which was followed by appropriate feedback
messages. Prime-target SOA was 2000 msec. Forty practice trials (10 of each
condition randomly presented), were followed by two blocks of 48
experimental trials. Half of the subjects received List A first followed by
List B, and half in the reverse order.
!Prime
!Onset
!Target
!Letterstring
!Onset
! Prime
_Bo_t_h_E_y_e_s v....Z.l..jZZ ......Z...&.Z... Zoll..l ~V...Z_l~71_,tRe!~onse
!( 500 )!
!<---------- 2000 msec ------------)!
Figure 5
Two systems provided knowledge of results. These were intended to speed
responses while keeping errors to a minimum. A second aim was to counteract
the "Yes" response bias produced by the 3 : 1 word to nonward target ratio.
The RT for the previous respon.e appeared above the displayed target at
the end of each trial. If the RT was less than 800 m.ec the word "GOOD"
appeared underneath the target, for RT'. between 800 and 1500 .sec the word
"SLOW" appeared, but if RT exceeded 1500 msec the mes.age was "TOO LATE".
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Word pairs with target RT's in excess of 1500 msec were re-presented at the
end of the sequence. If a response error was made then the message "ERROR
YOU PRESSED THE WRONG BUTTON" appeared below the rest of the display.
lQ1. BU. i[!.~!.§
If three errors were made in anyone block the display disappeared and
the following message appeared in the centre of the screen: "~QIg:VDU HAVE
MADE (3) ERRORS SO FAR IN THIS BLOCK, PLEASE CONCENTRATE ON THE TASK". The
message was updated and reappeared following every three errors and
alternately the latter part of the message read: "PLEASE TRV HARDER". At the
end of each block the subject was provided with mean RT's for words and
nonwords, and both type and number of errors. Error scores and R.T's were
reset to zero at the end of each block.
Table 5
~ff~£i gf B§§g£!.~i!.~~B~!.!~!.gn!n!'Qgn ~!~n Br:! lm!!£L in ~~Q!rim!n~ ~
"Ves" Responses "No" Responses
Associated Synonym Unrelated Word/Nonword
482 514 518 622
1!1 :y!!: !Q9 :~g:r!!Qgnl!!
Errors to word targat. were 1.4~X. Th.ra were few.r error. to a••ociated
words than to either .ynany •• cr unrel.t~ word •• Errcr. to nonwards w.r.
6.8%. The mean RT for correct "V.... r•• pon... (Word.) was 505 .s.c cOfIIpared
with 625 .sec for corract "No" (Nonword) r.spon •••• Th. differ.nc. of 120
.sec i. significant (~ (42) • 5.27, Q < .001). A. this .~pari ..nt i. not
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primarily concerned with word / nonword differences further analysis is of
"Yes" responses only.
i~lE~i~ing~ff~£~!
An overall one way within subjects ANOVA on "Yes" responses only to
determine the effect of Prime type (synonym, associated, unrelated), is
significant (E (2,42) = 28.55, 2 < .0001). Separate analyses perforMed to
compare each of the Prime types showed that (i) the 36 msec RT difference
between associated and unrelated RT's is significant (! (21) = 6.28, e<
.001), (ii) the 32 msec difference between associated and synonym RT's is
significant (t (21) = 6.35, Q < .001), but (iii) the 4 msec difference
between synonym and unrelated RT'. is not significant.
~~~~~~~i§£~!§iQD
The results show that RT's for synonyms were significantly slower than
RT's for associated words, and the comparison with unrelated words indicates
that synonyms provide significantly less priming. Priming for associated
pairs (36 msec) compares favourably with the 38 msec associative priming
reported by Fowler et al. (1981). This experiment was specifically aimed at
trying to understand the reasons for the failure to achieve conscious
priming in Experiment 3, and in retrospect it was a poor decision to use
synonym word pairs in that exp.riment. As only twelve pairs of synonyms and
associates were tested no strong conclusions can b. drawn, but why synonyms
prime less than associates is not clear. Schvaneveldt and Meyer (1973)
suggested that the affact of association in a LDT was due to a ·spread of
activation" from location to lOCation In ... antic ...cry. Spreading
activation following pri.. encoding l••d. to rai.ad activ.tion in r.latad
nodes, facilitating subsequent acc••• (May~, Schv.n.veldt and Ruddy, 1975).
According to Collins and Loftus (1975), the degr .. of activation in r.lated
nodes following pre.ant.tion of an aRaciattv. pri_ dttpand. on .everal
factors; (a) strength of pri ..-targat aSSOCiation, (b) elapsed tt.. fro.
prime to target pr••ent.tion, and Cc) the distanc. b.t ....n the two units in
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semantic space. This experiment mainly addresses the latter aspect (c).
There is a high degree of overlap between feature list. for synonyms. These
shared features should result in closer proximity in semantic space than
would an associated word which shared fewer features. Therefore synonyms
should prime more than associates. However, a major difference between
synonyms and associates is that sentence production often requires a £nQi£~
~!~~!!n!~nQn~m!,but a !~!~£~iQnQ£ ~Q~h!!!Q£i!~!!.Associates such as
Bread and Butter will often occur close together in the speech stream.
Although synonyms share features, and may be more proximal in some semantic
system, the amount of facilitation may also depend on the probability of one
word following another. Whatever the explanation for these differences, the
results aid the selection of associated word pairs providing large conscious
priming.
~~~~ ~~Q~im!Q~ ~!In! !££!£1 2£ erl!! 1!r9!1 ~Qe2U £2u!£i2Y! !!!9£l!1l~!
R!:.imio9:..
~:..~:..!:.. !O~!:.g~Y5tign
The present experiment continues with the attempt to maximise conscious
associative priming. Collins and Loftus (1975) .ugge.t that (a) association
strength, and (b) pri .. - target SOA are important determinants of degree of
priming. The latter i.su. i. further inve.tigat.d in this exp.riment.
i!l In! !ff!£1 2£ !!~lI1lgn !tr!ngtn gn erimin9:..
There has been con.iderable di.agr .... nt on whether a••ociation strength
does affect priming. Fischler (1977b) did not find a corr.lation between
association .trength and ..aunt of facilitation, and neither did Neely
(1977) find a difference in priming betNeen high and low category exemplar ••
In Warren's (1977) experi.-nt using a n.. ing ta.k there was no difference in
facilitation between ~ately associated (341) and strongly as.ociated
(641) word •• On the other},."d, Fischler and Saodm.n (1978) did find a
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significant difference between strong and weak associates in a post-hoc
analysis of their data. Similarly in de Groot et al.'s (1982) experiment
strong associates with an associative strength of 40% and above provided
substantial priming whereas weak associates of less than 3% did not. De
Groot et al. attributed the lack of agreement on the effect of association
strength in LOT experiments to differences in the "neutral" prime baseline.
Both Neely and Fischler used a row of crosses as neutral priming condition.
According to de Groot et al.'s experiments, a row of crosses inhibits
processing of a following target relative to repeated presentation of the
word "Blank". The choice of neutral prime is important in determining
priming effects. For example, in de Groot et al.'s experiment the 19 msec
facilitation for strong associates is increased to 35 msec if mea.ured from
the "crosses" neutral baseline, and priming is 41 msec when associates are
compared with unrelated words. In Marcel's (1983a) experiments the related /
unrelated comparison was used to mea.ure priming effects and the sa~e
comparison will be used in the following experiments. Furthermore, strength
of association will be maximised in selection of associated word pairs for
the lexical decision task.
lQl !~! E(iffi@ = !@(Q!t§Qe
The second issue was the effect of SOA on pri~ing. It was necessary to
establish an SOA which would provide maxi.uM target priming in the LOT. If
SOA is too short activation may not have had time to build up, while if too
long the activation may have decayed. The time course of noncon.cious
priming has not been established, but the evidence is that autcaatic
processes arise earlier than conscious attentional one. (Nealy, 1977,
Fischler and Goodman, 1978). In both Marcel (1983) and Fowler et al.'.
(1981) experiments the SOA was 2000 m••c. In de Groot et al.'. (1982)
experiment an SOA of 460 m.ec produced more priMing than the ..... ti.ulu.
set presented at 920 maec SOA. Neely (1976) found greater pri.ing at 600
msec than at 360 msec SOA, although in this .tudy SOA and pri •• duration
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were confounded. In his 1977 study, where SDA and prime duration were not
confounded, maximum associative priming was obtained at 400 msec SDA.
Fischler and Goodman (1978) however, found that associative priming was
greater at 550 msec SOA than at 90 msec SDA but was still present at 40 msec
SDA. Conversely, Fowler et al. (1981, Experiment 6) failed to achieve any
associative priming effect when the SDA was reduced from 2000 to 200 msec.
Although there is a lack of agreement between experiments, the bulk of the
evidence suggests that maximum priming should occur somewhere between 460
msec (de Groot et al., 1982) and 1000 msec SDA (Becker, 1980). Within this
range several investigators have found large associative priming effects at
600 msec SDA in a lexical decision task (Neely, 1976; Lorsch, 1982).
In the following experiment a stimulus set intended to produce large
associative priming was tested at both a short (600 msec) and a long (2000
msec) prime - target SOA.
~~~~~~~~!~gQ
ill §~Qj~~1!
Ten male and twenty female first year psychology students participated
as part of a course requirement. Ages ranged from 17 to 34 with a mean age
of 20.3. All subjects were tested to have 6/6 vision.
1111aee!~!1~!was the same as in Experiment 5.
11111E~1m!!DQ I!~g!~e!l~!
For the experimental trials 112 word pair. were selected, of which 28
were word-nonword pairs. All words were concrete nouns of between three and
six letters. Word frequency varied between 3 and 1772 per million (Kucera
and Francis, 1967), with a mean frequency of 86.33. Mean frequency was
approximately the same for both prime. (86.9) and targets (SS.7). A.sociated
word pairs were selected to maximise association strength. Thirty eight were
taken from the CFA norm •• They were all first as.ociate. with association
strengths of between 327. and 827., with a ..an of 43.77.. Th. other 46 pairs
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were derived from Kiss et al. (1973)~ either directly or via the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart~ 1981). These were also first
associates~ with association strengths of between 30 and 91~ with a mean of
50.64. Fourth order approximation to English nonwords were constructed and
balanced with the word list for string length and initial consonant.
Associated word primes are shown in Appendix A.6, and word-nonword pairs in
Appendix A.7. Separate lists (A, B~ and C) were designed such that each list
contained a particular prime or target only once. A repetition target in
list A was thus an associated target in list B and an unrelated target in
list C. Across lists each word was presented under the three priming
conditions (repetition~ associated~ unrelated). The target order was
randomised once~ and then presented in the same order for each for each
list; only the prime-target relationship was altered. Word - nonword pairs
were the same for each list. The 40 practice pairs were constructed on the
same basis as the experimental trials. All subjects received the same
practice set.
Presentation conditions were the same as in Experiment 5, except that
half of the subjects in each group were presented with the sequence at 2000
msec prime-target SOA and half of the subjects at 600 msec SOA.
1!~1E[Q£!g~[!
Subjects were randomly allocated to list. and SOA treatment. The
procedure followed was described in detail for Experiment 5. In the 40
practice trials a display provided feedback on RT and errors to the subject.
A two minute rest period followed during which the subject was encouraged
(via the program) to seek help, advice or information from the experimenter.
The 112 Experimental trials were then presented in three blocks (38, 37 and
37 trials respectively). There was a two minute rest period between each
block. During experimental blocks the trial by trial knowledge of results
feedback was discontinued, but error me••age. were provided follOWing every
third error as in Experiment 5.
-n-
Response latencies are displayed in Table 6. Error rate was 1.4% for
"Yes" responses and 5% for "No" responses. An overall two way within
sUbjects ANOVA was performed with factors Response (Yes, No) and SOA (2000
and 600). "Yes" responses were significantly faster than "No" responses at
both SOA's (E (1,28) = 105.28, e < .0001). Responses were significantly
faster at 2000 msec than 600 msec SOA (E (1,28) = 5.05, e < .05). FUrther
analysis is of "Yes" responses only.
Table 6
~§2Q Br:! im§§~L ~~ E[~m~~~Q§ ~~ ~QQ m!~~~QQ ~QQQm§~~§QB ~Q ~~e~~~m~n~~
"Yes" Responses "No" Responses
Repetition Associated Unrelated Word/Nonword
-----------------------------------------------------------------
600 msec
2000 msec
490
470
546
499
590
539
695
637
------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7
E[~m~Qg~ff~£~§(~l!~~Y!~Q ~b! m!!D YD[!i!i!gBI lm!!£L
Repetition Associated
600 msec
2000 msec
100
69
44
40
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19l Eriming~ff~~!§
An overall two way ANOVA was performed with across subjects factor SOA
(600~ 2(00) and within subjects factor Prime Type (repetition, associated,
unrelated). The main effect of SOA is significant (E (1,28) = 4.47, e < .05)
as is the effect of Prime type (F (2~56) = 60.32, e < .0001). Separate
analyses were performed to see if the RT's for each condition differed
significantly between 600 and 2000 msec SOA. There is no difference in
repetition RT's across SOA. However there are significant differences for
both the associated (t (28) = 2.38, e < .05) and the unrelated RT's (t (28)
= 2.37, e < .05) across the two SOA·s.
Priming effects displayed in Table 7 show that there is greater absolute
priming at 600 msec SOA than at 2000 msec SOA. Additional analysis for the
600 msec SOA revealed that (a) the 100 msec RT difference between the
repetition and unrelated targets is significant (i (14) = 6.92, e < .001),
(b) the 44 msec difference between the associated and unrelated RT's is
significant (t (14) = 7.35, e < .001), and (c) the 56 msec difference
between associated and repetition target RT's is also significant <t (14) =
4 •44 , e < • 0 1) •
~~§~~~ ~i!~~!!ign
The greater repetition priming at 600 msec than at 2000 msec SOA i.
consistent with the pattern of re.ults obtained in similar .xp.rim.nts
(Neely, 1976; de Groat et al., 1981). The present result of 40 m••c
associative priming is within the range of previous finding. (Fowler et al.,
1981; de Groot et al., 1981, Marcel, 1983). The 600 ••ec SOA w••
suffiCiently long for both automatic and conscious att.ntion.1 proc.sses to
be operating (Neely, 1977). A. priming was a••••• ed by the difference
between a.sociated and unrelated primed targets, it is the product of both
inhibition and facilitation effect •• A post hoc analysis w•• perform.d to
see if there were any differ.nc •• in priming b.tw ..n the two SOA treatment ••
The priming effect was calculated for each subj.ct at the two SOA's and a t
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test was performed on the two sets of scores. The 4 msec difference in
associative priming between 600 msec and 2000 msec BOA is not significant.
Repetition priming was significantly greater at 60(1than at 2000 msec SOA (t
(28) = 1.83, Q < .05 <1 tailed». The decision was made to use the 6(1(1msec
SOA to investigate nonconscious priming in the following experiments in view
of the claim that automatic priming effects occur earlier than conscious
attentional effects (Neely, 1977; Fischler and Goodman, 1978; Posner and
Snyder, 1975).
J~~~ ~~Q~[~m~QtZt E[~m~Qg~~tnQ~t~~~[~Q~~§~Q ~ Q~QQ£~t~[bQI ~n~[~
~~~[~Q~§§i§ Q~t~[miQ~QQ~ QQ§t=~~Q~[~m!Qt~!§~Qi!£t[!QQ[t~
J~~~!~!Qt[QQ~£t~QQ
Having established a set of associated words which provides sUbstantial
conscious priming, the next step was to determine the conditions for
nonconscious priming. This involved two main issues; (a) the display
parameters for effective masking, and (b) the criteria for determining lack
of awareness.
l!L ~QnQ!~!gQ! tg[ !tt~£t!y! m!!K!ng
The refresh cycle for the microcomputer and VDU was 20 msec, therefore
display times were in multiples of 20 msec. In informal testing effective
masking was produced by: (i) a mask consisting of non-alphanumeric typeface
characters (e.g., £ $ ~ X *>, used in conjunction with (ii) a 20 .sec
display of the prime followed by a 100 msec display of the mask. The biggest
problem with binocular presentation i. peripheral .asking, although
nonconscious repetition priming has been demonstrated under the.e conditions
(Experiment 2).
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lQl B§§~§§i~g~~~r~~~§§
Dissatisfaction with the critical SOA technique for determining
awareness has already been discussed at length. An alternative procedure is
to use a systematic method for eliciting accurate report from subjects.
There are three interrelated issues (i) the time at which subjects are asked
to report during the course of the experiment, (ii) the particular
instructions given to subjects, and (iii) the method of questioning
sUbjects.
ii~Iim~gf [~Qg[t
Dixon's (1971) second criterion is adopted to determine lack of
awareness for all the following experiments, that is "The retrospective
reporting by the SUbject that he neither saw (nor heard) anything of the
prime" (p. 12), However it was pointed out in Chapter One that this
criterion could be divided into (a) a trial by trial prime discrimination
report either prior to the LOT, or (b) subsequent to the LOT, or (c) a post
experimental report of whether subjects were aware of the primes. Other loci
for report are possible, as are combinations of the above.
iti~!~~t[~£!ign§
The instructions relevant to report will be partly determined by when
the SUbjects are asked to report. The instructions are also likely to
determine how subjects allocate their attention. For example, in the
following experiment, report was post- experimental and there was no
statement Or implication in the initial instructions that a prima word would
be presented. Subjects were asked to concentrate on the space between two
arrows where a string of symbols (the mask) would appear, and were told that
the symbols would act as a warning that the LDT letterstring was about to
follow. This instruction was intended to direct their attention to the
appropriate area of the visual field but without directing them to
concentrate on prime detection (prime detection was low under the given
conditions even when subjects were informed of their presence). At the end
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of the experiment subjects were asked a set of questions to determine their
awareness of primes. The nature of these questions is important.
liiilEQ§t=~~E~r!m~nt~lg~~§t!Qn§
The use of subject retrospective report is still at the centre of
controversy (Morris, 1981; Evans, (1980a); Nisbett and Wilson, 1977).
Further discussion of this issue will be dealt with in Chapter Five. Two
principles were adopted for post experimental questioning; (a) that the
primary question should be indirect, and (b) that the subjects are asked
only simple direct questions further to (a). The second set of questions
used in Experiment 4 were considered adequate to fulfill these principles,
particularly the primary question "Please describe the display sequence in
as much detail as you can". These questions were designed to reduce the
effect of demand characteristics by (i) non-directive questioning, and (ii)
allowing the subjects to describe the sequence in their own language.
Subjects who reported having seen a word or letters other than the
target on some trials were to be included in a post- experimental "Report"
category, while those subjects reporting that they saw nothing other than
mask or target on any trial were to be included in a "No Report" category.
Priming effects in the No Report category were regarded as evidence for
nonconscious processing under the given conditions. The original decision to
restrict the No Report category to reports that nothing at all was seen of
the prime, was modified following .everal report. from subject. during
informal testing, that they had seen a "C", an "O"~ an "5", or an "H", even
when there was no prime present. There is high confuseability between these
letters and some of the typeface characters. For example, a brief
presentation of ~ could be confused with 0 or C, and similarly the. with S,
and the £ with H. Consequently the No Report category included raport of 2Q!
of these confuseable letters as long as that letter did not appear in the
prime.
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In the following experiment three kinds of relation between prime and
target (repetition, associated, unrelated) under binocular masking were
studied .
.iil §~~U~£~§
Eight female and seven male first year psychology undergraduates
participated as part of a a course requirement. All subjects were tested to
have 6/6 visual acuity. Ages ranged between 17 and 44 with a mean of 20.6.
iiil. eEE!~!:~~!:!§
With the e>:ception of the mask the same apparatus and materi~ls ~s
described in Experiment 6 were used, in the same order. The m~sk was
constructed using the following typeface symbols: £ $ r. ~ * ~ . On each
successive presentation the rightmost character was removed and added at the
beginning of the sequence. Using this method each character was presented
only once in anyone position in every si>: trials. The mask measured 1.2 in.
wide by 0.2 in. high, subtending a horizontal visual angle of 2.7 degrees
and vertical angle of 0.45 degrees, when viewed at 26 inches.
liH.l. e(g£~Q!:!(~
Subjects were randomly alloc~ted to one of lists A, B, or C. Once
subjects had been tested for acuity, they were seated in front of the
screen in the testing room. The experimenter started the program and
thereafter the subject controlled the experiment, via the program. In
addition to the instructions provided for Experiment b, subjects were
instructed as follows: " Please concentrate on watching the space bet_en
the arrows. When you press "Start" you will see a string of sy.bols followed
half ~ second later by a string of letters. The symbols look like this I -
£ $ r. & * ~". Forty practice tri~ls were followed by 112 Experiment~l tri~ls
with rest periods and knowledge of results as in Experi ••nt 6.
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!Prime
!Onset
!Target
!Letterstring
!Onset
!Prime Mask
Both ~yes bZIIU\\\\\\\! 17////> To------------Lt~-~-~-~--~-u-~-~--~--~----------------~:~~~~Response
!(20 )-! < 100 >!
!<----------- 600 msec ------------)!
Figure 6
During the resting phase the two arrows were displayed in the centre of
the screen six characters apart. The subject initiated each trial by
pressing "START", which was followed by a 500 msec waiting period, then a 20
msec display of the prime word. Immediately on prime offset there was a 100
msec display of the mask, followed by a waiting period (arrows only) until
the target, which was displayed until subject response. The prime - target
SOA was 600 msec (see Figure 6).
The questioning session began with the open ended request to "Please
describe the display sequence in as much detail as possible" and continued
with structured questions based on this first answer (see Appendix A.8). The
use of an open-ended question containing no bias was intended to overcome
the possibility of directing the subject towards a particular re.pon.e. The
questions were read from a printed sheet.
Response latencies are shown in Table 8. Error rate was 3.2Y. for "Ves"
responses and 8Y. for "No" respon •••• An overall one way within .ubjects
ANOVA was performed on Response (Ves, No) RT' B. "Vestt r.spons •• ~.re
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significantly faster than "No" responses (E (1,14) = 109.97, Q < .0001).
Further analysis is of "Yes" responses only.
Table 8
~~~QB1:§1~§~£~Q~ E[~~~1~Q~~Q ~~2~[~~~Q1Z
-----------------------------------------------------------------
"Ves" Responses "No" Responses
n Repetition Associated Unrelated Word/Nonword
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Report
No report
2
13
516
498
522
509
542
516
655
672
n = number of subjects
Table 9
-----------------------------------
Repetition Associated
-------------------------------------
Report
No report
26
18
20
7
1~1E[~m~ng~ff!£1!(displayed in Table 9)
Only two of the fifteen subjects reported seeing anything attributable
to the presence of a prime word. A two way within subjects ANOVA was
performed with factors Report (Report/Ne Report) and Prime type (repetition,
associated, unrelated). Report does not significantly affect RT, but the
effect of Prime type is significant (E (2,26) = 3.51, e < .05). A s.parat.
ene way within subjects ANOVA on the 13 No Report subject. indicate. that
Prime type has a significant effect on target RT (E (2,24) • 4.33, e < .03).
-ss-
Further individual comparisons revealed that (a) repetition RT is
significantly faster than unrelated RT (~ (11) = 5.22, Q < .OOl)~ but (b)
the 7 msec difference between associated and unrelated RT's is not
signi fi cant.
~~~~1~Qi§~~§§iQD
The two aims of this experiment were (i) to see whether the presentation
conditions would produce effective binocular masking, and (ii) where m~sking
was effective, to see if there was any evidence for nonconscious priming.
The two issues will be discussed separately.
l~L g[i1~[i~fQ[~~~[~n~§§
Only two out of the fifteen subjects reported seeing all or part of a
prime word during the experiment. One of the two subjects who reported,
stated that he saw a prime at the end of the first block of tri~ls ~nd ~ few
primes subsequently. The other subject reported, in answer to question two,
that he had seen letters and possibly a word, but had only noticed these
towards the end of the experiment. There were no other reports, ~nd many
subjects expressed surprise that prime words had been presented.
1~1E[iming~ff!~~!
For those subjects who did not report seeing ~ prime on any tri~ls,
there is evidence for repetition, but not associative, priming when the
subject is un~ware of the prime. This finding supports the combined results
of Experiments 2 and 4 where there w~a ~lso repetition priming in the
absence of associative priming. There i. only 18 m.ec nonconscious
repetition priming in the present experiment as comp~r.d to 25 ••ec in
Experiment 2. The nonsignificant 7 maec a••ociative priming cannot b.
explained by peripheral masking becau •• of the signific~nt repetition
priming. In the pre.ent procedure the No Report criteria rely heavily on the
subject's memory, at the end of a tot~l of 152 (practice and experi ..ntal)
trials. It i. possible that .ubject. were either forgetting that they had
seen the prime, or were confused over the temporal sequence. However, it
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seems unlikely that they had been aware of the prime on many trials, since
they were only asked ~n~tn~[they had seen letters or words and not ~netthe
letters or words were. Furthermore, any such forgetting cannot explain the
absence of associative priming in the presence of repetition priming. Indeed
the absence of associative priming supports the subject's retrospective
report, since these primes have been shown (Experiment 6) to produce
substantial priming when subjects were aware of them. The following
experiment investigates priming effects under conditions where subjects are
less likely to forget seeing a prime word or letters.
~~z~~~Q~r!m~~!§l E[!m!~g~!!nQ~!e~er~~~!!~ ~ g!~Q£~!~[bQI ~n~[~
~~e[!~~§!! g~!~[m!~!g~~ 2Q!!=![!e!~~j!£![~2Q[!~
~~Z~!~!~t[Qg~£!!Q~
In the following experiment subjects were asked at the end of every
trial whether or not they had seen a prime word. The procedure still suffers
the weakness that the subjects were not questioned about the presence of the
prime until after the LDT response, by which time they have had to perform
several operations, and this may cause some interference with memory.
Nonetheless the demand on memory is greatly reduced and there is less
likelihood that the subjects will forget aspects of the prime of which they
had been aware. The change in task requirements is likely to produce a
corresponding chance in subjects' attentional strategy. In Experiment 7
subjects were not told that a prime word would be presented. Few if any
would be looking for a prime. In other words, their attention was probably
directed towards the mask as a warning indicator for the following target.
If subjects are asked at the end of each trial "Is there anything other than
the mask 7", then they will probably allocate some attentional re.ourc •• to
see if they can detect something else. Such reallocation of r••ourc •• should
produce an increase in the proportion of subjects in the Report category and
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an increase in the proportion of Report trials overall, compared with the
results of Experiment 7. It is possible that changing strategic attention
will affect the type and level of processing. Strategies resulting in more
intensive or narrowed attention can produce a situation counterproductive to
eliciting nonconscious processing, in comparison with the more relaxed and
passive approach in the previous e>:periment (see Marcel, 1983a, Experiment
1; Dixon, 1971), However, a higher degree of confidence can be accepted that
"No Report" i£ veridical for those subjects who £tate, approximately two
seconds after prime presentation, that they did not see anything of the
prime word.
The prediction i£ that there will be an increase in the proportion of
"Report" over "No Report" subjects in the following experiment compared with
Experiment 7. The question is whether repetition and associative priming
will occur under these conditions.
~!.z!.£!. ~!t!:lQQ
.itt §Y!H!£!!!
Five male and ten female first year psychology students, aged between 18
and 39 years (mean age = 23.4), participated as part of a course
requirement. All subjects were tested to have 6/6 visual acuity •
.iii1 e22!(!!~!, materials, and order of pr.s.nt.tion were the sam. .s in
Experiment 7 •
.iH.!!. E:[Q~!QY[!
The procedure was the same as Experiment 7, except that during the
instructions the subjects were told "On some trials there may be something
other than the symbols before the letterstring" and they were asked to
report back at the end of each trial. If subjacts saw something they were to
reply "Yes" and state what they saw, or "No" if the,.. was nothing other than
symbols. The presentation sequence was the sa•• as in Experiment 7 with the
following addition. After the subject had responded on the LDT there was a
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100 msec blank screen followed by a 120 msec display of the message: "That
was trial £ (x) : was there anything other than symbols?". During practice
trials this message appeared after the appropriate feedback messages. The
subject's verbal report was recorded by the experimenter via the audio link.
Errors (Misses) were approximately 3.2% for "Yes" responses (words) and
did not differ across Prime Type~ while for the "No" responses errors were
much higher at 8%. The large difference is attributable to the "Yes"
response bias generated by the higher probability of occurrence in that
category which was not completely counteracted by the error mes.age feedback
to sUbjects. An overall one way within subjects ANOVA of Response (Yes I No)
demonstrated that "Yes" responses are significantly faster than "No"
responses (E (1~14) = 57.26~ Q < .0001>. Further analysis is of "Yes"
responses only.
Table 10(a)
~~~n 8I:! im!~~Lq~er~m~ I~e~ fgr 8!egrt!ng ~g 8~egrt!~qi~~t~in
S?ie~rim~n1§
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Ves" Re.pons.s "No" Rasponses
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. Prime Type
Repetition As.ociated Unrelated WordSubjects Trials
11 35 Report 563 584 672 712
11 65 No Report 561 586 594 677
4 100 No Report only 4B7 513 4BB 632
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 10(b)
!~[g~t~~~Q B!:~ lm~~£L!Q[ !Q~nti!i~Q~nQ YniQ~nti!i~Qe[im~~in ~~e~[im~nt
§ i~Y~~~[~~eQn~~~Qn~YL
No. Prime Type
Repetition Associated UnrelatedSubjects Trials
9
9
6
22 Prime Identified
Prime Unidentified
Prime Unidentified only
522 587
574
547
627
595
522
78
100
551
517
l~l E[iming~!!~£t!(Displayed in Table 11)
A one way within subjects ANOVA on the overall results indicated that
the effect of Prime type is significant (E (2,28) = 11.43, Q < .001).
Results were partialled into Report and No Report trials using the sam.
criteria as in Experiment 7. Criteria for inclusion in the Report category
were reports of (i) a word, (ii) letters, (iii) a letter (excluding one
"confuseable" letter not included in the prime), and (i v) "something other
than symbols. Criteria for inclusion in the No Report category were report.
of (i) nothing other than symbols, (ii) one letter which may have been
confused with the symbols but was not a prime letter.
Eleven of the fifteen subjects (731.) reported seeing a prime word, or
part of it, on at least one trial (361.of trials were Report). Mean RT's for
Report and No Report trials were calculated and are displayed in Table
10(a). The mean RT's of the 11 subjects who gave both Report and No Report
data were analysed. A two way ANOVA was performed on this data with factors
Report (Report I No Report) and Prime Type (repetition, a.sociated,
unrelated). Report is not significant but the effect of Pri•• Type is
significant (E (2,20) = 17.35, e < .0001). Priming effects were analysed
separately for Report and No Report trials.
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Table 11
Repetition Associated
Report 109 88
No Report 33 8
(No Report only) 1 -25
Prime Identified 105 40
Prime Unidentified 44 21
(Prime Unidentified only) 5 -25
l~L~~2Qrt:The difference in mean RT>s between (a) repetition and unrel~ted
targets is significant (t (10) = 6.21, Q < .01), (b) associated and
unrelated targets is significant (t (10) = 3.07, Q < .01), and (c)
repetition and associated targets is not significant.
l~~L~Q 8!2Q[i: The difference in mean RT's between (~) repetition and
unrelated targets is significant (t (10) = 2.71, 2 < .05), (b) repetition
and associated targets is significant (1 (10) = 3.4, 2 < .01), but (c)
between associated and unrelated targets is not significant. If the trials
means for the four No Report only subjects are added to the No Report trials
of the other 11 subjects, then there is a significant difference between the
repetition and unrelated target RT's (t (14) = 2.83, e < .01), but no other
significant differences.
A separate analysis was performed to .ee if the meAns frOM subject. who
gave only No Report differed from the overall me~ns of subjects who gave
both Report and No Report. A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor
Report (*2) and within SUbjects factor Pri•• Type <* 3) shows that (a) the
main effect of Report is significant (E (1,13) = 4.97, Q < .OS), (b) the
main effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,26) = 7.02, Q < .01), and (c)
the interaction is signific~nt (E (2,26) a 3.74, 2 < .OS). Furth.r aep~r~t.
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analyses of the four No Report mean RT's revealed no significant
differences.
i£l Ig~Qi~f~~g~~[~~~~Q~Q~Qiifi~gQ[~m!!
The data was reanalysed on the following basis: (i) the Identified
category consisted solely of correctly identified primes, (ii) all reports
from reporting "Nothing" up to and including incorrect identification of a
prime, were included in an Unidentified category. This reallocation changed
the emphasis of the separation~ for in this second analysis many subjects
were aware of at least part of the prime word in the Unidentified category.
Nine of the fifteen subjects could identify a prime word on at least one
trial. Mean RT's for Identified and Unidentified were calculated and are
displayed in Table 10(b). A two way ANOVA was performed on this data with
factors Identification (Identified / Unidentified) and Prime Type
(repetition, aSSOCiated, unrelated). Identification is not significant. The
effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,16) = 22.68, Q < .0001). Priming
effects were analysed separately by Identification condition.
ii1 !g~Qi~fi~g:the difference in RT's between (a) repetition and unrelated
targets is significant (! (S) = 4.6, Q < .01), (b) repetition and associated
targets is significant (! (S) = 3.53, Q < .01), and (c) associated and
unrelated targets is not quite significant (t (8) = 1.78, critical value =
1. S6) •
ii~l~Qig!Qttfi!g:the difference in RT's between (a) repetition and
unrelated targets is significant (t (8) = 6.62, e < .001), (b) repetition
and associated targets is significant (t (8) = 2.8, e < .05), and (c)
associated and unrelated targets i. not significant. If the trial. means
from the six subjects who did not identify a word on any trial are added to
the Unidentified trial. of the other nine subjects, then the difference
between (a) the repetition and unrelated target RT's is significant (t (14)
= 3.35, Q < .001), (b) repetition and as.ociated targets is significant (~
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(14) = 4.22~ ~ < .OOl)~ and (c) associated and unrelated targets is not
significant.
A separate analysis was performed to see if the means from the nine
subjects who could sometimes identify primes (Identified) differed from the
overall means of six subjects who could not (Unidentified). A two way ANOVA
with across subjects factor Identification (* 2) and within subjects factor
Prime Type (*3) shows that (a) the main effect of Identification is not
significant although (b) the main effect of Prime Type is significant (E
(2,26) = 12.9S, Q < .001)~ and (c) the interaction is significant (E (2~26)
= 6.92, ~ < .01). Further separate analyses of the six Unidentified only
mean RT's revealed that the only significant difference was between
repetition and associated target RT's (! (S) = 3.01, Q < .OS).
~~z~~~Qi~~~~~!Qn
j~l ~[i!![i~f9[e~~[!n!!!
Comparison with Experiment 7 reveals, not surprisingly, that the number
of subjects who reported seeing at least a few letters of the prime,
increased substantially (from 2/15 to 11/15) when subjects were asked to
make their decision on a trial by trial basis. However, four &ubject& did
not report seeing a prime at any time during the experiment, and there was
still a high proportion of No Report trials for those subjects who reported
awareness on some occasions. The distribution of Report and No Report
depends partly on the expectations the subjects have of what they are likely
to see, and their consequent attentional strategies. Given the problems
associated with the critical SOA technique, the present procedure is
stronger because it allows for changes in .ensitivity and attentional
strategies during the experiment, and changes situational demand
characteristics by encouraging subject report.
1~1E[!mlngSff!SS!
The priming effect. for Report trials (Table 11) shows both repetition
and associative priming for the 11 subjects who could report at least
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something of the prime. However~ the associative priming effect for Report
trials appears to be partly attributable to inhibition for unrelated primed
targets (c.f. Neely, 1977). No Report data provided by the same subjects
shows a large and significant repetition priming effect, but only a small
and nonsignificant associative priming effect. There was no associative
priming effect for those subjects who never reported primes, indeed
associative primed targets were responded to slower than unrelated targets.
Results reallocated on the basis of correct / incorrect prime
identification provides the same pattern of priming. Reallocation includes
reports of (a) incorrectly identified words, (b) letters (correct or
incorrect), and (c) "something", as one category (Unidentified). This
category includes a high degree of partial cue information. The failure to
produce associative priming in the prime Unidentified category implies that
partial cue information has only a marginal affect on nonconsciou&
associative priming. It is worth noting that the priming effects (Table 11)
appear to be selective. Under all conditions associative priming is always
less than repetition priming.
The occurrence of nonconscious repetition priming in all conditions
shows that the failure to obtain nonconscious associative priming cannot be
due to complete peripheral masking. There is considerable evidence for some
peripheral masking under binocular presentation (e.g., Turvey, 1973),
although Marcel (1983a) claims nonconscious associative priming in several
experiments where presentation was binocular. If some contribution from
peripheral masking is assumed in the present experiments, then prime
information will be partially degraded. Under these conditions processing of
this minimal information could be sufficient to provide raised activation
facilitating a following repetition target, but insufficient to facilitate
an associated target.
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~~§~ ~~2~[im~n~l Eriming~i~nQ~~~~~[~n~§§in ~ Qi~bQ2~i~LDT ~b~[~
~~~[~n~§§i§ g~!~[mio~gQY 2Q§!=![i~1§~Qi~£![~2Q[!~
~~§~1!o~[QQ~~~iQO
Dichoptic presentation ensures central masking (Turvey~ 1973; Marcel~
1983a). According to Turvey's (1973) analysis central masking operates by
interruption rather than integration (Kahneman~ 1967). This may allow a
nondegraded representation and provide sufficient information for
nonconscious associative priming. The outcome of the earlier pilot studies
using the critical SOA technique was that effective dichoptic masking was
only obtained for small stimuli. These conditions produced no evidence for
nonconscious repetition priming (Experiment 1). Informal testing using the
display conditions used in Experiment 8~ except with dichoptic presentation
of target and mask, provided effective masking for most SUbjects. Comparison
of results from Experiments 7 and 8 shows that the proportion of Report
trials increases when subject·s attention is drawn to the fact that a prime
might be present. The optimum situation would be to maximise the number of
No Report subjects~ by using the post experimental report strategy. However
post-trial report has the advantage that it places less demand on subject·s
memory, and should therefore produce a more reliable result. The following
experiment was designed to be as similar as possible to Experiment 8 to
allow close comparison of results. If partial peripheral masking is the
reason why no associative priming has been found, then it should occur with
dichoptic presentation.
~~§~6~!tnQQ
1il §~ei!S~§
Eight female and seven male psychology undergraduates, mainly first
year, participated as part of their course requirement. Their ages ranged
from 19 to 36 with a mean age of 22.6. Only subjects tested to have 6/6
vision were accepted into the experiment.
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The same microcomputer apparatus was used as described for Experiment 7~
but with one major addition. A mirror stereoscope was constructed based on a
design described by Sperling (1970).
iiiil §~iID~liwere the same and presented in the same order as in
Experiment 8.
!Prime
!Onset
!Target
!Letterstring
!Onset
Mask
Dom. Eye t\\\\\\l Izlllt To----------------------~·~~~~~------------------~.~~·>Response
!< 100 >!
!< ----------- 600 msec ------------ > !
!Prime
'vLaLA 1/7//7 To----------------~-~-~-·-~--~-----------------------------~:~~~4Response
Non Dam. Eye
!<20 >!
Figure 7
The VDU screen was split and treated as two separate screens. Some
reformatting of the feedback messages was necessary, but the messages
presented essentially the same information as in E~periment 8. Subjects were
tested for visual acuity using the Lizar's eyesight test card, and then
tested for eye dominance using the modified version of the aligning
technique in a procedure fully described in Experiment 1. Subjects were
presented with the same instructions as in Experiment 8, on a separate
screen. They were then seated at the stereoscope and adjust.ents were made
for comfort. Two squares were presented in the centre of each half of the
screen, and subjects were asked if they saw one clearly defined square. The
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results of informal experimentation had provided a convergence setting for
the two sets of mirrors sLlch that it rarely needed adjustment. The rest of
the procedure was the same as in Experiment 8. The presentation sequence is
displayed in Figure 7.
}.!..§.!..}.!.. 8~§!:!!'!;§
l~L :r~§: ~nQ :~Q:[~§QQn§~§ (see Table 12)
Errors (misses) were approximately 21.for 'Yes' responses (words) and
did not differ across Prime type. Errors were much higher for the 'No'
responses at 81..An overall one way within subjects ANOVA was performed on
Yes/No Response. "Yes" responses were significantly faster than "No"
responses (E (1,14) = 93.54, P < .0001). Further analysis is of "Yes"
responses only.
Table 12
§!:!Qi~£~m~~nBr:! lm!~£LQ~ Er~m!i~Q!~n ~~Q![im!ni2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
"Yes" Responses "No" Responses
----------------------------------------------------
n Repetition Associated Unrelated Word/Nonword
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Report 5
No report 10
528
595
520
605
582
622
679
719
------------------------------------------------------------------
n = number of sUbjects.
191 E~!ming sff!s~! (see Table 13)
Results were partial led into Report and No Report trials using the same
criteria as in Experiments 7 and 8. Five of the fifteen subjects reported
seeing a prime word, or part of it, on at least one trial (29X of trials
were Report). Only three of these five subjects provided both Report and No
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Report data, one subject provided data in both categories but not under all
conditions, one subject provided only Report data on all trials. The
remaining ten subjects provided only No Report data.
Table 13
Eciming~!!~£i!c~~~ii~~iQ i~~m~~n~nc~l~i~QRT 1~~~£L
Repetition Associated
Report
No report
54 62
27 17
The mean RT's of the three subjects who gave both Report and No Report
data were analysed. A two way ANOVA was performed on this data with factors
Report (Report / No Report) and Prime Type (repetition, associated,
unrelated). There were no significant differences.
A separate analysis was performed to see if the means from subjects who
gave only No Report differed from the overall means of subjects who gave
both No Report and Report, or Report only. Mean RT's for these two groups
are displayed in Table 12. A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor
Report <* 2) and within subjects factor Prime Type (*3) shows that (a) the
main effect of Report is not significant, (b) the main effect of Prime Type
is significant (E (2,26) = 17.9, ~ < .0001), and (c) the interaction is
significant (E (2,26) = 4.28, e < .05). Report and No Report means were
analysed separately.
1~lB!e2(i=The difference between (a) repetition and unrelated RT's is
significant (i (4) = 3.91, e < .01), (b) associated and unrelated RT's is
significant (i (4) = 3.88, e < .01), but (c) there was no difference between
repetition and associated target RT·s.
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~iil ~Q B!QQ[!: The difference between (a) repetition and unrelated RT's is
significant (t (9) = 2.59, 2 < .05), (b) the difference between associated
and unrelated RT's is significant (t (9) = 3.2, Q < .05), but (c) there was
no difference between repetition and associated target RT' ••
~~§~~~ Qt~~~~~tQn
The most important finding is the appearance of nonconscious associative
priming. This suggests that binocular peripheral masking was present and may
have prevented associative facilitation in the earlier experiments.
Nonconscious associative priming of 17 msec is small compared with the
results from similar experiments (Fowler et al., 1981; Marcel, 1983a, de
Groot, 1983). These differences may be attributable to stimulus sets andlor
details of masking characteristics. The difference in the nonconscious
associative priming effect between Experiment 7, 8 and 9, provides support
for Chambers (Note 9) claim that dichoptic presentation is "critical"
(Marcel, 1983a, footnote p.232) in obtaining associative priming effects.
The outcome of the work described in Chapter Two was that there are
serious weaknesses in the critical SOA procedure as a stable ..asure of a
detection threshold. Nonconscious r.p.tition priming was obtain.d in a
procedure designed to overcome .Dee of th.s. weakn ••••• (EKperiment 2).
There was no evidence for noneon.ciou. a••ociative pri.ing using the
critical SOA technique (Experiments 3 and 4). A s.ri •• of expari-.nt. N••
designed to improve various aspect. of Hareel·. procedure for inve.tigating
nonconscious LDT priming (Experi.-nt. ~ to 9). Two further atta.pt. to
demonstrate nonconscious associative priming under binocular pattern .asking
conditions were unsuccessful (Experiments 7 and 8). The robust nonconscious
repetition priming effect in the same experiments indicate. that this
failure could not be due to complete peripheral masking. The results of
Experiment 9 demonstrate that nonconscious associative priming can be
obtained dichoptically. Comparison with other experiments in this area is
difficult because of (a) small but nontrivial difference. in procedure and
criteria for assessing awareness, and (b) different patterns of nonconscious
priming effects. These two aspects will be discussed separately.
i~l ~[!~![i!Q[!~~[!Q!§§
In Experiments 7 to 9 prime and mask presentation conditions were such
that most subjects detected only a few of the primes, whether report was
post-trial or post-experimental. A few subjects were able to detect a high
proportion of the primes. The principal criterion for determining lack of
awareness was the subjects' report that there was nothing other than the
mask before the target letterstring. A more detailed consideration of the
reliability of subject report under these conditions will be presented in
Chapter Five. Evidence for nonconscious or automatic processing in other
similar experiments is on the basis of criteria which range from (a)
inability to accurately detect the prime (Marcel, 1983a, Fowler et al.,
1981; Carr et al., 1982; Diaper, Notes 1 and 2), to (b) all reports of
letters other than the correct word (Evett and Humphreys, 1981, de Groot,
1983). These criteria are used to label categories variou.ly as (a)
"subthreshold" (Fowler et al., 1981, de Groat, 1983), (b) "zaro threshold"
(Carr et al., 1982), or (c) "No Report" COiapar, Notes 1 and 2). Allocation
to these categories may (a) follow an earlier detection task in a two task
paradigm (Marcel, 1983a, Fowler et al., 1981. Diaper, Not .. 1 and 2), or (b)
be assigned on a post-trial or post-experiMantal basis (de Groot, 1983,
Evett and Humphreys, 1981; Humphreys et al., 1983, Hu~hreys et al., 1984).
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S~l E[iming ~ff§£!§
Adopting these different criteria for awareness produces different
patterns of nonconscious priming. In addition the mode of presentation
appears to be particularly important, although even under dichoptic
presentation nonconscious associative priming effects CAn still be
unpredictable. For example, Fowler et al. (1981), in a dichoptic LDT, failed
to replicate a nonconscious associative priming effect obtained at 2000 msec
SOA when SOA was reduced to 200 msec. De Groot, (1983) on the other hand,
did obtain nonconscious associative priming in a binocular LDT where SOA was
240 msec. In the latter experiment less restrictive criteria were used to
determine lack of awareness. According to Chambers (Note 9), dichoptic
presentation is "critical" to obtaining nonconscious associative priming.
However Marcel (1980, 1983a) demonstrates nonconscious associative priming
in several binocular LDT experiments. Carr et'al. (1982, p.767) suggest that
such inconsistencies between experiments may arise:
When relatively small amounts of activation occur
from a prime, the influence of that activation may
be more difficult to observe in the processing of
word targets than in the processing of picture
targets, creating a situation in which one study of
words might find positive results and another might
find negative results even though activation from
subthreshold primes actually occurred in both studies.
The present experiments demonstrate that nonconscious associative
priming effects were only significant under dichoptic presentation. However,
for No Report subjects in the Mask conditions in the present e~peri.ant.,
associated targets were always responded to fAster than unrelated targets
but slower than repetition targets. If any nonconscious associative priming
was present it WAS Always smaller thAn the repetition priming and was very
fragile.
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CHAPTER FOUR
~~!~!ni[QQ~£itQn
The preceding experiments demonstrate that nonconscious associative
priming can significantly affect lexical decision time, but only under
dichoptic presentation. One major weakness in using the lexical decision
task is the small size of the priming effects. Further work on nonconscious
priming investigates priming of anagram solving. Differences in solution
times attributable to conscious priming can be measured in terms of seconds
rather than milliseconds. Large conscious associative priming effects were
expected to allow statistically significant evidence for nonconscious
associative priming under binocular presentation. In addition this
particular task was chosen in order to (i) investigate the effect of
nonconscious priming on retrieval of words from semantic memory, and (ii) to
examine the relevance of nonconscious processing to complex problem solving
tasks.
The prior presentation of the solution or a word associated with the
solution produces large conscious priming effects in anagram solving
(Dominowski and Ekstrand, 1967; Schuberth, Spoehr and Haertel, 1979, LeMay,
1972; Jablonski and Mueller, 1972). The effect of masked and nonma&ked
primes on anagram solution timeB i. investigated in the following
experiments.
Several authors (Schuberth et al., 1979; Mendelsohn, 1976; Mendelsohn
and O'Brien, 1974) suggest that two sequential stages are involved in
anagram solving; (i) the letters are rearranged to form a pO.Bible solution,
and (ii), the rearranged letters are compared with internal representations
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in semantic memory. The anagram solving procedure continues within this loop
until a successful match is obtained. Any factor which restricts or reduces
the potential set from which the solution is retrieved can be considered as
a cue. Cues operate at both stages as heuristics facilitating retrieval of
the solution word, producing a reduction in solution time.
i~t ~Q~[im!Q~Q~q[~m§Ql~~Qq
The first stage of reordering letters is affected by cues, some of which
are already present in the structural or orthographic rules of the language.
The following first stage factors are known to influence anagram solution
time; (f ) word length <Dominowski, 1966), Hi) number of letter moves from
anagram to solution <Dominowski, 1966), <iii) uncommon letters such as J, K,
Q, U, X, Z (Cohen, 1968), (t v) the transitional probabilities of bigrams and
trigrams (Mayzner and Tresselt, 1962, 1966; Mendelsohn and O'Brien, 1974),
(v) consonant-vowel patterns (Mendelsohn, 1976), and (vi), the number of
vowels overall (Mendelsohn, 1976). Several potential words or word units are
generated on the basis of these structural characteristics (Underwood and
Schultz, 1960) and matched against stored representations in order of word
frequency <Dominowski, 1967; Mendel sohn and 0'Brien, 1974; Warren and
Thompson, 1969). At the second stage of retrieval there is some evidenCR
that anagram solutions are faster for high frequency solutions than for low
ones (Dominowski, 1967; Warren and Thomson, 1969, Mayzner and Tressalt,
1958). However in other studies (Mendelsohn and O'Brien, 1974. Schuberth et
al., 1979) solution word frequency was only a marginal predictor of solution
times. The claim that imageability facilitates retrieval (Jablonski and
Mueller, 1972; Dewey and Hetherington, 1974), has not been supported by
Gilhooley and Johnson (1978).
let e[lmlg ini9[i! !9i~ln9
Several authors refer to prilling by the anagram solution .s "Direct
priming" (Dominowski and Ekstrand, 1967, Schubarth .t al., 1~79. JablonSki
and Mueller, 1972). In thR present eMperiments it will be c.ll~ "solution
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priming". Dominowski and Ekstrand (1967) investigated the relative effects
of conscious solution and associative priming on anagram solution times.
Their study involved two parts. In part one subjects were shown one of three
lists of words which contained either (a) solutions~ (b) associates~ or (c)
words inappropriate to the anagram solution. In part two subjects were
allowed 120 seconds to provide a verbal solution to an anagram. Dominowski
and Ekstrand found that priming by either the solution or its close
associates significantly decreased solution time compared with either
unprimed or inappropriately primed anagrams. The priming effect was
significantly greater for solution primed than associatively primed
anagrams. There was also "suggestive evidence" that association strength was
positively correlated with decrease in solution times. Jablonski and Mueller
(1972) replicated the solution priming effect but not the associative
priming effect. They suggest that their failure to show associative priming
may be due to differences in association strength between the two studies.
However, there may be other factors. For eKample, associative priming in the
LOT is known to be affected by intervening items (Oannenbring and Briand,
1982; Davelaar and Coltheart~ 197~). The effect of intervening items on
repetition priming in a LOT is small. These LOT findings may be
generalisable to anagram solving. Comparison between Jablonski and Mueller's
study and that of Oominowski and Ekstrand indicat. that in the former study
(i) association str~ngth between prime and solution was weaker, (ii) there
were additional intervening items in the form of instructions, b.tween pri ..
and anagram presentation, and (iii) there were fewer observations in
Jablonski and Mueller's 5tudy. There are several demonstrations that
category priming also decreases solution time (Safren, 1962, Schuberth et
al., 1979; Oewing and Hetherington, 1974). Schuberth et al. found thAt
category name priming was more effective for high .Ha.plArs ai a category
than low eHemplars.
Host authors (Schuberth et al., 1979, L-"ay, 1972, Warren and ThOMpson,
1969) agree with Mendelsohn (1976) that. "Fundallltntally the solution of
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anagrams is a retrieval problem, ie~ the subject's task is to retrieve a
word which is already in memory" (p.641). Safren (1962) suggested that
priming is produced through a restriction on the pool of words from which a
solution is to be retrieved. Dominowski and Ekstrand (1967) argued that
priming by associates produces differential availability for solution words.
Schuberth et al. (1979) described their category priming results within
Collins and Loftus (1975) model of semantic memory. According to this model
word priming produces spreading activation to associatively related nodes
which then facilitates subsequent retrieval. Activation spreads from the
node representing the prime word along association pathways "in an amount
that is inversely proportionate to the distance traversed" (Schuberth et
al., 1979, p.606). Schuberth et al. attribute the positive relation between
decrease in solution time and strength of association in their experiment to
differential levels of activation for associated nodes, where level of
activation is determined by semantic distance. A similar explanation was
offered for the overall results of the LDT experiments (Chapter Three).
However, anagram solving is probably a complex multi-facetted process with
priming acting in a number of different ways. Solution priming could be the
product of cumulative effects at the level of (i) feature analysis, (ii)
orthography, (iii) the visual whole word lexicon, (iv) the phonoiooicai
lexicon and (c) the semantic system. Same case .olution priming however can
be sufficently explained by activity at feature level only. On the other
hand, associative priming of the anagram solution .ugge.t •• ffact. operating
primarily at semantic level. There may also be a minimal contribution from
orthographic or feature priming if the same letter(s) occur in both prim.
and anagram.
There have been no attempt •• 0 far to a••••• the relative contribution
of automatic or nonconscious proc.s.ing and con.cious attention.l proc .....
to anagram .olving. For exaMple, it i. po••ibl. that in the fir.t .tage of
anagram solving, letter recoMbination i•• con.cious li.ited capacity
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process. However~ knowledge of the orthographic rules which facilitate
recombination is probably retrieved automatically.
The aims for the following series of experiments are (1) to demonstrate
conscious solution and associative priming effect in anagram solving and (2)
to use these results to investigate nonconscious solution and associative
priming using pattern masked primes.
1~~~ s~2~rim~Q~lQl In~~ff~£~of £9Q§£i9~§2rimiQ99Q ~n~g~~m!91~~i9n
~im~§~
1~£~!~!n~[QQ~£~iQn
The following experiment investigates the effect of three different
priming conditions on anagram solution times. The priming conditions are (i)
the solution~ (ii) a first associate of the solution, and (iii) an unrelated
word. The experimental procedure differs from that used by previous
investigators <Dominowski and Ekstrand, 1967; Jablonski and Mueller, 1972)
in several ways, (i) priming is by trial rather than previous exposure to a
word list, (ii) subjects are not informed of prime-anagram relationships,
and (iii) an unrelated condition was used to determine priming effect rather
than an unprimed or inappropriate condition. The hypothesis is that the
effect of the three priming conditions should provide results similar to
those of Dominowski and Ekstrand (1967).
Preliminary studies demonstrated that anagram solving was ..an a. quit.
threatening by some subjects, although others seemed to derive great
pleasure from it. The latter factor was a bonus. The former posed problem ••
Several people refused to continue after they failed to solve some of the
anagrams. These subjects saw the task as a covert intelligence test, and
considered themselves disadvantaged because they neither particularly
enjoyed anagram solving nor had much practice at it. Several authors (Di~on,
1971; Marcel, 1983a) have commented that nonconsciou. processes are most in
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evidence when the subject is in a relaxed or passive mood. A situation which
maJ(es some subjects feel threatened and anxt ous may therefore hinder
nonconscious processing.
Several measures were taken to make the task more acceptable and less
threatening. First, all subjects were specifically informed that the task
was in no wayan intelligence test, and a wide range of ability, from very
good to very poor, was needed for the experiment. Second, the first three
anagrams in the practice set were designed to be particularly easy; the
other 15 practice anagrams adequately reflected the difficulty of the
experimental set. Third, the experimental situation was made more
comfortable by providing a soft chair and hand held switch for the subject.
Fourth, subjects were specifically asked not to be discouraged if they
couldn't solve an anagram, but to keep trying until "time up".
~!.£!.f!.~!!ngQ
iU. E!:!tH!£!!
Six female and nine male first year psychology undergraduates took part
in the experiment as part of course requirements. Their ages ranged from 18
to 26 with a mean of 20. All subjects were tested to have 6/6 vision using a
Lizar's eyesight test card.
H.H. 8QQ!!:!!!!:!!
The same apparatus was used as for Experiments 5 to 9, except that a
Voice Key was interfaced with the interrupt timing card. The subjects verbal
response was relayed to the Voice Key timer, via a microphone. The
microphone was also connected to the Experimenter'. headphone ••
1~~~1e!:~m! !!Ug eU!9!:!!m e!~!:!
The word set consisted of 39 pairs of high-association concrete noun ••
The word set is fully described in Appendix A.10. Some were u.ed in
Experiments 6 to 9. Word length varied between 3 and 6 letter •• Word size
and visual angles were as detailed for Experiment 5 (Section 3.4.2(iii)).
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Overall word frequency varied between 3 and 1772 per million, with a mean
frequency of 102. Solution word frequency varied between 10 and 1772 per
million (Kucera and Francis, 1967). Mean solution word frequency was 113.4.
Prime word frequency varied between 3 and 1207 per million, with a mean of
91.3. In the associated condition primes were all first associates of the
solution. Mean association strength between prime and solution word was 43X
(Bousfield et al., 1961). The unrelated prime words were matched with the
associated primes for word length, word frequency, part of speech,
concreteness, and number of close associates. Three lists were constructed
such that each of the 39 anagrams received three different priming
conditions (solution, associated, unrelated). For example if in List A an
anagram was preceded by its associate, it would be preceded by the solution
in List B, and by an unrelated word in List C. Thus a solution time was
obtained for each anagram when primed by (a) the solution, (b) the fir.t
associate, and (c) an unrelated word. Order of presentation was randoeizad
for List A. The same random order was used to present the anagrams in Lists
Band C. A practice set of 18 word pairs, si~ for each of the priming
conditions, was constructed. Word frequency and association .trength wera
comparable. Anagrams were produced nonsystematically from tha target word ••
Constraints avoided successions of three l.tter. in the same sequence as the
solution, or any letter appearing in the display in the same position as the
solution. Highly informative bigrams or trigrams (e.g., ph, th, or .ch) did
not appear. The anagrams varied considerably in difficulty, fro. easy ones
with three letter (e.g., of cow) to quit. difficult .ix letters anagra ••
(e.g., of saucer). The intention was to keep the problem .et easy enough for
most people to solve.
ii~l ~rQS~g~r~
Subjects were randa.ly alloc.ted to list, and ... tad in tha ta.ting roo.
in front of the YDU. The experi ..ntar stArted the progr ... nd theraafter the
subject ratainad control of the experi ..nt until it h.d finished. Th. fir.t
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part of the program provided the experimental instructions. These are given
in detail in Appendix A.l1. In brief, subjects were given a definition and
examples of anagrams. They were told that a word would be presented followed
by an anagram. The task was to solve the anagram as quickly as possible and
speak the answer into the microphone. Subjects were told that (a) they had
60 seconds to solve the anagram, (b) the solutions were all common nouns,
(c) there may be several solutions to each anagram, (d) one solution would
be provided after the subject's response, (e) a solution would be presented
if they did not solve the anagram within 60 seconds. Subjects were advised
not to worry if they had a correct solution to the anagram which was
different to the one presented at the end of the trial. No explicit
instructions were given about the relationship between prime and anagrams in
this experiment as they would not be appropriate in subsequent experiments.
Subjects were expected to recognise the relationships between prime and
solution in the practice trials. There were 18 practice trials followed by a
two minute pause, or longer if the subject had any questions or comments. A
message inviting these was displayed on the screen. The 39 experimental
trials were presented in two blocks (20 and 19), with a 2 minute pause in
between. At the end of the experiment subjects ware thanked for their help.
Comments or criticisms of the experiment were invited.
Jyl Er!!!nt!t!QQ !!g~!Q~!
Presentation sequence was similar to Experi ..nt b (bOO .sec condition),
except that response requirements were different. During the resting pha ••
and inter-trial interval two arrows were displayed 1.23 in. apart in the
centre of the screen. All stimulus displays occurred betwaen the arrows. Th.
subject initiated each trial by pressing the hand-held MStartM button. A 500
msec pause was followed by a 500 .sec display of the pri •• word, then a 100
msec display of arrows only until the anagram was display.d. Th. anagram was
displayed until the subject"s response or bO seconds, which.ver was the
sooner. The anagram was replaced by the expected solution and the aolution
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time which were displayed for two seconds. The display then reverted to the
resting phase (arrows only).
1!..6!..~!.B ~\:!H.~
Incorrect solutions, together with solutions which were valid but not
the required solution, are termed "Exclusions". Anagrams unsolved at 60
seconds are termed "Misses". Misses and Exclusions are excluded from the
main analysis. Solution times for "Correct" solutions, percent Misses and
Exclusions are given in Table 14. The analysis is presented in two parts.
First, the number of anagrams solved within (i) 60 seconds, and (ii) three
seconds. Second, analysis of the mean solution times of those anagrams
solved within 60 seconds.
Table 14
~Qn~£lQ\:!~@n!9[!m Q[lming ~~ ~Ql~tiQn~ @n~ !~~Q£i!t!~ ~Q[~~ in ~~Q![lm!nt !Q
------------------------------------------------------------------
Priming Condition
---------------------------------------
Solution As.ociated Unrelated
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean Solution Time (secs) 1.2 2.2 6.6
Mean number Solved (Max=13) 12.3 11.9 10.7
Misses (% Condition) 3.1 J.6 10.8
Exclusions (7. Condition) 2.1 5.1 6.7
1!L an!i~!i!gf nY~![gf !Q!Q[III!Qi~~
l~L ~lthlQ!l~t~~£2Qg!. A one way within subj.cts ANOVA shows that the
effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,28) • 10.52, Q< .001). Separate
anal y... reveal that the di fference in the numb.,. of AlMtya.s 1101ved bet...-.n
(a) solution and unrelated pri.ing conditions is significant (E (1,14) •
18.1, Q < .001), (b) associAted And unr.lattld pri.in. conaitiantl is
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significant (E (1,14) = 15.2, Q < .01), but (c) the difference between
solution and associated priming is not significant.
(ii) ~~tn~Qtn[~~~~£QQQ!:the majority (797.)of Solution primed anagrams
were solved in the first three seconds compared with 327. of unrelated primed
anagrams. A one way within subjects ANOVA shows that the effect of Prime
Type is significant (F (2,28) = 80.31, Q < .0001). Separate analyses reveal
that the difference in the number of anagrams solved between (a) solution
and unrelated priming conditions is significant (E (1,14) = 172.1, Q <
.0001), (b) associated and unrelated priming conditions is significant (E
(1,14) = 70.7, e < .0001), and (c) the difference between solution and
associated priming is also significant (E (1,14) = 14.4, e < .01).
Furthermore, the number solved within the first second also differs widely
across priming condition. Across all subjects 108 (557.)of solution primed
anagrams were solved compared to only one (0.51.) unrelated, and 40 (211.)
associated primed anagrams.
1~1~!!n !g!y!~gn !~m!!
A one way within subjects ANOVA shows that the effect of Prime Type is
significant (E (2,28) = 32.55, Q < .0001). Separata analyses reveal that the
difference between (a) solution and unrelated priming conditions of 5.4
seconds is significant <t (1,14) • 5.62, e < .001), (b) associated and
unrelated priming conditions of 4.4. seconds is significant (t (1,14) • 4.28
e < .001), and (c) the difference between solution and associatad priming of
one second is also Significant <1 (1,14) • 3.09 e < .01).
~~~~~~~!!£Y!!~Qn
Most people were able to solve most of the anagr ... within the 60 second
time limit. However the number of anagra •• solv~ was aff.cted by the
prime-solution relation.hip. Nhen subject. were given the .olution,to the
anagram they solved 821. of the anagra.s. Only 79X of a.sociated p~i..d and
711. of the unrelated priMed anagra •• Mar•• olv.d. Ther. were ..v~al
solution. to so.. of the anagra •• even thOUgh can.id~abl •• ff~t had b..n
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expended in trying to select only single solution anagrams. This is almost
impossible when attempting to keep all the other factors such as word
frequency, concreteness, part of speech, and association strength balanced.
The results provide strong support for Dominowski and Ekstrand's (1967)
findings but are contrary to those of Jablonski and Mueller (1972) who
failed to find associated priming effects.
The aim of this experiment was to provide a task where lexical access
was assured. The results show that if people are given the solution to an
anagram they can solve it in about 1/5 the time it takes compared with when
no help is given. Furthermore, given the solution they can solve the anagram
in approximately half the time compared with when they are given a clue. The
one second difference between the two related conditions (solution and
associated) is less significant than the comparison between either of the.e
related conditions when compared to the unrelated condition. The faster
solution times for the two relatad conditions could reflect contributions
from both limited capacity attentional processes and from automatic
processes. The similarity between the solution and associated solution times
under the present conditions is worth bearing in mind when reviewing the
results of the following experiments. The long solution time for the
unrelated condition may be due partly to interference from inappropriate
attentional strategies, in addition to the lack of help in solVing the
anagram.
The assumption is made that subjects are aware of pri ..-solution
relationships. The following strategy for solving anagr ••• in the present
experiment was suggested by several SUbjects. The first strategy is
rearranging letters to see if they ••tch with the prt... If this fail.
associates of the pri.e are generated. The.e •••ociate. provide a larger but
still restricted retrieval set for .atching. Subject. know that the
solutions are all concrete and faMiliar noun. of between thr .. and SiM
letters. If rearranged letters fail to ..tch with associ.t~ ward. then the
routine of reorganising latters and attempting aatch .. continue •• This
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routine treats the anagram as if it were unprimed. The final procedure is
considerably delayed by the previously attempted but unsuccessful
strategies. This suggested sequence of operations is supported by the ratio
of the number of anagrams solved in the first three seconds. Less than half
of the number of unrelated compared with solution primed anagrams were
solved by this time. Exactly half the number of unrelated compared with
associated anagrams were solved. The higher number of solution and
associated anagrams solved within the first second may also indicate a fast
acting automatic process (Posner and Snyder, 1975). It was not possible to
separate automatic from limited capacity processes in the present
experiment. The following experiment was designed to investigate the
contribution of nonconscious automatic processes on anagram solution times.
The anagram solving task is strongly influenced by priming and provides a
wide separation between priming conditions. The following experiment
investigates whether solution and associative priming are still effective
when the prime word is masked to prevent awareness.
1~~~~~~!(~m!ntl!l e(~ming~itnQ~t!~!(!n!!!in !n!9(!m!QlyingL~n!(!
~~~(~n~!!i! q~t![min!Q~y Qg!t=!~Q![im@n!!l!~ei!~![@Q2(!gf eing~~l![lY
m!!~!QQ(im!!~
1~~~1~!n1[gQ~~1ign
The aim of the following experiment was to usa the materials and basic
procedure of Experimant 10, but in addition, to render the pri .. word
unavailable to consciousness using the masking procedura described in
Experi_ent 7. In ExperiMent 7 nonconscious priming effects were very s.a11
and the variance across subjects may have obscured statistical significance
of results. The large priming effects in Expari.ant 10 may increase the
chances of obtaining significant nonconscious associative priming if it
should occur. In order to maximise the chances of eliciting nonconscious
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associative effects the prime word presentation parameters used in
E>:periment 7, which provided Bb'l.No Report subjects, were adopted for the
following experiment.
Nine female and six male first year psychology undergraduates
participated as part of a course requirement. Their ages ranged between 17
and 22 with a mean age of 19. All subjects were tested to have a minimum of
b/b vision.
Materials and apparatus was the same as in Experiment 10, with the
addition of the pattern mask fully described for Experiment 7 (Section
s.e.zu n r.
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 10 with additional
instructions to account for the presence of the pattern mask. The
presentation sequence, similar to Experiment 7, is represented in Figure B.
!Prime
!Onset
!AnagrAm
!Presentation
!Onset
!Prime Mask
_Bo_t_h_E_ye_s__ --Jl.Vu.V.lJ!l~711\u.u.\\~\.J.:\\I.l.\\l.Jyl__------~Pl..Zl""""a~soi~tion
500 ->1<20 >1< 100 >11<-
Subject
Initiates !<------------- 600 ------------->!
Figure B
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Subjects were presented with five pages of instrLlctions~ given in detail
in Appendix A.12. Briefly, they were given a definition and examples of
anagrams. They were told that two arrows would be presented in the centre of
the screen and they were asked to "concentrate on watching the space between
the arrows". When they pressed start "a string of symbols would appear
followed half a second later by an anagram". The subjects were asked to
"watch the sequence carefully as the symbols would warn them that the
anagram was about to appear". They were told that "all solutions would be
common nouns and were asked to solve the anagram as quickly as possible~
speaking the answer out loud". The voice key relay system picked up their
answer and stopped the interrupt timer in the computer. Other instructions,
attempting to alleviate subjects worries about the task and to induce them
to relax, were the same as in Experiment 10.
There were 18 Practice trials followed by a two minute pause, then 39
Experimental trials in two blocks with a two minute relaxation period
intervening. At the end of the e>:perimental trials subjects were asked the
same series of questions as in Experiment 7 (see Appendix A.8), and thanked
for their participation.
Solutions which were valid but not the required .olution, together with
incorrect solutions, are termed "Exclusion.". Anagrams un.olved at 60
seconds are termed "Misses". Both were excluded from the main analysi ••
Solution times for "Correct" solutions, percent Mi •••• And Exclusion. tir.
given in Table 15 below. Subject result. ware allocated to a R.port or No
Report category sub.equent to the po.t .xperi..nttil qu••tioning u.ing the
same criteria as in Experimant 7. There were ~ive Report subject. and ten No
Report SUbjects. Mean .olution times, mean number ~ tinagra.s .alved, Mi ....
and Exclusions, are giyen in Table 15. Statistical antily.i. follow. the .time
procedure a. in Experiment 10.
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Table 15
6~~g[~m 2[~m~~g Q~ Q~~t~2[Q ill2§t!Q§Ql~i~Q~ 2~Q 2§§Q~~2i!Q2[~ill~§~~
;!5.2~[~ill~~i!!
Priming Condition
Solution Associated Unrelated
B~2Q[i
Mean Solution Time (secs) 2.6 5.1 6.1
Mean number Solved (May,=13) 12 10.2 10.6
Misses (I. Condition) 1.5 10.8 15.4
Exc l us i ons (I. Condition) 6.2 10.8 3.1
~Q B!2Q[t
Mean Solution Time (secs) 4.1 5.5 6.3
Mean number Solved (Ma>:=13) 11 10.6 10.8
Misses (I. Condition) 7.8 9.1 9.1
E>:clusions (I. Condition) 7.8 8.5 6.9
------------------------------------------------------------------
i~l ~~mQ![ Qf ~~29[~ill!§Ql~!Q
1~L ~~tn~~ !~~t~ !!£Q~Q!: A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor Report
(Report, No Report) and within subjects factor Prime Type (solution,
associated, unrelated) shows that the main effect of Prime Type is
significant (E (2,26) = 3.79, 2 < .05). The main contributor to this effect
was the difference between the number of solution and unrelated anagrams
solved (E (1,14) = 4.3, Q < .05).
1t~L ~~tntQ tn[!! !!£QQQ!= A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor
Report (Report, No Report) and within subjects factor Pri•• Type (solution,
associated, unrelated) shows that the .ain effect of Pri.. Type is
significant (E (2,26 • 18.88, e < .0001). Further analysis shows that (a)
the difference between the number of solution and a.sociated pri.ad anagra ••
solved is significant (E (1,14) • 35.7, S < .0001), (b) there was no
difference between the numbers of associated and unrelated anagra •• solved.
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A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor Report (Report~ No Report)
and within subjects factor Prime Type (solution~ associated~ unrelated)
shows that the main effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2~26) = 6.7~ ~ <
.01). There were separate analyses for Report and No Report subject means:
Jil 8~~Qr!:the difference in solution time between (a) solution and
unrelated primed anagrams is significant (! (4) = 3.4~ ~ < .OS)~ (b)
solution and associated primed anagrams is only marginally significant <1
(4) = 2.49, ~ < .OS 1 tailed).
liil~Q B~~Q[!:the only significant difference is between solution and
unrelated primed anagrams (! (9) - 2.81~ ~ ( .OS).
Further analyses were performed to ascertain the most appropriate
statistical method for analysing the present results. There was a remarkable
concordance in the results of these analyses. In the No Report category it
made little difference whether analysis was by Ca) number solved, either at
60 seconds or at three seconds~ Cb) mean solution times with or without
Misses included~ (c) median solution times~ or Cd) Mann-Whitney scores for
the means with Misses included. All these analyses show that in the No
Report category there is a significant difference between the solution and
unrelated condition, but not between the associated and unrelated condition.
4.3.4. Discussion------ ----------
The problem with post-experimental report is that intervening task. may
interfere with subjects' ability to correctly recall whether or not they had
seen a prime word. This problem ha. already been discu ••ed with reference to
Experiment 7. There may be a greater likelihood of correct recall in the
present experiment, for several rea.on •• First, there are fewer experi.ental
trials in this experiment (39 compared with 132), and therefore possibly
less interference. Second, awareness of a prime word related to an anagram
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solution is likely to be a more memorable event than the prime in a LDT.
These two factors may explain why there is a higher proportion of Report
subjects in the present experiment (5/15) compared with Experiment 7 (2/15).
lQl E~im!~g~ff~~t§
Several salient points emerge from this experiment. First, priming
effects from No Report subjects are assumed to reflect nonconscious
processes within the given criteria for awareness. Nonconscious solution
priming of 2.2 seconds is substantial and highly significant. Second,
although nonconscious associative priming is smaller (0.8 sec) and
non-Significant, it is in the predicted direction. Third the non-significant
associative priming cannot be due to complete peripheral masking because
there is significant solution priming under the same masking condition ••
Earlier experiments on the LDT suggested a contribution from peripheral
masking. Nonconscious associative priming has been demonstrated under
dichoptic central masking (Experiment 9; Marcel, 1983a, Fowler et al.,
1981). Two reasons are put forward for continuing with binocular
presentation, (a) the low ecological validity of dichoptic pre.entation to
studies of reading and visual perception in general, and (b) several studies
have demonstrated that nonconscious associative priming can occur under
binocular presentation (Marcel, 1983a; Evett and Hu.phrey&, 1981). If
failure to obtain nonconscious associative pri.ing is due to some
contribution from binocular peripheral masking then increa.ing the pri.e
duration may overcome some of the peripheral affect •• The following.
experiment investigates this possibility.
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1~1~~~~~[im~n!1~1In~~!!~~!Q! in~[~~§ing~[im~Q~[~tiQnQn ~[iming
~itnQ~!~~~[~n~§§in ~n~g[~m§Q!Ying~ n~[~~ ~[~n~§§i§ Q~I~[min~Q~~ eQ§1
~~~~[im~n!~!§~~j~~![~~Q[1~
1~1~!~!n1[QQ~~liQn
The problem addressed in the following experiment is how to make a
masked prime more available for nonconscious processing. This problem has
already been discussed prior to Experiments 7 and 11. Backward masking is
only effective for a 20 msec prime followed immediately by a 100 msec mask.
If prime duration or SOA are increased then mask effectiveness is seriously
impaired. Uttal's (1969a,b) dynamic visual noise experiment on the combined
effects of forward and backward masking offered the possibility of a
solution to this problem. Forward and backward masks presented independently
produced masking interference up to 30 msec SOA. When both masks were used
together, masking was effective up to 75 msec SOA for each component. Uttal
suggested that the two masks did not operate independently. The increase in
mask effectiveness was due to an interaction produced by "Some unknown
psychobiological process (which) may have extended the time constants of the
effects.N (p.1BO). Informal testing for the present experiment, using
backward and forward masks, showed that it was possible to increase prime
display time considerably and maintain effective masking. It is difficult to
determine the degree of peripheral masking under these conditions. As prime
duration increases there should be a corresponding decrease in the amount of
peripheral masking, if the ma.king parameters are kept constant. If Uttal's
findings apply to the present context then a considerable increa.e in prime
duration should be possible without a corresponding increase in Report. Tha
longer prime duration may provide evidence for nonconscious a.sociative
priming. The following experiment investigates this possibility. Pri.ing by
three masked prime relations (solution, associatad, unrelated) ware tested
across four prime durations (40, bO, 80 120 msec). Report was expected to
increase with prima duration.
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Sixty (23 male, 37 female) first year psychology undergraduates
participated as part of course requirements. Age range was 17 to 45 with a
mean age of 22.5. Only subjects tested to have 6/6 vision were accepted for
the e>:periment.
Materials, stimuli and apparatus were the same as in Experiment 11. The
second mask was constructed in the same way as the first version. The
forward mask was always different from the backward mask.
Subjects were nonsystematically allocated to Duration (40 msec, 60 msec,
80 msec, 120 msec) and List (A, 8, C). The procedure described for
Experiment 11 was followed for each duration in the present experiment.
!Prime
!Onset
!Anagram
!Presentation
!Onset
! Mask Prime Mask
--......-- __ --L.lKu\...l.\\..L\VJlLLJI/u.Z.L...Z""'/f\,Ll\u.\\..LSl..1, -~J7.L..711...l1~ztsoi~tion
1<- 500 -)!(100)!(Var)!(100)!
Both Eyes
Subject
Initiates !<------------ 600 -------------->! I
Figure 9
Two ~rrows were displ~yed in the middle of the screen during the resting
ph~se. Subjects initiated e~ch tri~l by pressing "St~rt". A ~OO mattc pilUS.
was followed by (~) the first m~.k displayed for 100 msec, (b) the prime
displayed for 20 msec ~nd (c) the second milsk displayed for 100 .sec. The
SOA between prime ~nd target remained constant ~t 600 .sec.
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Post-experimental allocation to Report and No Report adopted the
criteria used in Experiment 7 and fully described there. There were 35
Report and 25 No Report subjects, distributed nonuniformly across duration
(see Figure 10). Mean solution times, mean number solved, Misses and
Exclus ions , for each duration are given in Table 16. The statistical
analysis follows the same procedure as in Experiments 10 and 11.
14
~!:!!!.!!;!~r: 12
Qf. 10 § Report
§!:!!U~E~.§ 8
6 0 No Report
4
2
0
40 60 80 120
Figure 10
Qli1r:lQY1l2nQf B!QQ[1 !£[Qii Q[lm! 2Y[!1l2n! !~~~e~[lm!~1 !~
l!L ~~mQ![ gf !~!g[!~!!QiY!2
A four-way ANOVA was performed with across subjects factors Report
(Report, No report) and Duration (40, 60, 80, 120), and within subjects
factors Prime Type (solution, associated, unrelated) and Cut-off (60 sees, 3
secs). (i) The effect of Duration is not significant, (ii) Report i.
significant (E (1,52) • 7.55, Q < .01), (iii) the effect of Prim. Type i.
significant (E (2,104) = 18.29, e < .0001>, (Lv) Cut-off i. significant (E
(1,52) = 133.96, e < .(001). The interaction between (i) Duration and
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Table 16
~ff~s~Q± E~im~I~~~~~~~~~iQ~~~Q8~~Q~tQ~ §Ql~tiQ~tim~~~Q~~mQ~~Qf
~Q~g~~m§Ql~~QiQ ~~2~~im~~~1~
------------------------------------------------------------------
Priming Condition
Solution
--------------------------------------
Associated Unrelated
------------------------------------------------------------------
Rep NoRep Rep NoRep Rep NoRep
------------------------------------------------------------------
1Q m§~s~[im~Q~[~~iQ~
Number of subjects
Mean solution time (secs)
Mean number- Sol ved (Max=.13)
Misses ('l. Condition)
Exclusions ('l. Condition)
~Q m§!£~[~m!g~[~t~Q~
Number of subjects
Mean solution time (secs)
Mean number- Solved (Max=13)
Misses ('l. Condition)
Exclusions (1. Condition)
§Q m§!£Q[im!g~[~~ign
Number- of subjects
Mean solution time (secs)
Mean number Solved (Max=13)
Misses (1. Condition)
E>:clusions (1. Condi tion)
1£Q m!!£e[~m!g~[~t~9Q
Number- of subjects
Mean solution time (secs)
Mean number Solved (Max-13)
Misses (1. Condition)
Exclusions (1. Condition)
B£[9!! ~!!g~[!1i9Q!
Number of subjects
Mean solution time (sees)
Mean number Solved (Max=13)
2 13
2.6 6.9
11.5 11.2
o 7.1
11.0 7.1
4.0 7.0
12.0 10.3
o 9.5
7.B 10.7
4.2
10.8
6.8
10.8
4.4
11.6
3.B
6.2
4.0
12.0
4.4
3.9
6.6
10.8
5.1
10.8
4.7
9.B
10.B
:5.9
3.7
12.0
7.7
o
4.2 5.S
11.6 11.0
5.5 6.3
12.0 10.5
o 12.4
(I 5.9
5.4
11.7
7.7
3.1
5.2
11.6
5.4
6.2
6.2
10.5
9.3
B.3
5.9
11.7
10.3
3.1
5.9
11.0
9.2
6.2
7.1
B.O
7.7
IS
5.6 6.3
11.5 11.0
------------------------------------------------------------------
9
2.6
12.0
2.6
6.2
10
1.7
12.3
1.5
3.B
14
1.8
12.B
o
2.1
6
4.1
12.0
6.4
6.2
:5
3.3
11.8
7.7
1.5
1
1.7
10.0
7.5
7.7
35 25
2.2 4.0
12.2 11.1
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Prime Type is significant (E (6,104) = 3.8, Q < .01), (ii) Prime Type and
Cut-off is significant (E (2,104 = 14.14, Q < .0001), (iii) Duration, Prime
Type and Cut-off is significant (E (6,104) = 2.19, Q < .05).
Separate analyses were performed to look at the effect of Report and
Prime Type on the number solved at the two Cut-off paints (60 seconds and
three seconds).
liL ~~mQ~rgf ~~~gr~m§§Q~~!Q~itni~§i~t~§~£g~Q§
A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor Report (Report, No Report)
and within subjects factor Prime Type (solution, associated, unrelated)
shows that (a) the effect of Report is significant (E (1,58) = 3.03, Q <
.001), (b) the main effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,116) = 7.95, 2
< .001).
Separate one way within subjects ANOVA's with factor Prime Type were
performed at each duration for both Report and No Report SUbjects:
l~L B~QQ[t: The effect of Prime Type on the number of anagrams solved is
significant at 120 msec prime duration (t (2,24) = 24.71, ~ < .0001), but is
not significant at 40, 60, and 80 msec prime durations.
(b) ~g B!2Q[t:The effect of Prime Type on the number of anagrams solved is
not significant at any of the prime durations.
JiiL ~~mQ!r gf !D!9[!ID!!g!~!g ~iSDiD SDrt! !!~QDg!
A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor Report (Report, No Report)
and within subjects factor Prime Type (solution, associated, unrelated)
shows that (a) the effect of Report is significant (E (1,58) = 16.01, e <
.001), (b) the main effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,116) = 43.06,
Q < .0001), (c) there is a significant interaction (E (2,116) = 13.61, g <
.0001). Separate one way within subjacts ANOVA's on the effect of Prima Type
were performed at each duration for both Report and No Report subjectsl
i!L B!QQC~: The effect of Prime Type on the number of anagrams solved is
significant at the following prime durations, (i) 60.sec (E (2,16) = 7.43,
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e. < .01)~ (ii ) 80 msec (E (2~20) = 24.98~ Q < .00(1)~ (iii) 120 msec (F
(2~24) = 46.36~ Q < .0001).
iQL ~g B~eg~!:The effect of Prime Type on the number of anagrams solved is
significant at 80 msec prime duration (E (2~8) = 4.97~ Q < .05)~ but not
significant at 40~ 60~ and 120 msec durations. Further analyses at 80 msec
prime duration indicates that the difference in number solved between
solution and unrelated primed anagrams is marginal (E (1~4) = 7.56~ Q =
.051). There were no other significant differences.
iQ~ ~~~~ §Ql~!tQ~Itm!~
An overall three way ANOVA with across subject factors Report (Report,
No report) and Duration (40, 60, 80, 120), and within subjects factor Prime
Type shows (i) a marginal effect of Report (E (1~52) = 3.17, e = .(58), and
(ii) a significant effect of Prime Type (E (2,104) = 17.41, Q < .00(1), but
(iii) Duration did not affect solution times.
Figures 11 and 12 appear to show an interaction between Prime Type~
Duration, and Report. This interaction is not significant, possibly because
there were so few subjects in some conditions. Figure 12 indicates that for
No Report subjects there is sUbstantial priming at long durations but
clearly not at short durations. Figure 11 indicates that for Report
subjects, priming effects are not significantly affected by Duration.
Separate one way ANOVA's with across subject factor Report (. 2) and
within subjects factor Prime Type (*3) were performed at each Duration.
40 m~~£Q~[~i~Qn:Neither the effect of Report nor of Prime Type is
significant.
~Q m~!£Q~~ittQn:The effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,26) =
7.28, Q < .(01), but the effect of Report is not. Further analysis indicates
that for Report subjects there is a significant difference in solution times
between solution and unrelated primed anagram. (E (1,8) • 24.3, e < .01),
but not between associated and unrelated primed anagram •• There were no
significant differences for No Report sUbjects.
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Solution
Figure 11
~ii~£i Qi erim~ I~Q~ ~nQ Q~c~iiQn Qn §Q!~iiQn iim~ iQr 8@QQCi §~Qj@£i§ in
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Figure 12
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80 ~§~~ Q~[~l!Qn:The effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,26) =
11.18, Q < .001), but the effect of Report is not. Further analysis
indicates that for Report subjects there is a significant difference in
solution times between solution and unrelated primed anagrams (E (1,9) =
13.6, Q < .01), but not between associated and unrelated primed anagrams.
For No Report subjects the difference between solution and unrelated primed
anagrams is also significant (E (1,4) = 15.04, e < .05), but the difference
between associated and unrelated primed anagrams is not.
120 ~§~~ QH~~iiQn:The effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,26) =
8.10, ~ < .01), but the effect of Report is not. Further analysis indicates
that for Report .subjects there is a significant difference in solution times
between (i) solution and unrelated primed anagrams (E (1,13) = 91.6, Q <
.0001), (ii) associated and unrelated primed anagrams (E (1,13) = 6.93, Q <
.05), and (iii) solution and associated primed anagrams (E (1,13) = 16.73, Q
< .01). A within subject comparison for the one No Report subject revealed
no significant differences.
Only five subjects were included in the No Report category at 80 msec
Duration and one at 120 msec duration. Separate analyses performed for these
six subjects indicate that the difference in solution time between (i)
solution and unrelated primed anagrams is significant (~ (5) = 4.79, Q <
.01), (ii) associated and unrelated primed anagrams is significant (~ (5) =
2.59, Q < .05, one tailed», demonstrating a binocular nonconscious
associative priming effect.
~~~~~~R!§S~!!!QQ
1~1~[!~~[!~fQ[~~~[~n!!!
The post-experimental Report allocation procedure was the same as in
Experiment 11 and has already been discussed there. In the presant
experiment, the inverse relationship between prime duration and number of No
Report subjects is as predicted (sea Figura 10). The one subject who did not
report seeing a prime word at 120 msec was questioned intensivaly subsequent
- 126 -
to the normal questioning procedure at the end of the exper iment to
ascertain the veracity of her lack of report. Whatever way the questions
were put she remained adamant that she did not see a prime word at any time.
Some subjects were able to identify the first prime word that they saw.
These identifications were usually of primes which occurred in the last
block of experimental trials. The identifications contained more solution
and associated primes than unrelated primes. It is possible that all prime
types were recognised equally often but subjects were better able to recall
related primes. However~ subjects often gave an indication of when they
first saw a prime word by an exclamation of surprise or a sudden intake of
breath. These incidents, recorded by the experimenter, supported the
subject's post-experimental recall.
l~le[tmt~g~ff~£t§
The results demonstrate that it is possible to achieve effective masking
under a wide range of prime durations. As expected the proportion of cases
where masking is effective is inversely related to prime duration.
Sandwiching the prime word between successive pattern masks allows an
increase in prime presentation duration sufficient for nonconscious
associated priming.
The duration of the prime appears to make little difference to amount of
priming when subjects are aware of at least some aspect of a prime word.
Figure 11 illustrates the separation between the solution, associated, and
unrelated priming conditions for these Report subjects. A relatively
constant amount of significant priming was obtained for both solution and
associated primes, displayed from between 40 and 120 msec.
If the prime is not reported then priming effects see. to be dependent
on how long the prime is displayed for. Figure 12 appears to show a regular
psychometric function where the effect of Prime Type increa ••• with
duration. If the prime word is displayed for only 40 m.ee it doe. not appear
to contribute at all to priming. Nonethel ••• , there were .ar. an.gra ••
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salved within the first three seconds when preceded by the solution to the
anagram~ than when preceded by either of the other two Prime Types. A 60
msec prime duration provided sufficient nonconscious processing to enable
solution priming. There was a similar significant increase in the number of
anagrams solved at both three and sixty seconds. It was not until prime
duration was 80 msec that the effect of associative priming became evident
for the five No Report subjects at that duration. A similar result was
obtained for the one subject who did not report seeing a prime or any part
of it at 120 msec. Indeed, her solution times for solution and associative
priming are as fast as those subjects who did report seeing a prime. If her
results are added to those of five subjects who gave No Report at 80 msec~
then for those six subjects, anagrams preceded by an associated word were
solved significantly faster than those preceded by an unrelated word. This
nonconscious associative priming effect is not as clear as might be hoped
because there are so few No Report SUbjects.
Comparison between Figures 11 and 12 suggests different functions
dependent on whether or not people are aware of the prime word. The graphs
appear to provide support for the functional distinction based on Report
which has been used throughout the present e~periments. Brief presentations
of stimuli which are detected can produce comparable priming effects to
those obtained from much longer displays of the same stimuli where
presentation is not detected. Awareness appear. to reduce the dependence of
priming on stimulus conditions. In other words, one function of con.cious
attentionai processes may be to enhance activation in some way in order to
overcome poor definition or "weak" stimuli.
Although nonconscious as.ociative pri.ing has been obtained, it is
difficult to predict how robust this effect is. There are several reason.
for this; (i) the marginal significanc. of the nonconscious Associative
priming effects, (ii) subjects were not told that a pri... ight b. pres.nt,
(iii) awareness WAS not determined until the end of the e~peri ..nt.
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It is possible that the small "nonconscious" associative priming effects
may be attributed to occasions when subjects were aware of the prime but
subsequently forgot the event. On the one hand, it would be a memorable
event if the subject saw either a solution or an associated prime and linked
this event with the solution to the anagram. On the other hand, the effort
invol ved in trying to solve the 39 e>:perimental anagrams may lead to the
subject forgetting such an inCident, particularly if it occurred early in
the e>:periment. This argument would only be adequate to explain failure of
post-experimental recall if there were only one or two occasions when the
subject saw a prime word. It seems very unlikely that the subject would
forget a large number of such events.
~~~~5~e~~~m~~t1~1 Er~m~~ggf 2n!gr!ID!g!~ing~nQ!r~2r~~~gm!!~~ng
~gnQitign§~n!r!!~!r!n!§§i§ Q!t!rmin!Q~~ QQ§t:tri2!!~Qj!~tr~eQ~t
~~~~1~!~trQQ~~t~Q~
In Experiment 12, subjects were not expecting to see a prime word.
Several No Report subjects were unconvinced at the end of the experiment
that a prime word had been presented. They were only assured of the fact
after the experimenter showed them a slowed rerun of the condition in
question. Some subjects were able to accurately identify the prime words. It
is possible that a number of subjects had partial or complete knowledge of
some primes but failed for some reason to report this. The following
experiment poses two questions. First, what proportion of the critical No
Report results might have been attributable to instances where subjects were
aware of the prime but did not report? Second, would a similar result be
obtained if subjects attentional strat.gy was influenced by their
expectations? For example, if subject. are told that "so..thing" will b.
presented, at le.st on soe. occa.ions, they will probably look far it
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instead of passively watching the same display and waiting for the anagram
to appear. This should increase the proportion of Report data.
The results of the previous experiment demonstrated nonconscious
associative priming for the combined 80 and 120 msec duration No Report
sUbjects. Only one subject gave No Report at 120 msec. Preliminary testing
showed that under the following procedure most subjects would be able to see
prime words presented for 100 or 120 msec. Consequently only 60 and 80 msec
prime durations are tested under forward and backward masking conditions. A
third condition is included where the prime is presented for 20 msec but
backward masked only as in Experiment 11. The issue of particular interest
in the following experiment, is whether there will be any evidence for
nonconscious priming when awareness is assessed on a trial by trial basis.
1~§~~~!tn2Q
1~1§~~i!£t~
Nine male and nine female first year psychology undergraduates
participated as part of a course requirement. Age range was 17 to 23 with a
mean of 19.6. Only subjects tested to have 6/6 vision were accepted for the
experiment.
1~~1aQQ!t!i~!
Apparatus and materials were the same as in Experiment 12, with one
exception. Three stimuli were deleted from the stimulus set in order to
provide a balanced set of primes and anagrams for the three prime Durations
and three Prime Types. Thus 36 prime anagram pairs were used; there were
four trials at each Duration and for each Prime Type.
liyl E[gS!g~[!
Each subject was randomly assigned to a List (A, B, C) and received all
Prime Types (solution, associated, unrelated> at each Duration (20, 60, eO).
Across subjects all targets were presented under each condition and all
primes were presented at each duration. Procedure was the same as in
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Experiment 12 with the following additions to instructions. Subjects were
told that after they pressed "Start" they would see a string of symbols
between the arrows in the centre of the screen, and on some occasions
something other than the symbols would appear. Their tasks were (a) to solve
the anagram as quickly as possible, (b) speak their answer into the
microphone, and (c) to report whether or not they had seen anything other
than the symbols before the anagram appeared. Full instructions are given in
Appendix A.12.
(v) E[~~~nt~tiQn~~g~~n£~
For the 60 and 80 msec durations the presentation sequence was the same
as in Experiment 12. For the 20 msec duration the sequence was the same as
in Experiment 11. In addition, at the end of each trial there was ~ one
second dark period followed by a two second display of the message "That was
trial £ (X) Was there anything other than the symbols?". The display then
returned to the resting state (arrows only) until the subject pressed
"Start" for the next trial.
1~~~~~B~§~!t§
At each of the prime Durations there were only four presentations of
each Prime Type. Trials were allocated to Report c~tegory adopting the s~me
criteria as in Experiment 8. This produced 56X Report tri~ls and 44X No
Report trials. All subjects provided .ome Report and some No Report trials.
However many subjects failed to provide Report or No Report results for sa.e
Prime Types or Durations. Misses and Exclusion. were assessed a. in
Experiment 10. Mean solution times are calcul~ted from the trial. d~ta. Mean
solution times ~nd number of trial. for both R.port and No Report at each
Dur~tion, are given in Table 17. Mi•••• and Exclusions ~ra given for Report
~nd No Report trials overall.
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Table 17
Ibg gffgst ef e[i~g g~[~tien en 8~ee[t ~ng §el~tienti~~ in ~~eg[i~~nt!~
Priming Condition
Solution Associated Unrelated
B~EQBI IB1Bb§
J§l ~Q m§~£ Q[im~ Q~[§~iQn
Mean solution time (secs)
Number of trials
lQl ~Q m§~s Q[im~ Q~[~~iQn
Mean solution time (secs)
Number of trials
1£l §Q m§~s Q[im~ g~r~tiQn
Mean solution time (secs)
Number of trials
19l Qy![!ll [!§~lt§
Mean solution time (secs)
Misses (I. total trials)
Exclusions
2.6 2.8 7.8
24 20 14
1.5 3.0 5.6
46 44 37
1.4 3.2 5.6
57 51 41
1.6 3.2 5.6
0.7 2.4 6.6
3.7 2.3 3.7
~Q 8sEQ8I I81Bb§
J§l ~Q m~!£ Qrim! Q~ritiQn
Mean solution time (secs)
Number of trials
iQl ~Q m!!£ Qrim! g~r~tiQn
Mean solution time (secs)
Number of trials
l£~ ~Q m!!£ erim! g~r!liQQ
Mean solution time (secs)
Number of trials
igl QY@[~l! r@!ylt!
Mean solution time (sees)
Misses (% total trials)
Exclusions
2.9 4.8 5.8
38 41 44
3.9 5.5 7.1
18 20 24
3.3 5.4 6.6
10 13 20
3.1 5.S 6.3
7.8 10.8 11.8
3.2 4.6 2.8
------------------------------------------------------------------
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(a) ~~m~~~Qf ~~~g~~m? ?Q1Y~Q
lit ~i~bi~ ~Q ?~£QnQ?: A three way within subjects ANOVA was performed
with factors Report (Report, No report), Duration (20, 60, SO), and Prime
Type (solution, associated, unrelated>. The effect of (i) Report is not
significant but is suggestive (E <1,17) = 3.27, Q = .OS), (i i ) neither the
effect of Duration nor Prime Type has a significant effect on the number of
anagrams solved. The interaction between (i) Duration and Report is
significant (E (2,34) = 30.91, Q < .0001>, (ii) Prime Type and Report is
significant (E (2,34) = 5.13, Q < .05). Separate analysis of the number of
anagrams solved by Report and No Report trials showed:
8!QQ~~ ~~!!l?: a one way ANOVA across all Durations shows that the effect of
Prime Type is significant (E (2,34) = 6.53, Q < .01). The difference in
number solved between (i) solution and unrelated primed anagrams is
significant (E (1,17) = 11.24, Q < .01), (ii) associated and unrelated
primed anagrams is significant (E (1,17) = 5.02, e < .05).
~Q 8!Qgr~ ~~!!l!= a one way ANOVA across all Durations shows that the effect
of Prime Type is significant (E (2,34) = 3.41, Q < .05). This effect is
attributable mainly to the difference between solution and unrelated primed
anagrams (E (1,17) = 5.46, Q < .05). Associative priming was not
significant.
liit ~~m~~[ !2iY!Q ~itn!n tn[!! !!~QQQ!: The following analysis is for
number solved for Report and No Report trial •• Thi. was collap.ed acro ••
Duration as there was insuffucient data to include Duration a. a factor. A
two way within subjects ANOVA with factors Report (*2) and Prime Type (. 3)
shows that the following effects are significant (i) Report (E (1,17) •
12.78, Q < .01>, (b) Prime Type (E (2,34) :I: 27.4, Q < .0001>, and (c) the
interaction (E (2,34) = 9.94, e < .001). Further analyse. were of Report and
No Report separately.
8!QQ[t t[!!i!1 the difference in number solved between (1) solution and
unrelated pri_ed anagrams i. significant (E (1,17) • 34.99, e < .0001), (ii)
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associated and unrelated primed anagrams is significant (E (1,17) = 19.6, e
< .001).
~2 B~e2[!![~2k§:there are no significant differences.
(b) ~~2n§2k~!~gnI~m~§
Several subjects failed to provide Report or No Report data for each
Duration and Prime Type. Duration was collapsed within subjects to allow an
analysis of variance on the overall results. Two subjects failed to provide
an overall No Report mean, and one subject failed to provide an overall
Report mean for one Prime Type. An analysis of variance was perfomed on the
data provided by the remaining 15 SUbjects. A two way within subjects ANOVA
on the overall results with factors Report (Report, No report) and Prime
Type (solution, associated, unrelated) shows (i) the effect of Report is
significant (E (1,14) = 7.47, e < .05), and (ii) the effect of Prime Type is
significant (E (2,28) = 10.82, e < .001). Separate analyses of the
significant Prime Type effect for No Report trials revealed significant
differences between (i) solution and unrelated primed anagrams (E (1,14) =
6.3, e < .05), and (ii) between solution and associated primed anagrams (E
(1,14) = 5.82, e < .05). Associative priming was not significant. There was
a further analysis of Report and No Report trials at each Duration.
B!QQ[! ![!~!!
~Q m!!~ Q~[!1~QQ: the only significant difference is between solution
and unrelated primed anagrams (i (18) = 1.8, e < .05 (1 tailed».
~Q m!@£ 9~[~itQn:the difference in solution time between (i) solution
and unrelated primed anagrams is significant <1 (31) = 2.68, e < .01), and
(ii) solution and associated primed anagrams is significant (1 (31) = 2.18,
Q < .05).
~Q m!!~QH[!1tQQ:the difference in solution time between (i) solution
and unrelated primed anagrams is significant (1 (32) = 4.96, e < .OOl), (ii)
solution and associatad primed anagrams is significant (1 (32) = 2.16, g <
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.05), and (iii) associated and un~elated p~imed anagrams is significant (i
(34) = 2.12, Q < .05).
~9 B~Q9~ti~i~l§
~Q ~§~~ g~~~iiQn:the only significant difference is between solution
and unrelated primed anagrams (i (29) = 2.21, Q < .05).
~Q ~§~£g~~~iiQn:the difference between solution and unrelated primed
anagrams is significant <i (23) = 1.46, 2 < .05 (1 tailed».
§Q ~§~£g~~~iiQn:there are no significant differences between priming
conditions.
1~~~1~Qi§£~§§iQn
l~l ~[it~[i~fQ[~~~[~n~§§
Criteria for awareness are the same as those in Experiment 8, except
that a different intervening task was employed. The Report distribution for
the present 20 msec duration may be compared with the post-experimental
report distribution in Experiment 11. In that experiment 5/15 subjects gave
No Report. In Experiment 13, when subjects were asked to report at the end
of each trial, 2/18 subjects gave No Report (20 msec duration only). Seven
other subjects who provided Report data at 20 msec duration did so for only
one trial. None of these subjects were able to identify the prime.
Altogether, half of the SUbjects could report either little or no awareness
of the primes. As both time of report and instructions to subjects differed
between experiments, it is not possible to determine which variable most
affected the difference in Report distribution. Whatever the reason, the·
trial by trial procedure should provide a more accurate estimate of report
because (i) it can more easily accommodate changes in sensory sensitivity,
(ii) changes in response criteria, (iii) changes in attentional strategy,
and (iv) allows the subject to provide a more immediate account of what they
were aware of.
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1~1E~!~!og!££~£~~
The most important result from this experiment is that the nonconscious
solution priming effect remains significant at both 20 and 60 msec prime
durations, when awareness is determined post-trial. The nonconscious
associative priming effect in Experiment 13 remains at the same absolute
level as in Experiment 12 and, although large and regular, is
nonsignificant. The assumption is that report accuracy is greater in the
post-trial procedure, compared to the post-experimental procedure. If part
of the "nonconscious" priming effect obtained using a post-experimental
criterion (Experiments 11 and 12) was due to conscious but unreported
priming, then nonconscious priming should be lower as report accuracy
increases. Comparison with the results of comparable presentation conditions
in Experiments 11 and 12 shows that trial by trial determination of
awareness produces equal or larger nonconscious priming effects than does
post-experimental report.
It is still possible that subjects are failing to report solution primes
for some reason or another, and even post-trial questioning is insufficient.
Several subjects throughout the course of the experiments stated that
sometimes they imagined the prime rather than saw it. They were only
convinced that they had actually seen the word after this had happened a few
times. Failure to report may be connected with recall inability subsequent
to interference from the anagram solving task. In the following experi.ant
SUbjects are asked, before they attempt to solve the anagram, whether or not
a prime word was present.
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~~~~~~Q~~i~~otl~l E~i~ingQf ~n~g~~~~Q!Yingin ~ t~Q=t~~~Q~~!Qig~~itb
Q~i~~~~QQ~tQ~~£~Qing~n!g[!~Q[~~~n~~~iQn~
~~~~!~Int[QQ~£tiQn~
The results of Experiment 13 show nonconscious solution priming in the
absence of significant nonconscious associative priming. Nonconscious
solution priming may be due to some contribution from conscious attentional
processes. For example, partial cue information (such as the first letter of
the solution) may be consciously available at the time of presentation. If
this information is only weakly represented then interference from the
anagram solving task may interact with recall. The following experiment
investigates nonconscious priming where prime recall is not subject to
interference from the anagram solving task. A two-task trial by trial
procedure is used, where a presence-absence judgement precedes presentation
of the anagram. This procedure is included within the most restricted
version of Dixon's (1971) second criterion for assessing awareness. The
intention was to keep the following experiment as comparable as possible
with Experiments 11 and 12. However, the the manual presence-absence task
required an increase in prime-anagram SOA of 160 msec to 760 msec SOA.
~!.~:.£!. t!!!QQQ
.H.l. §~~i!!5.!~
Five female and ten male first year psychology undergraduat.s took part
as a course requirement. Age range was 18 to 39 with a mean of 24.5. All
subjects were tested to have 6/6 vision •
.1H.l ~Q![!t~!
The same apparatus was used as in Experiment 11, but with the following
additions. A response panel was constructed similar to the one described in
the LOT experiments (see Experiment 6). Three low profile fast repon ..
buttons, similar in operation to touch sensitive membran.s, ware used to
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allow madmum facilitation in RT. They were situated 3.3 in. apa....t in an
inve....ted triangle, marked "YES" and "NO" at the top and "StART" at the
bottom. The ....esponse buttons were connected to the interrupt timer in the
microcomputer. All other equipment, materials and stimuli were the same as
in Expe ....iment 11.
Initial procedure was the same as in Experiment 13. Instructions were
the same except that subjects were told that after pressing "Start" they
would see a string of symbols appear between the arrows, and on some
occasions they might see something other than the symbols. If they saw
anything other than symbols they were to press the "YES" button <dominant
hand) as quickly as possible. If they saw only symbols, they were to p....ess
the liND" button <nondominant hand) as quickly as possible. If response was
too slow then they would receive a message telling them it was "Too late"
and asking them to try again. After the "Yes/No" decision they would be
presented with an anagram. Their second task was to solve the anagram as
quickly as possible and speak the answer into the microphone. Further
instructions were the same as in E>:periment 13 except that at the end of
each trial subjects were asked to elaborate on what they had seen prior to
the anagram.
!Prime
!Onset
!Anagram
!Prelientation
!Onliet
!Prime Malik
B_o_t_h_E_y_es .LVL..17u/..Ll.4I\~\~\~\~\.~Su' .,..--__ ~VL.I',-,Iu..ltsoi~tion
T<- 500 ->! <20 >! < 100 >! 1< Var >
Subject Ves/No
Initiates Response
!<----------- 760 mliec ------------>
Figure 13
e~~~~Q~!~iQQ!~gY~Q~~f~ ~~e!~l!@o~!4 (time in msec)
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ilYLE~~§~~t~~lQ~§~g~~~~~
During the resting phase two arrows were displayed 1.2 in. apart in the
centre of the screen. Subjects initiated each trial by pressing "START".
This was followed by a sequence of (a) a 500 msec pause (b) a 20 msec
display of the prime, (c) a 100 msec presentation of the mask, (d) a dark
period followed to produce a prime-anagram SOA of 760 msec. If a "Yes/No"
response was not made within 760 msec, then the message "Too late: Try
again?" was dispayed in the centre of the screen. Missed trials were re-
presented at the end of the experimental trials. The anagram was displayed
until subject verbal response or 60 seconds. Finally, the message "Was there
anything other than symbols? Please reply into the microphone" was
displayed for two seconds. The subject·s reply was recorded by the
experimenter.
1!..~!..~!.. !3~§~!.tt!
"Yes" responses were classed as Report and "No" responses as No Report.
This produced 72% No Report trials and 28% Report trials. Six subjects
provided only No Report data on all trials; 14 subjects provided No Report
data on some trials; and nine subjects provided Report data for some trials.
Mean solution times, number of trials, Misses and Exclusions for Report and
No Report trials are displayed in Table 18.
i~L an!!.~!l!2£ M~m~![ 2£ !O!g[!~! !2!Y!~
The data provided by the nine subjects who provided both Report and No
Report data, used in the following analyses, is presented in Table 18.
ilL ~~m~![ !2!.y!q~ltbtO ~Q !!SQOq!1 A two way within subject ANaYA with
factors Report (Report, No Report) and Prime Type (solution, associated,
unrelated) shows no significant effects.
illL ~~m~![ !g!YIQ ~ltblO ~ !IS20g!1 A two way within subject ANOYA with
factors Report (Report, No Report) and Pri•• Type <solution, a.saciat~,
unrelated) indicates that the effect of Prime Type i. significant <E (2,16)
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= 6.61, ~ < .01). Further analysis was of Report ~nd No Report separately.
There are no significant differences for Report. For No Report subjects the
only significant difference is between the number of solution ~nd unrelated
primed anagrams solved (E (1,8) = 5.42, ~ < .05).
Table 18
IQ~ ~ff~£ief E[~m~ng~Qg B~~e[ien !ei~iteQiim~! tn ~~~@[im@ni!~
Priming Condition
Solution Associated Unrelated
8~EQ8I I81Bb§
Mean Solution Time (secs) 4.4 6.3 7.4
Number of trials 54 46 53
Misses (% Condition) 0 0 3.5
Exclusions (I. Condition) 1. 1 0.9 1.1
MQ 8~eQ8I I81ab§
Mean Solution Time (secs) 4.2 S.3 S.S
Number of tri~ls 123 121 111
Misses (% Condi tion) 7.5 10.9 10.1
Exclusions (% Condition) 1.4 1.2 1.4
------------------------------------------------------------------
i~len~!~~!~gf~~n §g!Y~!QQI!!!~~
The dat~ provided by the nine subjects who provided both Report And No
Report data was analysed in a two way within subjects ANOVA with factors
Report (Report, No Report) and Prime Type (solution, A.sociated, unrelAted).
The effect of Prime Type i. significAnt (E (2,16) = 4.81, Q < .O~). Further
analysis was of Report and No Report separately.
liL 8!2e(t:there are no significant differences.
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iiilNQ 6~QQ[!:For No Report subjects the difference between solution and
unrelated primed anagrams is not significant but is suggestive (E (1~8) =
4.53, Q = .(6). The means for the five subjects who provided No Report data
only was added to the analysis. A one way within subjects ANOVA for the 14
No Report means shows that the effect of Prime Type is significant (E (2,26)
= 3.42~ Q < .(5). Separate analyses reveal that the difference in solution
time between (a) solution and unrelated primed anagrams is significant (t
(13) = 2.32, Q < .OS), (b) solution and associated primed anagrams is
significant (! (13) = 3.63, Q < .OS).
In a further analysis the results for the five No Report only subject.
were compared with the overall means for those subjects who provided both
Report and No Report. A two way ANOVA with across subjects factor Report and
within subjects factor Prime Type shows that only the effect of Prime Type
is significant (E (2,26) = 4.94, e < .05).
~~~~~~Qi!£~!!iQn
i~l ~[!!~[!~fQ[!~![~n~!!
The introduction of a speeded manual Ves/No response raises two problems
(i) the relationship between manual and verbal responses to the same display
conditions, (ii) the relationship between post-mask and post-trial
presence-absence decisions.
For the first of these, possibly the most important factor influencing
the relationship is that the manual Ves/No decision was speeded. Subjects
had to make a decision within 760 mssc in order to complete the trial.
Response criteria are likely to b. different undar the.e condition. ca.pared
with when subjects are allowed ample time to make the ad.. d.ci.ion. Ther.
is no way to determine whether this speeded decision re.ulted in a higher
number of errors, or if there was a syst ... tic bias in th... errors. The
"Ves" response was always to the subject. dOllinant hand. It was expected
that any systematic effects would be refl.cted in til positive ("Ve.")
response bias. However, there was a higher proportion of "No" respon ... in
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this experiment than No Report under post trial report procedures
(Experiments 8 and 13). The intention was to reduce the likelihood that No
Report data was contaminated by consciously processed but unreported primes,
while keeping other experimental parameters as constant as possible. It was
hoped that the present procedure would provide an estimate of what
proportion of primes subjects would have been able to detect in Experiments
11, 12, and 13 if they had concentrated their efforts on doing so.
The second problem was the relationship between the manual post-mask and
verbal post-trial decisions of awareness. In post-trial decisions, subjects
may be unable to recall accurately whether or not they saw anything of the
prime because of the interference of the anagram solving task. This decision
may require recall from LTH. A speeded decision post-mask may be made on the
basis of the contents of 5TH. In Experiment 13 report, even of a vague
"something", was included as Report. In Experiment 14, subjects were asked
to respond "Yes" if they saw "something" other than symbols. Given this,
"Yes" responses are taken as equivalent to Report and "No" responses as
equivalent to No Report.
lQl E[~m~nq!ii!£i!
Nonconscious solution priming provided .ignific~ntly f~.ter solution
times compared with unrelated priming. A ••~ll but non .ignificAnt
nonconscious associative priming effect w~. obtained. Noncansciou. solution
priming is less in the present experiment than in ExperiMent. 11 and 13
where presentation conditions were si.il~r. In Experiment 11 nonconscious
solution priming was 2.2 seconds; in Experi.-nt 13 it was 2.9 saconds, but
in the present experiment it is only 1.3 seconds. Th. greatest difference
between the three experi_nts is in the ti_ of Rapcrt. Rttport ....
post-experimental in Experim.nt 11, post-trial in Experiment 12, and
post-prime in Experiment 13. Unrelated solution times are considerably lower
in the present experiment compared with the other two and solution priead
times are higher. It may be that effects attributable to nonconscious
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solution priming in previous experiments were due to conscious partial cues
which some subjects failed to report. Whatever the reason~ results
demonstrate that nonconscious solution priming can be obtained under
rigorous conditions for determining awareness. Nonconscious associative
priming~ although small and nonsignificant was again in the predicted
direction. The following experiment adopts dichoptic presentation in an
attempt to provide significant nonconscious associative priming in anagram
solving.
1~Z~~~~~[~m~nt!~t E[~m~ngf ~n~g[!m!gt~t~gn!~!tQQ!~Qget!£
~[~§~nt~t~gn~~Q~[~~~~[~n~!§!§ Q~t~[m~n~QQ~ eQ§t=t[!~t!HQi~~t[~eQ[t·
1~Z~!~!nt[QQH£t!Qn
Nonconscious associative priming in the lexical decision task was
significant under dichoptic presentation but not under binocular
presentation (Chapter 3). Discussion of the LOT results concluded that
binocular presentation produces a degree of peripheral masking due to
integration between prime and mask. Intact aspects of the prime
representation were sufficient to allow priming of a physically identic~l
word~ but insufficient to prime an aS5oci~ted word. Anagram solving produces
large conscious associative priming effects, ~nd significant evidence for
nonconscious associ~tive priming was expected. However the s~.e problems
have been encountered with the anagram solving t~sk as with the LOT. The
failure to achieve nonconscious associative priming under binocul~r
presentation may be due to partial periph.r~l m~sking. The following
experiment uses dichoptic present~tion to ensure central m~sking (Turvey,
1973) in an attempt to obtain nonconscious ~••oci~tiv. priming of ~n~gr~m
solutions.
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1.!.Z.!.~.!. t!~!t!QQ
(i) §~~U~~!§
Six female and six male volunteer undergraduates were paid £2 for
participation in the experiment. Their ages ranged from 19 to 47 with a mean
of 23. All subjects were tested to have 6/6 vision.
Jiil ~QQ~~~!~§: was the same as in Experiment 9. The masks and
prime-anagram lists were the same as in Experiment 11.
Hiil e~Q~~Q~~~
Subjects Were tested for acuity using a Lizar>s eyesight testcard, ~nd
for dominance using the aligning technique described in Chapter 2. Subjects
were seated at the stereoscope. Instructions were as in Experiment 11,
except that subjects were told that stimulus presentation would be to each
eye independently. Two squares were displayed on the screen (appearing as
one square to the subject), and subjects were asked if they saw a clearly
defined square. No convergence adjustments were found necessary for any of
the sUbjects. One block of 18 practice trials was followed by two blocks of
experimental trials (20 and 19 trials respectively). There w~s a two minute
pause between each block. At the beginning of each block the squares were
redisplayed to check that convergence rem~ined stable. At the end of each
trial knowledge of results was provided, ~. in Experiment 6, but abbrevi~ted
to allow for dichoptic presentation. Two addition~l trials provided a post
experimental check to ensure that each subjects could have seen the prime
word clearly if it had not been m~sked. In this procedure ~ filter w~s
inserted into the stereoscope to block stimuli presented to the dOMinant
eye. Subjects were asked to n~me the (prime) word. All subjects were ~ble to
perform this task on the first trial.
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During the resting phase two arrows were displayed in the centre of
either side of the "split" screen and remained on throughout the experiment.
Subjects initiated each trial by pressing "Start". This was followed by a
sequence of (a) a 500 msec pause, (b) a 20 msec display of the prime to the
nondominant eye, (c) a 100 msec display of the mask to the dominant eye, (d)
a 480 msec dark period, (e) simultaneous presentation of the anagram to both
eyes. Subject vocal response, or an elapsed time of 60 seconds, terminated
the trial. The solution and solution time were then presented. Finally, a
display reminded the subjects to report whether something other than the
symbols had been presented.
!Prime
!Onset
!Anagram
!Presentation
!Onset
Mask
_Do_m_._E_y_e ....tlu.\\.A..\I..,,;\L..I\u.\\..LII ~V.J.Z.J.Z.../~0Re~~onse
! < 100 )-!
!<-------------- 600 --------------)-!
!Prime
_No_n__D~om-.--E-ye----~kL/L/L/~J~----------------------V~7~/UZ~Re!;onse
!(20 )!
Subject
Initiates
Figure 14
e[!!!n1!1~9n~!g~!n£! f9[ ~~2![~m!n1!~(time in msec)
Trials were categorised as Report or No Report trials using the critaria
adopted throughout the previous .xp.riments. This produced 871. No Report
trial. and 131.Report trials. S.ven subjects did not report s•• ing a pri..
or any part of it during the experiment. The other five .ubjecta provided
both Report and No Report trials.
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Table 19
rn~~tf~stet ~~sneei~se!tt~t~m!§t~~gg~ 8~eeti!~~ §et~ttQ~itm~t~
~~e~c!.m~!2t~
Priming Condition
Solution Associated Unrelated
8§;EQ8! !8!Bb§
Mean Solution Time (secs)
Number of trials
Misses (I. Condition)
Exclusions (I. Condition)
1.7
28
3.4
0.7
~Q 8~EQ8II8!Bb§
Mean Solution Time (secs)
Number of trials
Misses (I. Condition>
Exclusions (I. Condition)
2.9
113
8.6
2.6
2.7
16
5.1
18
o
0.7
o
o
4.8
118
8.0
S.l
6.S
118
8.0
S.l
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean solution times, number of anagrams solved, Misses, and Exclusions,
for Report and No Report trials across all subjects are presented in Table
19. The data is for Report and No Report trials across all subjects. There
were fewer Misses for Report than No Report. Misses did not differ acro ••
Prime Type for No Report. There were no Exclusion. for Report trial. and
fewer Exclusions for solution than for unrelated prime. for No Report
trials.
i!L ~m~~ g! !rr!g[!!! Q!Y!9
The data for the five .ubjects Mho provided both Rwport and No Report
data is analysed first. A two May within subjtct ANOVA Mith factor. Report
(Report, No Report) and Pri_ Type (solution,a.soclatR, unt"'.latMl)tihoMS
no Significant tRain effects on the"uMber .olved Mithin e1th.,. thr... ec:ond
or 60 seconds. The interaction bet..., Report and Pri_ Type i•• ignificant
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for number solved within bO seconds (E (2,8) = 8.05, ~ < .05)and marginal
for the number solved within three seconds <E (2,8) = 4.24, ~ = .055).
The No Report trials data was added to that of the seven No Report only
subjects. A two way within subject ANOVA with factors Report (Report, No
Report) and Prime Type (solution, associated, unrelated) was performed on
the number solved within (i) bO seconds and (ii) three seconds.
1i1~~mQ![~Q!~!~~i~bin~Q !!SQn~!:There are no significant differences.
iii1~~!Q![~Q!~~ ~i~Qin~Q[!!!!SQn~!:The effect of Prime Type is
significant (E (2,22) = 4.21, ~ < .05). Further analysis indicates a
significant difference in number of anagrams solved between (a> solution and
unrelated primed anagrams (E (l,lb) = b.91, ~ < .05), and (b) associated and
unrelated primed anagrams (E (l,lb) = 5.7b, e < .05).
lQl8n!!Y~i~Qf ~!n §Q!~~ignIim!~~
The data provided by the five subjects who provided both Report and No
Report data was analysed in a two way within subjects ANOVA with factors
Report (Report, No Report) and Prime Type (solution, associated, unrelated>.
There are no significant differences. The means for the seven subjects who
provided No Report data only was added to the analysis. A one way within
subjects ANOVA for the 12 No Report trials mean. shows that Prime Type is
significant (E (2,22) = 18.13, 52 < .0001). Sttparilteanalyses reveal that the
difference in solution tiDeS between Ca) solution and unrelat.a pri.ing is
significant (~ (11) = 5.53, ~ < .001), (b) .ssociated and unrelated priming
is significant (1 (11) = 2.58, Q < .05), and (c) solution and associated
primed anagra.s is significant C~ (11) • 4.2, Q < .01).
In one further .nal ysi s the ra.ul ts for the S.VItn No Report onl y
subjects were compared with the over.ll ..an. for those subjects who
provided both Report and No Report. A two way ANOVA with across subjects
factor Report and within subjects factor Pri.. Type shows that (a) Report
solution times are signific.ntly faster (E (1,10) • 7.44, Q < .O~), and Cb)
Prime Type is significant (E (2,20) • 15.72, 9 < .001).
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1~Z~1~Q!§~~§§iQQ
(a) ~ri1~ri~!Q[ ~~~[~D~~~~
The problem of interference from the anagram solving task on report
accuracy in post- trial report procedure has been discussed with respect to
Experiments 8, 9, 13 and 14. In this e~periment 7/12 (58%) subjects gave
entirely No Report trials. This compares favourably with the 10115 (67%)
subjects who gave only No Report data in the dichoptic LDT experiment
(E>:periment 9). A subject who assisted with preliminary testing for this
experiment had also taken part in Experiment 13. She reported that the
subjective evidence for report was different under the two modes of
presentation. Under binocular presentation there was often an impression
that "something" was there. Decisions were often difficult. Under dichoptic
presentation the impression was more definite. The prime was either there or
not there. There is no further information on qualitative differences in
introspective evidence across mode of presentation as subjects were only
allowed to take part in one of the present experiments.
JQl eriming~!!~£!§
The suggestion that failure to achieve significant nonconscious
associative priming under binocular presentation may have been due to a
contribution from peripheral masking is supported by the result ••
Nonconscious solution priming is as robust as in previous experiment ••
Nonconscious associated priming is also clearly demonstrated. The
nonconscious associative priming effect is supported by both differenc .. in
mean solution times and by the number of anagrams solved within the fir.t
three seconds. It appears that mode of presentation may b. important in
obtaining these significant results.
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1~1~[i~~[!~fQ[~~~[~n~~~
Dixon's (1971) second criterion was adopted in various forms to
determine awareness in Experiments 11 to 15. A 20 msec display of the prime
followed by a 100 msec display of a mask, with binocular presentation,
produced the following pattern of results.
1. When awareness was determined by post-experimental report (Experiment
11) five of the 15 subjects gave No Report.
2. Awareness determined by post-trial report (Experiment 13) produced
681. No Report trials in the 20 msec prime duration condition. Two of the 18
subjects produced only No Report trials. Seven other subjects produced only
one Report and none of these were able to identify a prime word.
3. Awareness determined prior to anagram presentation on the basis of a
"Yes-No" response (Experiment 14), produced 72% No Report trials. Six of the
15 subjects gave only No Report trials.
The proportion of No Report data does not dramatically decrease as time
of retrospective report approaches prime presentation. Two assumptions
suggested that it WOUld. First, post experimental retrospective reporting
could produce false No Report data. False No Report would be due to subjects
inability to recall caused by the intervening interference of the anagram
solving task. Second, instructions were designed to increase the level of
attention directed towards the prime as retrospective report approached
prime presentation. It was assumed that attention to the appropriate
position in space where the prime appeared would b. active rather than
passive, and a greater proportion of subjects would be att..pting to detect
the prime. No Report under these conditions was expected to be lower. Report
accuracy should not be affected by anagram solving interference in the post-
mask procedure. In addition, subjects were actively looking for the pri ...
The similarity between post-aaak and post-experimental No Report
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distribution suggests that post-experimental No Report data was largely
unaffected by recall deficiency.
When awareness was determined by post-trial report under dichoptic
presentation (Experiment 15), 87% of the trials were No Report. Seven of the
15 subjects gave only No Report trials. Dichoptic presentation appears to
provide more effective masking than binocular presentation under the same
luminance and presentation conditions. This finding supports that of the LOT
series (Chapter 3) but conflicts with the earlier pilot studies on the SOA
technique. However it should be noted that (i) the subjects for this
experiment were not drawn from the pool of introductory psychology students,
(ii) there are wide individual differences in detection sensitivity which
are reflected by the No Report distributions.
Table 20
~Ql~~tQn~nQ ~~~Q£t!t~Q!n!g[!ffiQ[lffiln9~ii~£t~m~!!~[~Qi[Qm tQ~ ~n[~l~t!Q
£QQQitiQnin ~~e~[im!n!!!Q !Q !§~
------------------------------------------------------------------
Priming Effects (secs)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Exptl Time of I Masking Durn Solution J AssociatedNo Report (msec) Rep I NoRep Rep I NoRep
------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Not Masked 500 5.4 4.4
11 Post-Exptl Backward 20 3.5 2.2 1.0 0.8
12 Post-Exptl Forward 40 2.9 -0.6 1.5 -0.7
12 " " and 60 2.8 1.8 1.2 -0.6
12 " " Backward 80 3.5 2.6 0.8 1.5
12 .. " .. 120 4.4 5.4' 2.2 3.U
13 Post-trial Backward 20 5.2 2.9 5.0 1.0
13 " " .. 60 4.1 3.2 2.6 1.6
13 .. .. .. 80 4.2 3.3 2.4 1.2
14 Post-Mask .. 2() 3.0' 1.3 1.1 0.2
15 Post-trial Dichoptic 20 3.4 3.6 2.4 1.7
le Backward------------------------------------------------------------------
* one subject only
- (SO -
191 ~[i~!~g!££!£~§ (see Table 20)
Large consciou5 solution and associative priming effects have been
demonstrated (Experiment 10). These results support Dominowski and
Ekstrand's (1967) findings of both solution and associative priming effects,
but not those of Jablonski and Mueller (1972), who found no associative
priming effects.
The main results for the No Report data in Experiments 11 to 1~ are as
follows:
(i) Significant nonconscious solution priming is obtained under all of
the criteria used to determine awareness.
(ii) Significant nonconscious as.ociative priming was obtained only (a)
under dichoptic presentation (Experiment 15), and (b) with long prime
durations under binocular presentation (Experiment 12). However,
nonconscious associative priming !QQ!![! to be present under all of the
criteria for determining awareness.
(iii) The amount of nonconscious solution priming increases with prima
duration, becoming comparable to conscious solution priming at 120 msec
(Experiment 12).
(iv) The amount of nonconscious associative priming varies
nonsystematically with time of report. It does not become ca.parable to
conscious associative priming at any pri .. duration.
(v) As priming increases with pri .. duration (Experi ....t 12), the larga
conscious priming effects obtained in Exp.ri..nt 10 ••y be partly d.ter.in~
by the longer priM duration in that experiMnt.
(vi) Nonconscious prilftingeffects are lower in £>cp.,.itlltftt14 compared to
ExperiMnts 11 and 13. In ExperilMlnt 14, thefir.t ta.k in the two task
procedure required close attention and was considered d__ ding by IIOIY
SUbjects. The reduced priming eUttetMY be partly attributable to
interference fra. this intervllning ta.lt.
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The results overall indicate that nonconscious priming may extend to the
level of the semantic system. The conditions which demonstrate this are
restricted. The only evidence for semantic access under normal (binocular)
viewing is when masking conditions permit a relatively long prime duration
in the absence of awareness. Stronger evidence for associative priming
without awareness is provided under dichoptic presentation conditions. The
overall results are similar to those obtained in Experiments b to 10
investigating priming in the lexical decision task. They also provide
support for Marcel's (1983b) claim for a dissociation between automatic
information processing and conscious awareness. The results of Experiment 12
suggest that awareness of some aspect of a briefly presented prime word
increase priming effects to a level where they are comparable with much
longer displays of the prime presented without awareness. This indicates
that one difference between automatic and conscious attentional processing
.ay be that conscious attentional processes are able to enhance processing
of brief or degraded stiMuli, whereas automatic proces.es are more dependent
on the stimulus characteristics.
The results support the suggestion that priming affect. the second stage
of anagram solving by increaSing the availability of both the solution and
its associates in the lexicon (Schuberth et al., 1979). This increased
availability provides facilitation for memory search proce ••e. in the
subsequent matching of the output of the first-stage latter racoabination
procedure. Although letter recoMbination appears to be pri.arily a conscious
attentional process, it is possible that pri.ing influ.nce. the way in Nhich
letters are recombined, thereby providing additional facilitation. There i.
no direct evidence for this notion, but there does .... to b. a fa.t-acting
"intuitive" process in anagram solving which .ppe.,.s to bypass the letter
recombination stage. This intuitive mode of anagr .. solving could be
produced by a feed forward priming eff.ct Nhich directly influences the way
in which letters are recOllbined to for. possible solutions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
~~1~~[i~~[i~iQ[B~~[~D~§!
The criteria adopted to determine whether a person is or was unaware of
a particular stimulus continues to be • major issue in .ttempts to study
behaviour without awareness (Eriksen, 1960, 1962; Dixon, 1971; Spielberger,
1962; Mandler, 1975; Marcel, 1983.). Dixon (1971) suggests two categories of
perception without awareness (a) "subliminal perception", where the stimulus
is presented .t or below a particular threshold, and (b) "unconscious
perception", where responses are governed by stimuli of which the recipient
is unaware. Both categories are employed in the preceding experiments and
will be discussed separately.
~~!~!~§~Qi~~~n!i2~£!2!~Qn!nQ!h~£~~!~£!i§Q82~9£~Q~~~
Marcel's (1983a) critical SOA procedure establishes a detection
threshold, which prevents stimulus identification to a predetermined
criterion. A behavioural effect produced by stimuli under these conditions
"seems to constitute an example of sublimin.l perception" (Marcel, 1983.,
p.217). The underlying assumption in experiments using the critic.l SOA
procedure to determine .w.reness .ppa.rs to be th.t the threshold, once
established, is fixed (M.rcel, 1980, 1983a, M.rcel and Patterson, 1978,
Fowler et al., 1981). There .re two serious weaknesses in this a••uaption.
First, the evidence from SDT analysis (Swets, Tanner, and Birdsall, 1961,
Swets, 1964) suggests that the notion of a fixed psychophysical threshold
insufficiently describes performance. All signals contribute to a sensory
continuum which varies and upon which probablistic decisions are based. Th.
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decision that a signal is either present or absent is determined by both
sensory sensitivity and response criteria. Second, Stevens (1951) states
that "ordinarily the threshold is not invariant with time. Rather it shifts
about from moment to moment and we are forced to catch it on the fly". If
thresholds can vary over time or trials (Stevens, 1951), or either sensory
sensitivity or response criterion can change over time or trials (Swets,
1964), then it is possible that subjects can become aware of masked primes
during a series of e~perimental trials. Marcel agrees that "when stimuli are
rendered ·subli.inal·, the procedure and conditions by which a detection
threshold is determined and defined is crucial" (1983a, p.222). He argues,
however, that this crucial problem lies not in ensuring that subjects are
unaware but in ensuring that the stimulus is not peripherally masked. Marcel
implies that the pre- and post- experimental critical SOA procedure is
sufficient to ensure that subjects could not have seen a prime during the
intervening e~perieantal trials. This claim is open to several critici.m.,
(i) insufficient trials were used to ensure the accurate determination of
the detection threshold (Merikle, 1982, Diaper, Note. 1 and 2), (ii) in any
event, thresholds may vary over time (Stevens, 1951), (iii) detection
performance on the presence ~.enc. task does not n.c .... rily ..asure
awareness during the LDT (Marikl., 1981), (iv) there was no reported direct
evidence that subjects were unaw.re of the prime. during the LDT in Marcel's
(1983a) E~periment 4.
There have been .everal failures to replicate Marcel'. Experi ..nt 4
(Creighton, Note. 6 ~d 7, Evett, Note 8J Diaper, Not •• 1 ~d 2), .0De of
which ara noted by Marcal (1993&, footnote p.232). Th..e f.ilure. to
replicate .uggest that Marcel'. procedure for deter.ining the detection
threshol d i. in.uff ic iant. Where • ftIOr'. sen.' tive threshol d i. used (i)
there is no evidence of a••ociativ. pri.lng (Experi-.nt. 3 and 4, Evett,
Note B, Creighton, Note.6 And 7), (ii) exten.iv. questioning reve.l. that
subjects csn report and ld.,tify pri_ ....d. on SOIMt occa.ian. during the
experimental trial. (Experi..nt 3).
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Fowler et al.'s (1981) replication suffers the same methodological
problems. In their Experiment 5 post-experimental questioning appeared to
improve the procedure, but its sufficiency in eliciting maximum subject
report is open to question (Experiment 4). Experiment 4 demonstrated that
nonconscious associative priming effects found using a procedure similar to
Fowler et al.'s may have been due to a contribution from consciously
processed but unreported primes. It i. perhaps worth noting that in Fowler
et al.'s Experiment 5, nine out of 20 subjects produced lower post-
e>:perimental than pre-experimental cri tical SOA' 5. In the present
e>:periments, 13 out of 20 subjects produced lower post a>cpttrimental SOA'.
when 40 detection trials were used (Experiment 4), whereas this was the ca.e
for only three out of 28 subjects when 100 detection trials were u.ed
(Experiment 3). No reduction in post-experimental SOA was reported for any
of the 52 subjects tested in Marcel's experiments utili.ing the critical 80A
technique (Marcel, 1983a, Experiments 3, 4, and 5, Marcel, 1990). How Marcal
managed to obtain such an apparently .table threshold i. unclear. Finally,
YeslNo detection accuracy is not perfectly correlated with subject report.
In "Blindsight" studies the prima faci. cas. i. that report of phlll\Otlllf\al
e>cperience determines "being aware". However, Ve./No detection uy be highly
accurate in ca.es where there is no report of a phena.anal experience. Thi.
will be discussed mora fully later.
There are striking similarities betw.en current clai .. for perception
without awareness (Marcel, 1980, 1983a, FONlar et al., 1981) and previous
claim. for learning without awarene •• (Greenspoon, 1~51 Taffel, 1955). The
learning without awarene •• paradigm apparently d..an.trated that subject.
learned through "nonconsciou." social reinforc~t to produce particular
designated words or sentences. Awareness was determinad on the ba.is of •
brief series of post-conditioning que.tions. Thi. procadure frequently
produced evidence that learning could occur without the subject being
conscious of the reinforcing sti.ulus. When • .are e~tan.ive ragi .. of
questioning was used however, a higher proportion of subject. war. found to
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be aware of the reinforcing stimulus ~nd its relationship to the learning
task (Eriksen, 1960, 1962; Speilberger, 1962J Dulany, 1962). Froll the
resul ts of several e>:periments, Spei lberger (1962) concluded:
Findings suggest that when aw~reness was inferred
on the basis of responses to the BI (brief
interview), unaware subjects le~rned. But when the
El (extended interview) was employed ~s the b~sis
for inferring awareness, the evidence for conditioning
without awareness w~s found to be largely accounted
for by the 16 subjects who failed to verb~lisa
awareness in response to the BI but who did so during
the El (p, 78) •
These findings support the results of Experi.ent 4; (i) when subject.
were questioned only briefly, there w~s evidence for ~ssoci~tive priming,
(ii) more extensive questioning resulted in ~ higher number of raport
subjects, and (iii) there was no evidence for nonconscious ~••ociativ.
priming for the remaining No Report SUbjects.
So far there is no published f~ilura to replicate Marcal'. Exp.rillant 4.
Many people are still assured th~t Marcel's critical SDA proc.aur. i.
sufficient to determine l~ck of ~warene.s. The procedure appaars to provide
an elegant solution to the probleM of ex~.ining the proc ..... underlying
consciousness. Tha only published critici .. of the procedure i. by Marikle
(1982). However, there is con.iderable unpubli.hed cri tid .. of the
procedure (Creighton, Nota. 6 and 7, Evett, Not. 8, Diap.r, Not.. 1 and 2,
Forster ~nd Creighton, Note 3).
~~!~6~g[i~![i! !2r !~!r!O!!! io :Yo~2Q~igy! e![~!Q~i9Q:
The pattern masking experiments in Chapters Thr.. and Four are cont.tn.d
within Dixon'. category of "unconscious perception", __ tch doe. not
necessitate notions of thresholds. Lack of awaren •• s Is defined within
Dixon's second criterion where ~w~renes. i. determtnad by r.trospectiv.
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subject report. Two procedures were used in most of the experiments in
Chapters Three and Four to determine awareness. First, the masked priMes
were presented under conditions known to reduce detection on some or all
trials for most SUbjects. Second, subjects were carefully questioned to
determine their level of awareness of the masked primes. However, the use of
subject report as a dependent variable is beset with problems (Natsoulas,
1967; Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Lieberman, 1979, Evans, 1980a, Morris,
1981b,c; Morris and Hampson 1983). In the present exp.riments introspective
reports of either presence-absence or descriptions of perceptual .vents
within a specific area of the visual field, are r.garded as a perceptual
report. The present approach endorses Natsoulas' view that there exist. a
systematic relation of reference between phenomenal (p.rceptual) reports and
perceptual e>:perience. Marcel <1983a) however, notes; liasNi.bett and Wilson
(1977) suggest, reports, even of tachistoscopic stimuli or one's own
sensation, probably tell us more about people's beliefs about s.n.ation and
cognition than about those process •• themselve." (p.233). This .tat.ment
needs qualification; Nisbett and Wilson argue specifically that "there may
be little or no direct introspective acc••• to higb@( 2tg!~ proc ••••• "
(p.231, emphasis added). They later d.fin. higher order proc ..... a.
"cognitive processes underlying compl.x behaviours .uch a. judg-.,t,
choice, inference and problem .oving" (p.232). In ather ward., Nisb.tt and
Wilson are drawing the distinction, previou.ly ..de by Nat.oulas (1967),
between cognitive and perceptual r~ort •• Nisb.tt and Wilson·. Argueent ,.
aimed primarily at the u.e of subject r.port in social p.ychology,
particularly in those ca••• Nhere it i. uncritically ua.d a. a ba.i. far
inferring underlying proce .... in attitude .tudi ... Th.y di.cu •• aubli.inal
perception, and in particular a dichotic ahada.ing .Kp.ri.-nt by Wilson
(1975). In that expari.ant subject report ... u.ad to d.ter.in. a..renee. of
a tone presented on the unattendedchann.l. Although subject. Mer.
apparently un.....r of the ton. (adapUnl'aubjKtrepart a. criterian to
determine awarene •• ), r.sult. indicated a di.tinct f .. tltartty effect
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displayed by subsequent preferential rating of that tone compared to novel
tones. Nisbett and Wilson do not comment on or criticise the use of subject
report to determine awareness in this experiment or any other. Ericsson and
Simon (1980), on the other hand, argue that introspective response. c~n and
do provide important data on cognitive processes. They outline operational
definitions of introspections varying in prObablility of accurate report,
and discuss the impact of instructions and probe techniques within thiS
definition. Non-directed probing together with the differential measur •• of
awareness which have been used throughout the present experi.ents are
endorsed by Ericsson and Simon (1980). They suggest that.
Verbal reports, elicited with care and interpreted
with full understanding of the circum.tances under
which they were obtained, are a valuable and
thoroughly reliable source of information about
cognitive processes. It is time to abandon the
careless charge of "introspection" as a lIeans of
disparaging such data (p.247).
Several authors have noted that some of the most rel.vant cognitiv.
processes are unconscious and ther.fore inacc ••• ibl. to intro.pection
(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, Kellogg, 1980, 1982). Th. rnult. of the pr.sent
experiments provide evidence for th.ir vieMpOint, and indicate that indirect
techniques are essential to uncover such proc ......
The question of whether reportability i. equivalent to ather ... sur .. of
awareness is difficult. Salle subject. in the prnllnt critical lOA
experiments ware performing above the hOt correct criterion, often a. high
as 90% correct, even when they .t.ted that they Mer. guessing. Thi. wa. true
of both trained ob.ervers and naive SUbjects. In ather MGrds their awaren •••
as determined by their own reports differed from their awaren ..... a&Ured by
performance on the pr..ence Bsenc.,ctt.cri.inaUon task. sa.. P'tIpGrtlld
claims of "blindsight- dlNlOnstrate. st.Uar di.sociation. Fer ..... 1., on.
patient, AB, (Wei.krantz et al., 1974), was able to ditlCri.t:nat. with _av.
- ISS -
chance accuracy on several tasks even though he w~s un~ble to report
awareness of the stimuli in question. Marcel (1982) cl~im. th~t
"nonconscious" semantic priming effects have been demonstrated in a patient
with similar injury and deficit. There appe~rs to be a sharp contra5t
between measures of awareness in the critic~l SOA technique (M~rcel, 1983.),
and measures of awareness in cases of blindsight (Harcel, 1982). In the
critical SOA technique, !~Q[ g!!Q~ chance performance on a presence-absence
task is assumed to reflect "nonconscious" processing in a LDT. In blindsight
studies, !~gy!chance presence-absence perform~nce is assumed to reflect
"nonconscious" processing. Ca..pion, L~tto, and Smith (1983) have Suggested
alternate hypotheses to account for the blindsight finding •• They accept
that a principal defining criterion of such cases is that patients have a
lesion which produces a scoto ..a in which the subjects are unaware of
"seeing". One of their main cri ticis",s of blindsight attacks the criteria
for awareness used, although their criticism h~. not been entirely accepted
(Clark, 1983; Economos, 1983; H~ber, 1983, Horten, 1983; Underwood, 1983).
Campion et al. suggest that:
Acknowledgement of awareness by a subject is a
weak piece of evidence because it. v~lidity rest.
on the YniY!tlil!2assumption th~t a subject is
both able and ~l!!lngtQ (!29tt t~~y(tt!!~en hi.
experiences <p.435, .-phasis added).
It is odd that Campion et ~l. t~ke such a .trong position in vi.. of the
f~ct th~t they themselv.s us. subject introspective report in order to
define the li~its of the scota.a. While it i. h..lthy to be sceptical about
the validity of introspective data under soee circu ..tanc .. , c..pian et al.
go way beyond the available evidence in suggesting that aubject. _til
nor.ally be insensitive and dishon ..t.
The position argued in this th•• i. t. that the u.. of subject
introspecU v. report as data is nec.ssary i.,~.tancli", tbe prob!_
under 1nvesU g~ti on wi thin cog"i t1ve psychalGtJ'" A ,en.. al arg .......t.. to
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whether subject report is invalid in all cases (Campion et al., 1983), or
invalid in most cases <Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), or valid in most ca•••
(Ericsson and Simon, 1980; Kellogg, 1980, 1982), is unhelpful. The validity
and accuracy of subject introspective report, the effect of prior
instructions, the kind of information the subject is asked to report, and
the adequacy of the probe techniques, may be assessed separately for each
experimental situation.
Three measures were taken to increa.e the accuracy of .ubject report in
the present experiments. Morris (Morris, 1981c; Morris and Hampson, 1983)
has argued recently for similar measures. First, the questioning procedure
was intended to be as open and nondirective as possible. Over-specific
instructions are known to bias SUbjects interpretations of their p.rceptions
(Joynson and Newson, 1962). The primary question in the post-trial r.port
procedure asked subjects only for simple reports of awar.n •••• In the
post-experimental report procedure the primary question was a .i~le
non-directive request asking subjects to describe their visual e~perience in
their own language at their own .peed. Second, the ca.puter progra •• for
running Experiments 5 to 15 were de.igned to minim1se the degr .. of
interaction between experi ..nter and subject in order to reduce uncontrolled
social variables (Orne, 196201, Rosenthal, 1963). All progra •• contained
instructions for the experiment, knowladge of results, r.. tnders to
subjects, practice and experimental trial., and provided data collection and
analysis. The effects of verbal and nonverbal cu.. , intention.l or
unintentional, were therefore minimised. Third, report wa. required
immediately after the appropriate condition .nd before any further
intervening factors. However, ti.. of report varied aero ••• ~peri.ent. and
was confounded with mAnipulation. of ••vel of attention directed at;pri_
detection. When the effect ofa .in1 .. 1 level of attention 01,1 pri ..
detect ion WAS intended, subjEt report. .... past-xperi.ent.l •."'.., the.... ~ ,- \.' ,_. ,'.
effect of maximal level of att."ti~ on .pr,~ ,.d.tllCttqn"",.:\'~t!"ded•
•ubject report ..as po.t-mA.k. The a•.u.ptian th.t accur.cy of report
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would be impaired in the post-experiment~l report procedure compared with
the post-trial report procedure. The proportion of No Report was expected to
fall as time of report ~pproached stimulus presentation. Table 21 indic~tes
that the distribution of No Report sUbjects across time of retrospective
report is similar for both the an~gram ~nd lexical decision tasks.
Table 21
e~lm!ng!ff!£t!f~Q!~Q m!!~Q!~~~!~Qm!!k!Q~~!m!!~~nQ Q~Q~Q~t!QnQf ~Q
8!2g~t~Ql!~t! ~nQ t~!~!!~fg~ Q!ff!~!Qtm!Q!e~!!t!gQ!gf !~~i!~t
[!t~g!Q!£tt~!~!Q~t tQ tn! !!~l£!!Q!~l!tQQ~QQ !Q!g~!m!Q!~!Qgt!!k!~
Time of Report I 7. No Report I Priming Effects (msec)Subjects I Trials Identity f Associated
b!~!£!!Q!£l!!QQi!!~
PO$t-experiment~1 87 18 7
Post-tri~l
(a) Binocul~r 27 64 33 8
(b) Dichoptic 67 71 27 17
eo!Q[!! !Q!~ingt!!~
Post-.xperi.ental 67 2237 816
Post-trial
(a) Binocul~r 11 66 2858 947
(b) Dichoptic 58 87 3590 1719
Poat- ..sk, Binocular 40 72 1331 227
------------------------------------------------------------------
It is clear that for both tasks, post-tri.l qu.stioning produces a
higher proportion of Report, both by tri.ls .nd subjects, th~n po.t-
experiment.l questioning under the ..... od. of pr.s.nt~tion. Difference. in
Report distribution .cross tiDe of report may b. due to several factors; (1)
ch.nges in subjects .ttention~l str.tegie., (ii) f.ilure to provide ~ccur.te
report po.t-experiMent~11y, or (iii) v~riation in instructions may it••lf
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affect accuracy of report. With regard to the latter, Haber (1966) has
argued that report accuracy is increased with instructions to attend to
particular aspects of the stimuli. Whether this is due to perceptual
enhancement, or recoding to facilitate recall, is unclear, but higher report
accuracy would be predicted for post-trial compared to post-experimental
report.
The slight decrease in Report between post-trial (Experiments 8 and 13)
and post-mask experiments (Experiment 14) is contrary to that expected. In
the manual Yes/No task (Experiment 14) subjects were requested to respond
"Yes" if there was "something other than the symbols". The same question was
asked in the post-trial report experiments where !n~positive reply was
classed as a Report. In an experimental situation similar to thiS, Ericsson
and Simon (198(» argue that "keypunches are psychologicall y
indistinguishable from verbal response, except that they are made with the
finger instead of the IIOUth <p.216)". If the two responses are taken as
equivalent then making report po.t-mask rather than post-trial did not
increase the probability of Report. This makes it unlikely that Report was
underestimated in the post-trial case.
Dichoptic presentation appears to provide more effective masking in both
the lexical d.cision and anagram solving task •• A higher proportion of No
Report trials and subjects is obtained, co~ared with similar .timulus
conditions under binocular presentation.
A critical attitude toward. the validity of subject retrospective report
has b.en adopted. Thi. has r.sulted in efforts to incr •••• accuracy of
report, manipulations to check r.port validity, and a restrictive criterion
for inclusion in the No Report cat.gory. In the pr.sent exparieent. 165
subjects were asked to provide a si.ple report of awarenes. of pattern
masked word. under the various conditions in Experi-.nts 7 to 9 .nd 11 to
15. Of these, 77 gave No Report data only, and .cst of the others provid.d
both No Report .nd Report data. It is possible that SOMe subjects provided
either inaccurate or dishonest report, but it is considered that this would
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amount to only a few cases, if at all. It is extremely implausible that such
cases were sufficiently systematic to account for the pattern of priming
effects found across the experiments.
Comparison of priming effects and report between Experiments 13 and 15
shows increased priming with decreased probability of report. This is strong
evidence against the view that report probability and priming are both
measures of a common underlying variable such as "stimulus availability".
This point will be discussed more fully in Section 5.3.
Cheesman and Merikle (Note 16) draw a distinction between subjective and
objective definitions of awareness. They endorse the view, expressed in this
thesis, that awareness can be assessed using a subjective threshold, defined
by what the observer reports being able to discriminate. Their results show
that words presented at an objective threshold, where forced-choice
discrimination is at chance level, provide no evidence of perceptual
processing. However, they also show that words presented at a subjective
threshold, where observers ~!!im not to be able to discriminate perceptual
information, do provide evidence of perceptual processing.
~~£~!~B!2!~l~l2n!~Q!9!Ytl90Qtl!l~9
When both pri.a and target can be clearly sean, repetition and solution
pri.ing produce large pri.ing effects in both the LDT and anagra. solving
tasks. Nonconscious repetition and solution priming also provide significant
priMing on both tasks, under all experim.ntal manipulations, with one
exception (Experiaent 1). In all other experiments nonconscious repetition
and solution pri.ing effects ware both large and significant. These effects
ware present under conditions adopting (i) the critical SOA technique
(Experiment 2), (it) the least restrictive crtteria for awareness
(Expari.ant.7, 11, and 12), (iii) the aost re.trictive criteria far
awaren.ss (Expert..nt 14), And (tv) appear to increa.e with prime duration
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(Experiment 12). Most important, nonconscious repetition or solution priming
was significant under several conditions which did not provide evidence for
nonconscious associative priming. Table 21 illustrates priming effects
(relative to the unrelated condition) for both tasks under all masking
conditions.
~~£~f~ a§!Q£t~!t~~[tm!Qg
When both prime and target can be clearly seen, associative priming
produces substantial and significant facilitation on both the lexical
decision and anagram solving tasks. In contrast to the pervasiveness of
nonconscious repetition priming, nonconscious associative priming was only
significant with dichoptic presentation (Experiment 9). In anagram solving,
nonconscious associative priming was significant (i) binocularly with long
prime durations, and (ii) with dichoptic presentation (Experiments 12 and
15). In all of the other experiments .asked associated words appeared to
provide some priming effects, although this was not significant for anyone
experiment. The pattern of a.sociative priming across the twelve experiments
which use masked primes suggests that associative priming is often present,
even though it is not significant.
The results in general support Marcel's (1983a) claims that nonconscious
processing may extend to the .emantic .y.t ••• They also support other
findings of nonconscious a••ociative priming (Fowler et al., 1981, Salata,
1983) and nonconscious identity priming (Evett and Hu~hries, 1981;
Humphries et al., 1983, 1984). In addition, the re.ult. of the anagra.
experiment. demonstrate that noncon.cious priming effect. can facilitate the
retrieval of word. fro. ..mantic ..MarY in a co~lex problem .olving ta.k.
Marcel's (1980, 1983b, Marcel and Patt.rson, 1978) claim that pattern
masking interferes with proc ••••• sub.-rving con.ciou. repr.s.ntation, but
not with all ongoing information proce.sing, is partly supported by the
present result •• If Marc.l's Approach is adopted it is e.sy to suppo.e that
nonconscious processing occurs equally, without selection, and to the
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highest level of activation for all representations. The present results do
not support the view that all stimuli are processed equally to the same
level of representation. They indicate instead that nonconscious processing
is selective. The way in which this selection might occur is discussed in
the following section.
Evidence from studies of word recognition in normal subjects, and data
from neurological patients with reading deficits~ indicates that "the
lexicon" may be divided into functionally independent subunits (Allport,
1979; Allport and Funnel, 1981; Marcel and Patterson, 1978; Morton and
Patterson, 1980; Patterson, 1981; Phillips, Orchard, Doyle~ and Allen, Note
10). Visually presented words achieve lexical access and recognition
following figure-ground separation; feature analysis; letter identification
(5chvaneveldt and McDonald, 1981; Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1976; Morton,
1969); and analysis of orthographic structure (Estes, 1975, McClelland,
1979). Information flow through the processing system may be either
continuous (McClelland, 1979; McClelland and Rumelhart, (1981); Rumelhart
and McClelland~ 1982) or discrete (Forster, 1979; Morton, 1979,1980).
In Morton's recent logogen models (Morton, 1979, Morton and Patterson,
1980), the visual input 10gogen which represents each word collects evidence
for the presence of that word, receiving information from both the visual
analysis system and the cognitive system. Two thresholds for onward
transmission have to be exceeded for recognition to occur. Evidence in
excess of the first threshold results in code transmission to the cognitive
system containing semantic information. Further accumulation of evidence
exceeding the second threshold produce. trans.i ••ion of a code to the output
logogen system providing the word·s phonological code for the .ubsequent
response. Processing up to the lO9ogen unit. is in parallel but only the
maximally excited logogen at anyone ti.. is afforded conscious
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representation. The modality specific (visual, auditory) input and output
logogen systems are independent in Morton's model, where separate codes are
used for reception and production. Allport's model (Allport, 1979; Allport
and Funnell, 1981) differs on this issue; input and output logogen systems
are not functionally independent, although they are modality specific.
Reciprocal interactions in the latter model between phonological,
orthographic, and semantic (cognitive) le~icons provides a multiplicity of
processing routes.
The Phillips et al. (Note 10) approach is similar to the above models
and to Rumelhart and McClelland's (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart
and McClelland, 1982) interactive activation model, in that word recognition
involves three domains of representation, and activation between and within
these domains. The Rumelhart and McClelland model concentrates primarily on
contextual effects below word level, although no explicit attempt is made to
separate conscious and nonconscious processes. They suggest that "visual
input produces partial activation of letters, which in turn produce partial
activation of words. These activities then produce feedback to the letter
level" (p.60). This automatic reciprocal activation may explain the word
superiority effect (Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970) more parsimoniously than
the active recovery of records hypothesis put forward by Marcel (1983b). The
level of priming facilitation derived from multi-level interaction depends
on the number of active pathways initiated by the prime and their physical
and semantic relation to the output. Interrelations between the three
domains of representation allow automatic r.coding from ona representational
form to another. For example, in the Phillips et al. approach, output
phonology can be derived from graphic repre.entations at .everal levels. In
the present experiments, nonconscious rep.tition or .olution priming do••
not isolate which of the elements in this syst.m provide a locus of pri.ing.
Facilitation from priming .ay b. located at tha 1.v.ls of (i) feature
analYSis, (ii) letter description, (iii) orthographiC lexiCon, (iv) visual
whole word lexiCon, (v) phonDlogical lexiCon, (vi) .... ntic syst ... Although
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the pattern of results suggest some contribution from lexical or semantic
levels, the effects might be partly explained by (i) and (ii) above.
However, they cannot be wholly explained in this way because word frequency
effects have been demonstrated for masked repetition primes (Evett and
Humphreys, 1981; Humphreys et al. 1983), which indicates the involvement of
factors subsequent to the letter level. Furthermore, there is evidence that
nonconscious solution priming in anagram solving may be affected by word
class. In a recent experiment (Phillips et al., Note 10), nonconsciou.
anagram solution priming by concrete nouns provided significantly greater
effects than priming by function words. As word class is determined by
meaning rather than structure, these solution priming effects reflect
automatic access to some part of the semantic system. Considerable further
evidence of nonconscious access to the semantic system has been reviewed,
although different criteria were u.ed to determine lack of awareness in each
of these e>:periments (Experiments 9, 12, and 15, Fowler et al., 1981;
Marcel, 1980, 1983a; Evett and Humphreys, 1981; de Groot, 1983).
Nonconscious associative priming in E~periment. 9 and 15 in particular
provides further strong evidence of automatic access to the semantic sy.tem.
Restrictive criteria for awarene •• have been adopted in order to
determine the extent of nonconscious processes in word recognition. However,
the notion of a continuum of conscious awareness from entirely unaware to
completely aware, may be more APpropriate both to noraal viewing and in
understanding the various "noncon&cious" priming affact. discus.ad so far.
For example, in Experiment 8, undar the most re.trictive criteria for
awareness, where any report of "something" was considered as Report, there
was no evidence for nonconscious as.ociativ. priming. If, on tha othar hand,
only correct! y identified words were con.idered as Report, "nonconsciou."
associative priming was .ignificant. Inv.stigator. who adopt tha latter la••
restrictive criteria obtain a••ociative pri.ing effact. from unidentified
prime. (Evett and HuMphray., 1981. d. Groot, 1983). Th••• finding. sugge.t
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that part-cue information from words or letters may be affecting task
performance. Nonetheless, increasing priming effects in the present
experiments are not simply a reflection of increased reportability, or
"availabliity" of the prime. The general finding is thilt priming effects
increase with availability, where availability is related to changes in
prime duration, or changes in masking conditions (Marcel, 1983a; Carr et
al., 1982). However, a dissociation between reportability and priming is
indicated by report and priming differences under dichoptic and binocular
presentation conditions in the present experiments. In both the LDT and
anagram solving tasks reportability of the prime decreases between binocular
(Experiments 8 and 13) and dichoptic (Experiments 9 and 15) presentation,
while at the same time priming effects increase (see Tilble 21). Mann Whitney
tests were performed to see whether solution or associilted priming effects
were significantly greater under dichoptic presentation (Experiment 15)
compared with binocular presentation (Experiment 13), for 20 mssc prime
durations only. Subject mean solution and associated priming effects wera
treated as individual subject data. The increase in priming effect under
dichoptic presentation, with a amaller proportion of No Report subjects, i.
significant for solution priming (Y (14,12) = 45, Q < .01 (one tailed», but
not for associative priming. A Chi aquare comparison of the proportion of No
Report trials across the two experiments does not show a significant change
in reportability. It therefore a..ms that reportability can b. constant, or
even decrease, while solution priming affects on anagram solving increas ••
This militates ilgainst the possibility that "nonconscious" pri.ing effects
in the present experiments merely reflect an arbitrary report decision
criterion.
The pattern of the results across experiments, and those of Experiment 12
in particular, suggests that nonconscious priming effects in single word
recogni tion may be dependent on "strength" of activation. This strength of
activation varies with (i) the nu.oer of similar graphemic f.atures and (ii)
the semantic relationship between prime and target (cf. Evett and Hu.phreys,
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1981). Most views of nonconscious processing hold that a nonselective and
automatic spread of excitation occurs within the processing system (e.g.,
Marcel, 1983b; Posner and Snyder, 1975) Selection is seen primarily as a
function of conscious attention. The results of a series of experiments
(Evett and Humphreys, 1981; Humphreys et al., 1983, 1984) show a hierarchy
of priming effects in a word naming task where primes were masked to prevent
identification. For example they found (1) repetition and associative
priming effects, (ii) repetition priming significantly greater than
associative priming (as in Experiments 9 and 15), (iii) repetition priming
greater than graphemic priming, (iv) graphemic priming from both words and
nonwords, (v) graphemic priming increased with the number of common letters,
and (vi) graphemic priming was greater for end letter positions. However,
Forster and Davis (1984) failed to find graphemic priming effects from
masked primes in a lexical decision task. They suggest that graphemic
priming may only occur at the short prime-target SOA's tested in the
Humphreys et al. series. On the other hand, in the Humphreys et al.
experiment graphemic priming may facilitate a naming response via
grapheme-phoneme conversion rules, even though it does not significantly
affect access to the whole word lexicon in a lexical decision task (Forster
and Davis, 1984).
Interpretation of nonconscious priming effects may be aided by vi.wing
the priming process as a result of multi-pathway automatic activation. The
number of pathways which can be activated b.tween the prime representation
and the target representation will deter.ine the level of target activation.
The larger and more pervasive repetition or .olution priming effects,
compared with associative priming, May thus b. explained by the additional
structural priming pathway. which are activated for repetition and solution
priming but not for associative priming.
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The present results directly address only conscious and nonconscious
same identity and associated priming by brief single presentations of
centrally fixated words. Priming effects have been useful in demonstrating
nonconscious automatic access to meaning, but it is difficult to understand
what part nonconscious foveal priming plays in normal reading. Average
fixation duration for skilled adult readers is between 200 and 250 msec
(Bouma, 1979; Rayner, 1979), much faster than the 600 msec SOA tested in the
present experiments. Furthermore, a centrally fixated word is unlikely to be
followed by the same word in the same retinal location in normal reading. An
associated word may follow, but the likelihood that it will be correctly
predicted, or that it will follow immediately will probably be low.
Additionally, all the words were associated concrete nouns paired by free
recall, such as lion-tiger, man-woman, or arm-leg. However, free recall
scores do not necessarily reflect probability of sequential occurrence in
written language. Moreover, other words usually mediate between the paired
associates even when they do occur sequentially in reading, yet conscious
associative priming is either weakened (Davelaar and Coltheart, 1975) or
destroyed (Dannenburg and Briand, 1982) by intervening words. The reaults of
the present experiments indicate that word recognition processes may be
entirely automatic for centrally fixated words in normal reading.
Automaticity at this level allows more capacity for conscious attentional
processes involved in comprehension and meaning of the overall text.
The contribution of nonconscious foveal priming as a heuristic for word
recognition in normal reading is uncertain. When this thesis was started
there was considerable theoretical and empirical support for the view that
contextual priming facilitates reading. Recent findings, however, indicate
that contextual priming effects, either with or without awareneaa, have a
minimal impact on reading performance. First, it was held that a related
sentence context facilitated response to a final (target) word in the
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sentence (eg. Fischler and Bloom, 1980; Schuberth and Eimas, 1977; Stanovich
and West, 1979; West and Stanovich, 1978). In most experiments the target
word was also the final word in a sentence and in a cont ex t designed to
provide high predictability for its occurrence. However, when Stanovich and
West (1982) provided a more "normal" sentence conte>:t in which the target
word was less predictable and nonterminal, they found that contextual
priming effects were considerably reduced, and were minimal compared with
previous findings.
Second, preprocessing of words in the parafovea was thought to
facilitate recognition of that word when it was fixated following a
subsequent eye movement (Marcel, 1978, Rayner, McConkie and Zola, 1980).
Marcel (1978) suggested that all unattended text was simultaneously and
nonconsciously processed to a level of meaning. This claim was not supported
by Rayner (1978) who found no evidence for semantic parafoveal priming,
either facilitatory or inhibitory. However, Rayner~s results indicated that
some graphemic priming was provided by parafoveal words, particularly the
first few letters. Although initially supported (McConkie, 1979, Rayner et
al. 1980), this claim has since been dis.issed (McConkie, Zola, Blanchard,
and Wolverton, 1982).
Third, it was also held that parafoveal preprocessing was more effective
when words were presented to the right of fixation (Bradshaw, 1974;
Underwood, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981, Inhoff, 1982, Inhoff and Rayner, 1980).
Underwood has shown both interference (Underwood, 1976, 1977) and
facilitation (Underwood, 1981, Underwood, Parry, and Bull, 1978, Underwood
and Thwait.s, 1982; Underwood, Rusted, and Thwait •• , 1983) attributable to
related parafoveal pri ... on a nu.ber of ta.k •• On balance, Underwood~s
series of experiMents tend to show .are interference than facilitation
provided by parafoveal, unattended and unreported words presented
simultaneously to the right of a centrally fixated target ward. Conver.ely,
many authors have found that under .i.ilar condition. there are no ...antic
effects, either facilitatory or inhibitory, froa parafoveal unattended word.
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(Inhoff and Rayner, 1980;, Inhoff, 1982; Rayner, 1975; McConkie and Rayner,
1975; Rayner and Bertera, 1979; Rayner, McConkie and Zola, 1980; Paap and
Newsome, 1981; Stanovich and West, 1983).
Fourth, several authors (Haber and Haber, 1981ab; Haber, Haber and
Furlin, 1983; Monk and Hulme, 1983) have suggested that word shape
information indicated by supraletter feature information such as patterns of
ascending and descending features, and density of distribution, provides
semantic information which facilitates subsequent foveal recognition.
Although word shape facilitates recognition using these criteria, overall
word shape on its own does not (Paap, Newsome, and Noel, 1984).
Many findings, therefore, fail to show evidence for automatic semantic
priming effects in experiments which investigate word recognition in
situations comparable with normal reading. These findings provide difficulty
for theories of reading which require semantic preprocessing of parafoveal
or peripheral words (Hochberg, 1970; Nei ...r, 1967). McConkie (1979) and
Rayner (1979), argue that direct access to .eaning only occurs at fixation.
McConkie suggests that eye movement. to new location. in normal reading are
directed primarily by the lack of sufficient information resulting from
parafoveal analysis of that area. In Rayner's (1979) viaw, a combination of
sequential redundancy of the teHt and parafoveal identifaction of the size
of the next word determines the lOCation of the neHt fix.tion, and not
preprocessed semantic information.
The overal evidence indiCate. th.t direct .cce •• to meaning by
parafoveal words does not occur in normal reading. The que.tion re.. in. of
whether foveal word priming in the pre.ent experiment. reflect. a MOre
general facilitatory mech.ni •• for object recognition. The graphic
characteristics of letters used in mo.t of the preceding experim.nts ••y b.
described largely in terms of high spati.l frequencies. Parafove.l pri...
were u.ually pr••entad between on. degree and five degr ... fro. the fovea,
although visual angle was •• much •• eight degrees in one .tudy (Underwood,
1977). However, the proces.ing capability of the .y.t .. decre •••• with
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angular distance from the fovea (Riggs, 1965). Sensitivity to high spatial
frequencies is selectively reduced with foveal eccentricity (Campbell and
Green, 1965; Campbell and Gilchrist, 1966; Daitel and Green, 1969; Sharpe
and Tolhurst, 1973) by a factor of ten between the fovea and 16 degrees into
the periphery (Hilz and Canonius, 1974). Failure to achieve parafoveal word
priming effects may be due to the high spatial frequency cutoff which
reduces the ability for early visual analysis of letters and perhaps letter
groups. The low frequency word shape information which is available in the
parafovea and periphery does not appear to facilitate word recognition.
Several authors have found semantic priming effects for word and picture
priming, both with and without awareness (Sperber et al., 1979; McCauley et
al., 1980; Carr et al., 1982; Smith and Magee, 1980). According to Carr et
al. (1982) both word and picture primes acces. a common semantic code. In
their experiments, when primes were masked to prevent identification,
neither associated word primes nor associated picture priMes facilitated
word naming. On the other hand, picture naming was considerably facilitated
by masked associated pictures primes. Carr et al. argue that this priming
advantage is due to the confounding of physical and semantic similarity
which is common between associated picture. but not between associated
words. They interpret their overall results within a simple perceptual
effort hypothesis; the degree of Similarity between an input and its
representation can determine both the degree of auta.aticity of processing
and the amount of facilitation provided by priming.
Carr et al.'s finding that subthreshold pictures provide substantial
facilitation when subthreshold words provide nona at all, may indicate an
underlying function for priming which has produced the word rapetition and
solution priming effects. Foveal word priming may be only an unimportant
consequence of a general pattern recognition heuristic. Tha facilitation
provided by foveal identity priming in a normal object anvironment under
normal viewing conditions may provide ongoing facilitation for sa.. object
recognition on subsequent scans, and aid the pres.rvation of object
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constancy. Parafoveal processing of common objects mAy benefit from the
additional information provided by colour, depth, motion, and by low spatial
frequency analysis. Parafoveal identification of objects will be limited by
the discriminative capacity of the underlying system at that pOint. Low
spatial frequency information allows only minimal detail, but this may be
sufficient to provide a contextual reference. The facilitatory effect of
preprocessing of foveal, parAfoveal, and peripheral primes on object
recognition has yet to be determined.
In summary, the nonconscious automatic foveal priming effects on single
word recognition in the present experiments do not appeAr to be
generalisable to studies of normal reading. These fovEal priming effects
may, however, reflect a more generAl heuristic in object recognition.
Parafoveal object recognition may be (i) less dependent on high spatial
frequency analysis, and (ii) supplemented by additional processing of
colour, depth, and motion. Clearly it is important to know whAt types of
information are automatically And nonconsciously availAble for particular
classes of information as foveal eccentricity increase. The sugge.tion is
that word processing and picture proce.sing are differently affected by
masking under foveal presentation, and that differenc.s in the amount of
information available will increase with foveal angle. It would be useful to
determine relative priming effects from words, picture., and objects at
different locations and foveal eccentricity. The masking technique.
developed in the present series of experiments could be modified to
investigate nonconscious automatic pri.ing for these different CIA .... of
visual stimuli.
Marcel~s (1983A,b) experiments and theory provided much of the impetus
for the present thesis. Hi. claim for noncon.ciou. acce.s to the •••antic
system is partly supported by the present re.ults. So too i. hi. claim that
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backward pattern masking can prevent conscious perception while allowing
some underlying nonconscious processing to continue. His call for a
rejection of the Identity Assumption is thus supported. The mechanisms
underlying visual perception cannot be uncovered by relying on conscious
perceptual report alone. However the present results do not map entirely
onto Marcel's theoretical model. First~ Marcel's theory proposes that
perceptual data are processed automatically and nonconsciously to the
highest level of description available. The data is automatically
redescribed into all codes available to the processing system. The present
results indicate that nonconscious processing and redescription of words is
limited and appears to be selective. Direct (repetition or solution> primes
and associated primes do not afford the same degree of facilitation at the
same stimulus energy level. Neither do function and concrete words.
Second~ in Marcel's theory consciousness requires an active process of
matching hypotheses about the stimulus with records recovered from the
initial processing of that stimulus. Because recovery acts in the opposite
direction to the information processing flow, information reflecting the
meaning of a stimulus will be available to consciousne •• before information
describing its structure. The results of Marcel's (1983a) Experiment 1
initially provided substantial empirical support for this view, although
criticisms of his method together with failures to replicate suggest that
these results are not dependable. Dixon (1971, 1981) also holds that meaning
dominates structure, particularly in the recognition of degraded stimuli.
One example he provide. is Worthington'. (1964) experiment where rate of
dark adaption sufficient to detect a small, dimly lit screen, wa. dependent
on what was written on the .creen. The ti.. taken to detect the .creen was
longer for presentation. of socially unacceptable (taboo) words than neutral
words, even though subject. never reported seeing a word displayed.
Worthington claims that his result. d..an.trate (1) nonconsc1ou. acce.s to
the meaning of words, and (i1) that .. anlng can dc.inate structure in what
ls represented in consciousness. Unfortunately, this experimant is also
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difficult to replicate (Weintraub and Krantz, 1968; Orchard, Note 11).
Overall there appears to be little support for the claim that meaning
dominates structure in nonconscious automatic processing.
The pattern of results of the present experiments and others suggest
that consciousness of a stimulus may be more a passive result of
nonconscious automatic processing (cf. Morton, 1969; Deutsch and Deutsch,
1963; Shallice, 1972, 1978), rather than an active process of recovery
(Marcel, 1983b). The same pattern of priming effects is displayed across a
number of tasks independent of whether or not subjects are aware of the
stimuli: (i) nonconscious identity priming produces better performance than
nonconscious associative priming in word recognition (Experiment 9), (ii)
nonconscious identity priming produces better performance than nonconscious
associative priming in retrieving words from ...ory in a problem solving
task (Experiment 15), (iii) conscious priming effects show the same patterns
of facilitation.
Nonconscious processing may be seen as both passive and selective.
Selectivity is determined by structural characteristics of the visual
information processing system. Some aspect. of the •• are probably
predetermined (e.g., opitico-retinal structure), while other. m.y be learned
(e.g., word processing). Selection appears to depend on (i) vi.ual acuity
subject to optical limitations, (ii) visual acuity determined by density and
distribution of retinal receptor., (iii) non-homogeneous differences in
spatial frequency sensitivity contingent on foveal eccentricity, (iv)
activation level of logogen or aimilar units determined by prior contextual
priming. The present experiment. sugge.t th.t the level of contextual
priming will be deterMined by the number of .hared physical attributes, and
by degree of associ.tion. Con.cious awaren ••• of a word i. seen a. a pa••ive
product, automatically determined by the .o.t highly activated 10g0gen unit.
Marcel argues against this point of view and sugve.t. that activation alDne
is insufficient to produc. aw.ren •••• In hi. (1983a) Experiment S,
repetition of an associated prime increa.ed priming effect. but repetition
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did not increase probability of report. In a related experiment, Doyle (Note
12) has shown that nonconscious repetition of an identity prime increased
priming in the anagram solving task, although repetition of a nonconscious
associated prime under the same conditions did not facilitate anagram
solving. Doyle's results support the present finding that evidence for
nonconscious associative priming is difficult to achieve under conditions
which provide substantial nonconscious solution priming effects. The
additional priming effect produced by multiple repetitions in Marcel's and
Doyle's experiments support the earlier argument that facilitation may
summate across the number of operative processing routes used. Failure to
achieve a conscious percept following a number of repetitions suggest that
conscious perception of a word require. activation of a lexical unit by a
number of different routes, particularly perhaps those subserving structural
analysis. In terms of Mortons (1979) model, input of a semantic code to the
output logogen can be insufficient to produce a phonological code for
output.
One aspect of Marcel's view of consciousne.s is particularly difficult
to understand. He argue. that consciousness of a perceptual stimulus i. the
result of an active recovery and verification proces •• In discussing the
relationship of hypotheses and record. to conscious percept. he .ake.
several assumptions (Marcel, 1983b, p.247). Three of the •• are.
(g) We are unaware of the proce.s.s by which
hypotheses !~! ~nQ!!n for te.ting and
by which they are te.ted •••
(b) (Consciousness) involve. the parallel t.sting
of the subset of the activated perceptual
hypothesis ii ~h! ~h9!!nl!~!lagainst appropriate
record ••••
(a) ~ ~h22!!at what level to be con.cious.
(1983b, p.247, empha.i. added).
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The initiating process in this procedure is unclear, and the argument
appears to be circular. The latter assumption is particularly tautological.
In what way can "We", presumably "Self", be dissociated from "to be
conscious"? In what way can we directly affect our level of consciousness?
This type of misleading argument was noted earlier in reference to Atkinson
and ShiHrin's description of attention and 9TH. Clearly the concept "We" is
insufficently described to benefit any understanding of visual information
processes. Nonetheless many similar descriptions and definitions of
attention, awareness, and consciousness, invoke "the subject" as an
operative process within the information flow. To be conscious necessitates
being aware of something, even if it is only a minimal Cartesian statement.
Consciousness and awareness may be seen as synonymous in this respect. It
may be argued that attention, on the other hand, can be controlled, although
under some circu.stances attention may be demanded, as in an orienting
response. However, attention can be directed to a particular modality or
location (Duncan, 1981), and the spread or span of attention can be
modulated to include one or several operation •• In this sense attention is
an intentional act, a result of some conscious control process, and not an
initiating process itself. In other words, consciousness is given, and does
not control itself, although attention may be allocated. Marcel's circular
statement above may be improved by substituting "attention" for "conscious"
"We choose at what level to attend". In the present experiments
instructions were intended to induca subjects to adopt differant levals of
attending to the "space between the arrows". Variations in instructions, and
presumably, levels of attention directed at the appropriate space, resulted
in variations in perceptability. Although subjects were looking at the sa••
space on each manipulation, what they saw appearad to depend upon how Much
attentional effort they put into it (cf. Kahn ..an, 1973).
Three broad aspects of consciousn ..s war. revi8Wed .arlier, (i)
consciousness as a control proce.s, (ii) the capacity of consciousn ..s, and
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(iii), the relationship between conscious representations and underlying
nonconscious automatic processes.
First, consciousness as a control process. Although many authors discuss
this approach, it is often inextricably linked to capacity meaaures of
attention, and to processes of selection. According to some theories
however, conscious control processes may be separable from attention. In
Shallice's (1972) view for example, consciousness is the "selector input"
which determines which action system to put into effect, and to set the goal
for that action system. Presumably the allocation of attenton to specific
task demands is also determined by the selector input. Sperling's (1967)
approach is similar. He argues that consciousness may be equated with a
"scanner" which controls subsequent processing operations. Posner (1978), in
a view similar to Shallice's argued that conscious awareness represents a
control process which plays a specific identifiable role in the organisation
of information processing for particular task requirements. Atkinson and
Shiffrin (1974), and Marcel (1983b), imply the central importance of control
processes by invoking "the subject" as a control1ing and directing agency.
Mandler (1975) was less clear on this issue, sugge.ting that consciousness
"permits" the "choice syst_s" to act upon the contents of focal attention.
It is the control aspect of con.ciou.ne.s which appears to be related to
Dennett'. (1979) attempt to introduce a concept of consciousness "loosely
correlated with a sense of self" into cognitive psychology. Several authors
have noted the resistance within cognitive p.ychology to allow that the
concepts of ".elf" or "the subject" tIIaybe u.eful ilS descriptors of
effective processes within the inforaation proce.sing flow (Claxton, 1980,
Allport, 1980; Dennett, 1979). Nonethele.s, bath of the.e concepts have been
widely used in theories of attention (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1974), and
consciousness (eg. Marcel, 1983b, Duncan, 1980, 1981). In other theories the
same concepts are only thinly disguised by pragr ... ing .etaphor (Shallice,
1972), or loose cOlRputer analogy ilS in the CPU of Baddeley's Working HelKlry
theory. The re.istilnce to the idea that phena.enology may b. part of
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information processing is understandable in view of the legacy of the
Behaviourist tradition and the failure of earlier Introspectionist
approaches to perception and cognition. However, the continued reappearance
of phenomenological concepts in information processing theories suggests
that some account of the effect of "the person" on how that person acts and
perceives is necessary.
The second, capacity view of consciousness, related to studies of Short
Term or Working Memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1974; Mandler, 1975) appears
to confuse control and content in a way similar to that discussed above.
Atkinson and Shiffrin, for example, invoke "the subject" directly as the
controlling process in transfer of the contents of 8TM to LTM.
In the third aspect of consciousness, recent work on clarifying the
distinction between conscious and nonconscious processes indicates that
visual analysiS and discrimination can proceed automatically to a level
where the meaning of words and pictures is derived, with or without
conscious representation (Carr, et al., 1982, Marcel, 1983ab). The
relationship between conscious and nonconscious processing is also central
to the debate on "Early" vs. "Lata" theorias of selective attention. The
results of the present experiments unambiguously support "Late" theories
which posit that full identification of stimulus attributes can occur prior
to selection for attention (Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963, Duncan, 1980, 1981).
In Duncan's "Late" selection theory, stimulus characteristics such as form,
position, colour, size, and claSSification, are all noncon.ciously available
at a "first level" of repre.entation. However,
"To allow a report (or to reach consciousness),
a stimulus representaUon must ba cho ••n (....I.cUon
schedule") from those pr..ent at the first l.vel
and passed through a "lillitttdcapacity sy.talll"to
the "second level". Phenomenally, this would
correspond to directing attention to the stiMUlus.
(Duncan, 1981, p.91, (original punctuation».
- 110 -
Duncan states earlier (p.90) that it is "the person" who "directs
attention". The selection schedule "interviews" each first level
representation to determine whether it is relevant to the current task
before admitting that representation into the limited capacity system for
subsequent phenomenal representation. The way in which the selection
schedule is effected in information processing terms is left undisclosed, as
is the psychological correlate of the selection schedule. What Duncan
appears to be saying is that consciously knowing about the task requirements
automatically produces an appropriate nonconscious selection schedule in
order to produce task relevant alternatives (only) for conscious
representation. In some ways this is similar to Harcel's suggestion that
conscious decisions of choice determine the level of attention. In other
words the entirely phenomenological process of thinking appears to affect
decision processes involved in the phenomenal representation of perceptual
stimuli.
It may be possible to discuss the effect of conscious cognitive
processes involved in the perception of words in term. of priming. The
results of the present experiments indicate that noncon.ciou. priming
effects are selective. This "structural" selectivity appears to operate
automatically and provide. a nonhomogeneous matrix of facilitation within
the logogen system. In addition, the anagram experimants demonstrate that
conscious cognitive processes involved in anagram solving are affected at
some point by prior visual presentation of a word related to the .olution,
as well as the solution it.elf. Me.cry s.arch proc ..... , th.refore, .pp.ar
to be sensitive to raised activation level. within the lexical or ••mantic
systems, and benefit from the facilit.tion provided. Perhaps this
facilitatory effect is rever.ible. Con.ciou. cognitive proce .... in thinking
about a word or a category may them.elv •• noncon.ciously provide rais.d
activation in the relevant l.xical unit., providing facilitation for
subsequent conscious perceptual recognition of that particular word or
category. Reciprocal facilitatory effects from conscious cognitive proce ••••
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and nonconconscious automatic perceptual processes may provide ~ further
means of automatic selection for consciousness. Reciprocal f~cilitation
appears to offer a simpler alternative for the processes of selection than
the complexities involved in Duncan's nonconscious "selection schedules".
"Expectancy effects" for example, may be the result of raised ~ctivation
levels in lex ical or semantic units representing selected stimuli as a
direct consequence of consciously thinking about the relevant task. Morton's
recent 10gogen models, although designed to account primarily for perceptual
processes in word recognition, allow that input from the semantic system can
provide raised activation levels in logogen units. Accommodation within
Morton's logogen model requires the assumption that cognitive processes
involved in thinking are similar to processes involved in visual or auditory
perception. Levels of activation in logogen units m~y therefore be a
composite product of automatic facilitation from cognitive as well as
perceptual processes. Although this notion is highly speculative, it
attempts to confront the issue of whether conscious processes themselves
indirectly affect subsequent conscious representations. Similar ideas appear
to be implied by several theorists already discussed, although the issue is
often clouded by oblique reference.
Irrespective of whether the above notion is useful to an understanding
of the relationship between conscious and nonconscous processing, it appears
th~t a decision must be made within cognitive psychology on what to do with
the concept of the "Self" or "The Person". Clearly there are profound
philosophical and empirical problems in working out such relationships, but
as Dennett (1979) and Searle (1984) have argued, the solutions are necessary
in order for psychologists to converse adequately amongst the.selves, and
explain clearly to the lay.an what it is that we are trying to explain.
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The empirical results from the present series of lexical decision and
anagram solving tasks indicate that nonconscious priming is selective.
Nonconscious priming is not found under all conditions even when the
stimulus is centrally represented (i.e., centrally m~sked, ~s in Experiment
1). Brief or degraded stimuli may be able to produce functionally effective
activation of some representations but not others. This differential
activation produces a situation where direct (repetition or solution)
priming is effective when associative priming is not. The results of other
experiments support selectivity in priming, ~nd indic~te th~t selectivity
can also occur (i) prior to the whole word lexicon (Humphreys et al., 1983,
1984), (ii) subsequent to the whole word lexicon (Evett and Humphreys, 1981,
Phillips et al., Note 9), ~nd (iii) within the semantic system (de Groot,
1983). Current approaches to word recognition assume a number of different
p~thways between hierarchically and heter~rchically related processing
nodes. Marcel (1983b) argues that all p~thways which exist are automatically
and nonconsciously utilized in priming.
All sensory data impinging however briefly upon
receptors sensitive to them is ~nalyzed, transformed,
and redescribed, autom~tically and quite independently
of consciousness, from its source form into !~!r~
other representational form that the organism is
capable of representing, whether by nature or
acquisition (p.244, emphasis added).
The assumption appears to be that priming is ubiquitous and produces
homogeneous nonconscious activation. This vieN does not explain the present
results which cle~rly indicate heterogeneous priming effect. dependent on
prime-target rel~tionship. It is proposed that nonconscious facilitation is
a heterogeneous m~trix of activ~tion of diff.r.nt levels in different
relevant representations. Priming depends in part an the number of pathNays
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available between prime representation and target representation. The
priming effect from prime to target may be summative across the number of
pathways used. This view would predict (i) larger priming effects for direct
than associative priming, and (ii) better concrete word priming than
function word priming.
One problem with the general view that parallel nonconscious automatic
processing fully identifies the meaning of al I stimuli, as in some "Late"
theories of selective attention for example, is the procedure by which some
stimuli are "accepted" for representation in consciousness tlnd others are
"rejected". Marcel (1983b) has suggested that consciousness equoates with an
active process of recovery of records and verification of hypotheses. He
implies that nonconscious proceSises can be selective, when he says: "We are
unaware of the processes by which hypotheses are choSien for testing and by
which they are tested" (1983b, p.247). Duncan (1980, 1981) suggests that a
nonconscious "selection schedule" selects ttlsk relevtlnt stimuli for a
limited capacity channel and representation in consciousness. Both views
imply an active process of nonconscious selection for consciouSi
representation, but neither is clear tlS to how this process opertltes. It may
be possible to view consciousness as, at letlst in part, a result of passive
selective activation opertlting nonconsciously, where a threshold criterion
determines access to consciousness. This suggests the hypothesis that
conscious attentionoal processes mtly oalso influence the ptlttern of
nonconscious priming which contributes to tlctivtltion levels (in nodes such
as logogen units in word recognition, for example). Conscious representation
is thus the result of tlctivtltion in representationtll nodes which receive
input from multiple sources. This tlctivtltion level is determined ptlrtly by
priming, and partly by the results of current perceptutll processing. It is
this ptlttern of heterogeneous nonconscious tlctivtltion which provides the
btlsi. for further conscious attentional selection.
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B~l~~Q[QQ[im~§~ Q[Qt~[g~t§~ngnQn~Q[Qt~[g~t§~!~g
in s~Q~[im~nt!1~~~~ng~~
Word Primes Target Letterstrings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Repeti tion Associated Unrelated Words Nonwords
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Talk Chat Rent Talk Harg
Pain Ache Fury Pain Cham
Rage Fury Fall Rage Sare
Just Fair Drag Just Joil
Thin Slim Pile Thin Nire
Neat Tidy Stop Neat Yile
Hurt Harm Tidy Hurt Tope
Tour Trip Join Tour Faip
Wish Hope Cold Wish Rury
Drop Fall Bare Drop Sto}
Link Join Vile Link Cust
Evil Vile Ch~t Evil Kish
Rent Hire Trip Rent Vink
Cool Calm Harm Cool Kalk
Heap Pile Slim Heap Surt
Firm Hard Hope Firm Nage
Nude Bare Boat Nude Rene
Pull Drag Hire Pull Haln
Halt Stop Ache Halt Teap
Ship Boat Fair Ship Lude
------------------------------------------------------------------
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This is an experiment on Visual Perception. During the next 40
minutes you will be asked to look into the tachistoscope (T'scope), and
press a few buttons. There are three buttons marked "YES", "NO", and
"START". Please place your (right) forefinger on the "YES" button, your
left forefinger on the "NO" button, and either thumb for "START".
If you look into the viewer you will notice a dim red cross in the
centre. The cross is the fixation point, at or around which all stimuli
will be presented to you. There will be a short dark- adaptation period
before the experiment begins. Once you are settled and comfortable,
please remain looking into the viewer for the rest of the experiment.
When I say "GO", wait until you are ready and then press the "START"
button with your thumb. <Then either (a) or (b».
J!!!l~~!h {;QnQi~iQn: After you press "START", a short dark interval will
be followed by a brief presentation of a group of scrambled letter
pieces. This is commonly known as a "Mask". Another dark period is then
followed by a string of letters.
J!!!lt::!Q!!!~§!!!;QnQi~iQn: After you press "START", a brief dark interval
will be followed by a word. No response is required for thia word. The
word will be displayed long enough for you to read it, but no raspon ••
is required. Another dark period is then followed by a string of
letters.
As soon as this letterstring appeara, make a decision on whether it
is a word, or a nonword, and press the appropriate button as quickly as
possible. "YES" if its a word; "NO" if its a Nonword. That is the end
of the trial. The fixation cross will then reappear. After I say "Go",
start the next trial in your own time.
There will be plenty of practice trial. to start with so just
settle in and make yourself comfortable. If at any time you wish to ask
questions, or have comment. to make, ple.s. do so, but do not look out
from the viewer, as this will remove your dark adaptation.
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6~~~~g~Qe~!~~§~~g~Q !~~g~!§~~~Q ~g~~g~Q!~~g~!§~§~Q
i~~~e~~i~~~!.
Word Primes Target Letterstrings
Associated Unrelated Words Nonwords
Wrong Float False Ciren
Neat Tilt Tidy Pazard
Crew Noise Gang Cuthor
Hawk Sour Bird Wat
Alarm Real Siren PaIse
Danger Thief Hazard Nidy
Writer Chickens Author Mang
Cap World Hat Wird
Float Wrong Drift prue
Tilt Neat Lean Prook
Noise Crew Sound Poosters
Sour Hawk Tart Barth
Real Alarm True Srift
Thief Danger Crook Pean
Chickens Writer Roosters Kound
World Cap Earth Gart
Ship Note Boat Piver
Ocean Start Water Sirm
Boy Scent Man Thort
Soil Melt Dirt Nake
Doner Stony Giver Loat
Hard Power Firm Sater
Brief Flyer Short Gan
Cook Funny Bake Yirt
Note Ship Memo Focky
Start Ocean Begin Migor
Scent Boy Aroma Gilot
Melt Soil Thaw Pilty
Stony Donor Rocky Pemo
Power Hard Vigour Fegin
Flyer Brief Pilot Proma
Funny Cook Witty Ph a",
-----------------------------------------------------------------
- 206 -
B~1~~9[Qg[im~§~~9[Q!2[g~!§~!nQ n9n~9[Q!![g~!!~§~Q
in ~~Q~[imgn!~.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Synonym Pairs Associated Pairs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Prime Target Prime Target Nonword Targets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tin Can Army Navy Orin
Beer Ale Atom Bomb Eth
Belly Stomach Petal Flower Sem
City Town Bread Butter Broase
Pig Hog Sister Brother Slile
Jail Prison Cat Dog Glay
Sea Ocean Cork Bottle Lorpse
Thief Crook Cow Milk Bick
Pile Heap Cradle Baby Sneech
Author Writer Dock Boat Leody
Cap Hat Father Mother Drin
Road Street Hammer Nails Lor
Pail Bucket Lock Key Nolame
Snare Trap Man Woman Nug
Harvest Crop Miner Coal Oack
Spade Shovel Saucer Cup Kout
Arms Weapons Spool Thread Frink
Cape Cloak Stars Sky Suy
Grave Tomb Wagon Wheel Bope
Donkey Ass Web Spider Saver
Pub Tavern Winter Summer Balter
Hatchet Axe Table Chair Gombet
Path Track Sun Moon Lervant
Lantern Lamp Horns Bull Maf
------------------------------------------------------------------
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E~g! QO!
Hallo, (Subject Name): This is an experiment on visual perception.
ErQ!;;!g!:!r!
Once the e>:periment begins you will see two arrows in the centre of
the screen. Please concentrate on watching the space between the
arrows.
(Experiments 5 and 6: When you press "START" you will see a word
followed half a second later by a string of letters. Please watch the
sequence carefully.)
(Experiment 7: When you press "START" you will see a string of symbols
followed half a second later by a string of letters. The symbols look
like this:- £ @ & X $ £. Please watch the sequence carefully - the
symbols will warn you that the letterstring is about to appear.)
The string of letters will either form a word or a "nonword".
~Q!'l~Q!:g
A Nonword is a psychologist's oddity. It is a letterstring,
constructed like a real word, usually pronounceable, but having no
meaning, no referent. Often used in perception or psycholinguistics
experiments. Examples: LOAT, RURV, OLKE, TERVE.
e!g! I!:!!:!!
The words will all be common and familiar English nouns. Your task
is to respond as quickly as possible to the letterstring by pressing
the appropriate button - "VES" for Word; "NO" for Nonword. You should
use your (right) inde>: finger for "YES", your <left) index finger for
"NO", and either thumb for "START".
e!9! EQ!:!!:
Start each trial as soon as this ( -} (- ) is displayed. The
words will appear between the arrows. We'll have some practice trials
to begin with, 50 just settle in, relax, and make yourself
comfortable •••• Okay?
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------------------------------------------------------------------
Prime Target Prime Target Prime Target Prime Target
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dog Cat Milk Cow Tin Can Jam Jar
Stars Sky Bath Tub Arm Leg Spider Web
Monk Nun Motor Car Holly Ivy Ink Pen
Army Navy Chain Link Atom Bomb Head Hair
Cradle Baby Boy Girl Shoe Sock Sun Moon
Key Lock Ice Rink Dock Boat Golf Ball
Horns Bull Grass Lawn Barrel Beer Branch Tree
Hand Foot Bee Hive Ant Hill Knife Fork
Saw Wood Hammer Nail Hose Pipe Orange Peel
Te>:t Book Brick Wall Egg Yolk Soap Suds
Prison Cell Horse Cart Ear Lobe Toe Heel
Ewe Lamb Judge Jury Queen King Jaw Bone
Man Woman Doctor Nurse Aunt Uncle Coal Miner
Flesh Blood Iron Steel Lion Tiger Sea Water
Rat Mouse Table Chair Fruit Juice Tie Shirt
Door Hinge Bow Arrow Wagon Wheel Eye Pupil
Salt Pepper World Globe Park Bench Pebble Beach
Cup Saucer Gold Silver Bread Butter Petal Flower
Needle Thread Gun Bullet Cork Bottle Brooll Handle
Autumn Leaves Crowd People Winter Summer Diesel Engine
Film Cinema Lung Cancer Tea Coffee Mother Father
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Stone Frot
House Drin
Steam Dorch
Salt Gatin
Carrot Tince
Human Sover
Attic Nel
Ape Relune
Chalk Kout
Record Plensh
Bike Bope
Room Crid
Circus Sirm
Razor Dilk
Soap Nust
Broom Potior
Office Blon
Paper Wat
Field Nuber
Cliff Shen
Divan Clo
Circ:le Frank
Plug Bliner
Beaver Manolt
Sale Tirch
Dust Lor
Coast Bock
Pillar Lurf
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g~~§!!Q~§! ~~E~8!~~~! l~~mQ!~L
§~!h!~!;;;!l!;;;QQ!L
§8Q!:!ElGQQ!
g!:!~§!!Q~Q~~: PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DISPLAY SEQUENCE IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS
YOU CAN:
<Descripti on)
ANYTHING ELSE?
(Reply>
(a) if subject reports seeing "something", letters, or words, then say:
CAN YOU SAY WHAT THE LETTERS OR WORDS WERE?
(Replv)
(b) If subject reports nothing other than mask, then say.
THERE WAS MORE THAN YOU'VE STATED IN THE SEQUENCE. CAN YOU SUGGEST WHAT
ELSE THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN?
(Reply)
gY~§!!Q~ !~Q:THERE WAS A WORD IN ADDITION TO THE SYMBOLS, AND THERE
WERE VARIOUS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THIS WORD AND THE LETTERSTRING (or
Anagram) •
IF YOU SAW A WORD, DID YOU NOTICE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORD AND
THE lETTERSTRING (or Anagram)?
(Reply)
• • • • •
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~!gg Qng
Hallo, (Subject Name): This is an experiment on visual perception.
~!,:Q£ggk!!:g
Once the experiment begins you will see two arrows in the centre of
the screen. Please concentrate on watching the space between the
arrows. When you press "START" you will see a string of liymbols
followed half a second later by a string of letters. The liymbols look
like this:- £ ~ & i. $ £. Please watch the sequence carefully - the
symbols will warn you that the letterstring is about to appear. On some
trials you may liee something other than the symbols before the
letterstring appears. The letterstring will be either a word or a
nonword.
~!gg I~o
as in Experiments 5, 6, and 7 (see A.5.>.
E!gg In!:gg
The words will all be common and familiar English nouns. Vour task
is to respond as quickly as possible to the second letterstring by
pressing the appropriate button - "VES" for Word; "NOli for Nonword. Vou
should use your (right) index finger for "VES", your <left) index
finger for "NO", and either thumb for "START".
At the end of each trial please report: If you saw something other
than symbols report "Ves" and state what else you saw. If you saw only
symbols before the letterstring then report liNo".
E~g! EQ!:!t:
as in Experiments 5, 6, and 7 (see A.5.>.
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B~10~B§§Q£i~~~Q~Q[Q Q~i[§~~Q ~n[~!~~~Q~Q[QQ[im~§~§~Q
i~ ~~Q~[im~~~§!Q1Q !~.
~~l B§!Q£i~~~QErim~!
------------------------------------------------------------------
PRIME SOL. ANAGRAM PRIME SOL. ANAGRAM PRIME SOL. ANAGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------------
DOG CAT ATC MIl~: COW WCO TIN CAN NCA
STARS SKY KSY SPIDER WEB EWB ARM LEG EGL
ARMY NAVY VAYN HEAD HAIR IHRA ATOM BOMB MBBO
CRADLE BABY YBBA MINER COAL OCLA BOY GIRL RGLI
KEY lOCK KLCO SUN MOON OMNO DOCK BOAT ATBO
HORNS BULL LUBL GOLF BALL ALBL BARREL BEER EBRE
HAND FOOT OTFO APPLE TREE ERTE HAMMER NAIL LANI
MAN WOMAN MNOWA SEA WATER REAWT DOCTOR NURSE USREN
TABLE CHAIR IAHCR TIE SHIRT RITSH LION TIGER IGRTE
RAT MOUSE OSMEU PETAL FLOWER OWFLRE BREAD BUTTER RUTBTE
CUP SAUCER RSCEAU WAGON WHEEL EHELW CORK BOTTLE TBTOlE
SPOOL THREAD AERTDH MOTHER FATHER THRAEF ANT HILL LIlH
BROTHER SISTER TSIERS lETTUCE TOMATO OAMOTT WINTER SUMMER ESURMM
------------------------------------------------------------------
BOX
PIG
RUG
SOUP
SOIL
GERM
OVEN
THIEF
SNAKE
CROWD
TRADER
PILLOW
STREET
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E~9~Q!J~
Halla (Subject Name): This experiment is looking at how people
solve anagrams. It usually takes about 30 minutes.
an~g!:!!m
An anagram is a jumble of letters which can be made into a real
word. For example, an anagram such as "Dettnus" can be rearranged into
the word "Student". Similarly, the anagram "Occkl" can be made into the
word "Clock".
e!:g~!!g!:!!:~
Once the experiment starts you will see two arrows in the centre of
the screen. Please concentrate on watching the space between the
arrows. When you press "START" you will see a word followed half a
second later by an anagram. Please watch the sequence carefully.
e~g! EQ~!:
The anagrams will appear in the centre of the screen between two
arrows. Your task is to solve the anagram as quickly as you can and
then speak the answer into the microphone. Pleas. try not to speak
until you think you have the answer - and try not to go "Um" - "Er",
etc, on the way.
E!9!Ei:l!~
The solutions to the anagrams will all be ComMon and fa.iliar
English nouns. If you don't solve the anagram within a minute then
you'll be given a solution. You'll also be shown a solution to the
anagram after you've given your answer.
Start each trial as soon as this ( -) <- ) is displayed. We'll
have some practice trials to begin with, so just s.ttle in, relax, and
make yourself comfortable •••• Okay?
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E~g~~ Qn~ ~ng I~Q: as in Experiment 10 (A.ll).
E!:Ql;!QY!:!
Once the experiment starts you will see two arrows in the centre of
the screen. Please concentrate on watching the space between the
arrows. When you press "START" you will see a string of symbols
followed half a second later by an anagram. The symbols look like
this:- £ ~ & i. $ *. Please watch the sequence carefully - the symbols
will warn you that the anagram is about to appear.
(E>:periments 13, 14, and 15, add: On some trials you may see something
other than the symbols before the anagram appears.)
E~g! EQY!:
(Experiments 11 and 12: as in Experiment 10 (A.II».
(Experiment 14: described in text (Section 4.4.2.»
(Experiments 13 and 15, add: At the end of each trial please report by
speaking into the microphone. If you saw something other than symbols,
report "Yes" and state what else you saw. If you saw only symbols
before the anagram then report "No".>
As for Experiment 10 (A.ll).
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